

SPECIAL SENATE INVESTIGATION ON CHARGES
AND COUNTERCHARGES INVOLVING: SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ROBERT T. STEVENS, JOHN
G. ADAMS, H. STRUVE HENSEL AND SENATOR
JOE McCARTHY, ROY M. COHN, AND
FRANCIS P. CARR

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
PURSUANT TO
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MONDAY, JUNE 14, 1954

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10:07 a. m., pursuant to recess, in the caucus room of the Senate Office Building, Senator Karl E. Mundt, chairman, presiding.

Present: Senator Karl E. Mundt, Republican, South Dakota; Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen, Republican, Illinois; Senator Charles E. Potter, Republican, Michigan; Senator Henry C. Dworshak, Republican, Idaho; Senator John L. McClellan, Democrat, Arkansas; Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat, Washington; and Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat, Missouri.

Also present: Ray M. Jenkins, chief counsel; Thomas R. Prewitt, assistant counsel; Charles Maner, assistant counsel; and Ruth Y. Watt, chief clerk.

Principal participants present: Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, a United States Senator from the State of Wisconsin; Roy M. Cohn, chief counsel to the subcommittee; Joseph N. Welch, special counsel for the Army; and James D. St. Clair, special counsel for the Army.

Senator MUNDT. The committee will please come to order.

As we begin another week of hearings and one which the Chair hopes and believes may be the last week of the current hearings, I again want to welcome our guests who have come to the committee room to observe a branch of their Government in action, and to repeat the regulation which the committee adopted at the beginning of the hearing and has enforced throughout, to the effect that there are to be no audible manifestations of approval or disapproval of any kind at any time from our guests in the audience. The committee has instructed the Chair and he has instructed the uniformed members of the Capital Police force and the plainclothes men scattered through the audience that this rule is to be enforced automatically, and that they should escort from the room immediately, politely but firmly, any of our guests who, for reasons best known to themselves, elect to violate the terms under which they entered the room, namely, to refrain entirely from audible manifestations of approval or disapproval.

The Chair would like to announce he received a call from Senator McCarthy's office this morning that Senator McCarthy had returned from the West sometime during the night by plane, and that he requested that we put on Mr. Carr, because Senator McCarthy is apparently catching up on the sleep that he missed during the night.

Mr. Carr is one of our scheduled witnesses, and therefore, Mr. Jenkins, I suggest you call Mr. Carr and that he be sworn at this time, and that we begin the interrogation of Frank Carr.

Will you stand and be sworn, please? Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. CARR. I do.

Senator MUNDT. You may be seated.

Mr. JENKINS. Mr. Chairman.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Jenkins?

Mr. JENKINS. I desire at this time to announce with pleasure and pride that my assistant, Mr. Thomas Prewitt, of Memphis, Tenn., will handle the examination of Mr. Carr.

Senator MUNDT. We will be glad to welcome Mr. Prewitt back to the committee table again.

The witness has been sworn, Mr. Prewitt, and you may begin first the direct-examination, and then the cross-examination, of Mr. Carr, a member of the committee staff.

TESTIMONY OF FRANCIS P. CARR

Mr. PREWITT. State your name, please, for the record

Mr. CARR. Francis P. Carr.

Mr. PREWITT. Mr. Carr, you hold what position with this committee?

Mr. CARR. Executive director.

Mr. PREWITT. You have since what date?

Mr. CARR. July 16, 1953.

Mr. PREWITT. Mr. Carr, since you were one of the original principals in this controversy, I think it appropriate that you give us some overall idea of your qualifications, with particular reference to your educational background. I will ask you if you are a college graduate?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. I was graduated from Brown University in 1939 with a bachelor of arts degree.

Mr. PREWITT. What additional training or education have you had?

Mr. CARR. I was graduated in 1942 from the University of Pennsylvania Law School.

Mr. PREWITT. Have you ever practiced law?

Mr. CARR. No, sir, I haven't. I went immediately into the FBI following my graduation from law school.

Mr. PREWITT. You have never been admitted to the bar in any State or jurisdiction?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. When did you go to the FBI?

Mr. CARR. June 1, 1942.

Mr. PREWITT. And were you a member of the FBI continuously from 1942 until you came with the committee?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir, I was.

Mr. PREWITT. Now, Mr. Carr, state in a general sort of a way the type of work that you were engaged in while you were with the FBI, with particular reference to your experience in connection with Communists and Communist-front investigations.

Mr. CARR. All right, sir. Following my training as special agent here in Washington, D. C., and at Quantico, Va., I was transferred about the country to several field offices. When I was in Portland, Oreg., I began to work on investigation of Communists. That was in 1945.

In 1946, I spent most of the year in San Francisco. I again worked on investigations of communism. In December 1946 I was transferred to the New York field division, New York City, where I was placed on the Communist squad. The investigations that I conducted and that were conducted under me, concerned the investigation of the Communist Party itself, Communist Party members, Communist-front organizations, and individuals alleged to be members of the Communist Party.

Mr. PREWITT. Now, Mr. Carr, when did you first begin to devote a large part of your time to the work of investigating communism and Communist-front organizations?

Mr. CARR. I would say that I started the real intensive investigation when I arrived in the New York field division in 1946, December 1946.

Mr. PREWITT. Would it be fair to say that from 1946 until you came with the committee, that your work was almost exclusively that of investigation and prosecution of Communists and Communist-front organizations?

Mr. CARR. Yes, I think that would be a fair statement.

Mr. PREWITT. When you came with this committee in July of 1953, did you hold any position, any executive position with the FBI in New York?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. I was supervisor of the Security Matters Section which dealt with communism.

Mr. PREWITT. And were there other FBI agents under your control and supervision?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. A large number.

Mr. PREWITT. Approximately how many?

Mr. CARR. A large number, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. Mr. Carr, what part if any did you play in the investigation and prosecution of what we know as the first-string Communist Party leaders?

Mr. CARR. Well, in 1948, I was placed on special assignment to work with the United States attorney for the eastern district of New York—southern district of New York, excuse me, John F. X. McGoughey, to prepare for the trial of the first-string Communist leaders.

Such leaders as Eugene Dennis, Jack Stachel, Henry Winston, John Gates, the Daily Worker editor, and others. Through the entire 9 months' trial before Judge Medina, I was assigned to Judge—now Judge—McGoughey, as a technical adviser, along with another man. The 11 who went to trial were all convicted.

Mr. PREWITT. And you say that you were the chief investigator in connection with the prosecution of those 11 first-string Communist Party leaders?

Mr. CARR. No, sir, I don't think that anybody could say that I was the chief investigator or the investigator in connection with the prose-

cution of any Smith Act cases. I think perhaps the credit has to go to teamwork between the FBI and the United States attorneys, who prosecuted the case. Probably if any one person should have any credit it would be Mr. Hoover, because he first saw the danger of communism and had the FBI work investigating it.

Mr. PREWITT. Before you commenced the prosecution of these 11 first-string Communist Party leaders, is it your testimony that you were almost exclusively engaged in the investigation of Communists and Communist-front organizations? That is, subsequent to 1946?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. Now, Mr. Carr, I believe you stated that you joined the subcommittee staff on July 16, 1953?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir, I did. Before that time, I had not been in Washington. I recall some discussion during General Reber's testimony. I arrived in Washington and was appointed on July 16.

Mr. PREWITT. Will you state briefly your duties as executive director on the staff of the McCarthy committee?

Mr. CARR. Well, "executive director" is a pretty fancy title. Actually, I am the administrative head, more or less, of the investigative staff. Some people have called it chief investigator. I don't know whether that is the correct name or not.

Mr. PREWITT. When you came with the committee, tell us what was your first order of business?

Mr. CARR. Well, the first thing I did when I came with the committee was try to find out what my new job was all about. I spent a few weeks in the beginning trying to familiarize myself with subcommittee work. I tried to find out what investigations the subcommittee had had in the past, what pending work it had, and what future work it had projected. I spent a good deal of time interviewing and discussing the background with each individual investigator on the staff, and I believe that I spent some time with each individual clerical person on the staff. I also met many people here in Washington, including members of the committee; I met with liaison people here in Washington, and generally tried to familiarize myself with what was going on.

Mr. PREWITT. At the time you came with the committee, had the committee started on its preliminary investigation of Communist infiltration of the Army?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir, it had.

Mr. PREWITT. Tell us briefly just what work had been done.

Mr. CARR. I would say about a week or possibly 2 weeks after I first came with the committee, I had conferences with Mr. Cohn and with Senator McCarthy. I recall that Mr. Cohn told me that the subcommittee had done some preliminary work in connection with Communist infiltration of the Army. He said that they had some evidence that there had been infiltration of G-2, the intelligence section of the Army. He said that they had some indication that there was Communist infiltration in two of the Army's agencies in the New York City area, the Signal Corps and the Quartermaster Corps. He also told me that he had received information from one Paul Crouch that Communist infiltration in the Army was not only likely but very probable.

He told me that he—not he; I should correct myself on that. He told me that the staff had done some preliminary work in connection

with the use of Communist line or Communist authors' work in the indoctrination material which was being used by the intelligence unit of the Army. He probably told me other things. That is all I recall.

Mr. PREWITT. What written data had been assembled concerning the investigation of the Army?

Mr. CARR. Frankly, sir, there wasn't too much written data that had been assembled. The preliminary investigation of the Army, the Government Printing Office, or of any other investigation, with the sub-committee—I assume with other subcommittees—is a rather informal thing. Every investigator on the staff is at all times—certainly I hope they are at all times—trying to think of, make contacts concerning, and develop information which will lead to future investigations and future hearings.

They had at that time information which Senator McCarthy had received to the effect that at Fort Monmouth there were a large number of Communists or alleged Communists employed. They had information—they had this Crouch memorandum which is really a general outline of his estimate of what the Communists would like to do in the Army. They had done some work concerning development of informants.

Mr. PREWITT. I know it has been previously stated, but will you tell us when executive sessions on Communist infiltration of the Army commenced?

Mr. CARR. Yes. The first executive session on infiltration of the Army was held on August 31, I believe, at least August 30 or 31, in New York City. At that time, information had been developed to the point where the chairman thought that executive sessions should be held concerning the infiltration of the Quartermaster Corps in New York City—Brooklyn, I believe, more properly—and the Signal Corps Photographic Laboratories in Queens.

As a result of those hearings, 2 persons were suspended, 1 from the Signal Corps and 1 from the Quartermaster Corps.

Mr. PREWITT. Those first sessions, as I understand it, were not with relation to Fort Monmouth; is that correct?

Mr. CARR. Well, no, they were not with relation to Fort Monmouth proper. However, the Signal Corps was involved in connection with the security guard at the Signal Corps laboratories in Queens.

Mr. PREWITT. After this first session—I believe you stated August 31—did Senator McCarthy manifest publicly any determination that he would insist on calling members of the Army loyalty screening board?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir, he did. I think on about the 2d or 3d of September, Senator McCarthy publicly announced that he would have to look into the situation to determine who was responsible for allowing Communists to still be employed by the Government at this late date. I believe that there were announcements in the paper. Right. This is a Washington Times-Herald article, by Willard Edwards, on September 3, in which he quotes Senator McCarthy as saying:

"Until we find out who cleared these individuals for Army employment, despite their record of Communist activities, we will not get to the bottom of this tragic situation," McCarthy remarked.

Following that, there were at least 10 public announcements concerning the need for getting at the bottom of the situation.

Mr. PREWITT. By 10, do you mean 10 before the—

Mr. CARR. No. There were several, sir, concerning this early part of the investigation of the infiltration of the Army in the New York area. Then throughout the investigation of Fort Monmouth, there were several other statements along the same lines by the chairman.

Mr. PREWITT. Did you participate in the executive sessions concerning investigation of the Government Printing Office?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir, I did.

Mr. PREWITT. Were members of that loyalty board called before the committee?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; they were. They were called in and testified quite frankly.

Mr. PREWITT. And no objection, as I understand, was interposed?

Mr. CARR. No objection was raised at that time; no, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. It is your testimony, as I understand it, that beginning around the first part of September, Senator McCarthy manifested publicly and repeated publicly on many occasions prior to January 20 or around that time—

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. As long as I have been with the subcommittee Senator McCarthy has always impressed upon me that it is not so important—it is not only important to get rid of the individual Communists by exposure and suspension, but it is also important to find out who is responsible for leaving him in there at this late date.

Mr. PREWITT. When did you meet Mr. Stevens for the first time?

Mr. CARR. I was introduced to Mr. Stevens on September 8. At that time it was no more than an introduction. I again met him on September 21, I believe, at which time I was one of several in a discussion.

Mr. PREWITT. I will ask you when you first met Mr. John Adams.

Mr. CARR. I first met Mr. John Adams on September 28, I believe. It was following a hearing here in this room. He introduced himself to me as the man who would be the new Department counselor. Mr. Stevens had previously advised me that Mr. Adams would be taking over that job.

Mr. PREWITT. You were present, were you not, on the occasion of the meeting in Secretary Stevens' office on October 2?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; I was.

Mr. PREWITT. Mr. Cohn was also present?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. Will you state briefly, very briefly, the substance of that meeting, the conversation between either you or Mr. Cohn and Secretary Stevens?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. Cohn and I went to the Secretary's office in the Pentagon for two reasons. Mr. Cohn was interested in the General Partridge situation and also the fact that there had been a more or less a blackout order placed over the personnel at Fort Monmouth forbidding them to talk with subcommittee investigators. I was primarily interested in the latter.

We went to Mr. Stevens. While we were there I explained to him that there had been this blackout order. Mr. Cohn also took part in that. Mr. Stevens picked up the phone and called General Lawton at Fort Monmouth. He told General Lawton that he wanted this order rescinded. During the course of this conversation, of which we could hear but one half, I recall Secretary Stevens saying to General Lawton, "No, no. I didn't say that, not that."

And then he went on. As a result of the conversation, the order was rescinded. I was very pleased with that. And the investigation proceeded at Monmouth.

Also during that conversation Mr. Cohn and the Secretary discussed General Partridge. Also during that conversation the subject of Dave Schine came up. It is my recollection, although I don't want to swear strictly to this, but it is my recollection that Secretary Stevens brought the subject up by stating that Mr. Schine was not going to receive a commission in the Army, but he had arranged that he would take care of Mr. Schine for the advantage of Mr. Stevens and the Army by placing him in a series, I would say, of intelligence schools to more or less observe them and report directly to the Secretary. He said that there was a great lack in the Army of personnel who knew anything about communism, and he thought he could use Schine to his advantage in that way.

I thought in Mr. Cohn's attitude and action that it was perfectly all right with him. I took no part in this phase of the conversation.

Mr. PREWITT. As I understand it, you made no statement one way or the other with reference to Schine?

Mr. CARR. I took no part in this phase of the conversation.

Mr. PREWITT. Mr. Carr, I think at this point it would be well to state briefly the charges or specifications as contained in the document which Senator McCarthy filed on your behalf and on Mr. Cohn's behalf.

Mr. CARR. Right, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. I am sure you are familiar with it.

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. And correct me if I am wrong, when I state that in substance, Senator McCarthy, you, and Mr. Cohn have charged or specified that Mr. Stevens and Mr. Adams sought to halt your investigation of the Army, that those two gentlemen sought to hold Private Schine as a "hostage" and that Mr. Stevens and Mr. Adams sought to "blackmail" Senator McCarthy and members of his staff with threats that an unfavorable report would be issued if the loyalty board subpoenas were not called off. Now, is that in substance the specifications as contained in your document?

Mr. CARR. That is the substance of our statement; yes, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. Now, with reference to that, and I ask you for the sake of clarity to confine your testimony to those specifications or charges, I will ask you when was the first occasion on which either Mr. Stevens or Mr. Adams sought to stop your investigation of the Army which is within your knowledge.

Mr. CARR. The first occasion, to my knowledge, was a suggestion by Mr. Adams on or about October 9, in New York City, in room 1402 of the courthouse. Mr. Adams was present while we were interviewing witnesses concerning Fort Monmouth. He listened to much of the testimony, or the statements taken, and he said that the Army had most or all of this information, and that they would be able to handle the situation at Fort Monmouth themselves. He suggested that there was no need to continue beyond that week, and that there was no need for any hearings.

Mr. PREWITT. What was your reaction to that?

Mr. CARR. Well, frankly, sir, I thought it was a good try by Mr. Adams, and I didn't blame him for suggesting that. I saw nothing improper. I thought it was a good try.

Mr. PREWITT. You don't attribute anything in the way of improper motive to that conversation?

Mr. CARR. No, sir, I don't.

Mr. PREWITT. When was the next attempt, if any, on the part of either Mr. Stevens or Mr. Adams to halt your investigation?

Mr. CARR. Well, the next, to my knowledge, was on either the 13th or the 14th of October. We were lunching with Mr. Stevens at the Merchants Club in New York City, about a block or two from the courthouse where we were holding hearings on Fort Monmouth. The Secretary and Mr. Adams both, at that time, were doing what I thought was exploring and feeling out the chairman to see if they couldn't put across the idea that there should not be any continuance of the executive hearings and no future hearings. They made it very clear that they did not think that there was any necessity for future hearings, they made it clear that they had most, if not all, of the information; that if the committee would give them what information they had, the committee had, with the information they, the Army, had, they would be able to clean up the situation.

I recall that Senator McCarthy didn't buy this. Later he told me that the main reason he didn't buy it was because the Army had had this information, to his knowledge, for a long period of time, and that they had not done anything about it.

Mr. PREWITT. Would you say, then, that these feelers or exploratory measures were unsuccessful on the part of Mr. Stevens and Mr. Adams?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. Obviously, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. When was the next occasion on which either Mr. Stevens or Mr. Adams, within your personal knowledge, attempted to halt your investigation?

Mr. CARR. October 21, I believe, is the next one that I have personal knowledge of.

Mr. PREWITT. State briefly the substance of what was said or done.

Mr. CARR. On that date Mr. Adams, Mr. Cohn, and I flew to New York. We dined at Mr. Cohn's apartment, and we went to a prizefight that evening. On that date, Mr. Adams stated that he wanted the hearings on the Fort Monmouth situation ended. He thought that it would be helpful to him and to Mr. Stevens if we could drop these hearings. He suggested that there had been—again, he suggested, I might say, that there had been enough in the way of hearings, there had been enough in the way of publicity concerning the hearings, to force the Army to stop the hearings—excuse me, to force the Army to take action, and therefore we could turn it over to them.

At this time, Mr. Adams also advised us that he would then, from then on, take over some of the control of the assignment of Mr. Schine who was to go into the Army. He said that prior to that time the Schine matter, as he termed it, was being handled by Army personnel. But he now, as a representative of the Secretary, would take over that matter.

Mr. PREWITT. Do you mean he stated that he would personally take over and supervise the induction of Schine into the Army?

Mr. CARR. No, sir; I don't. I can only tell you what he said. He said that up until this time, personnel had handled the situation. But from now on he, as a representative of the Secretary of the Army, would have a say in it. I don't recall him saying that he would supervise it or anything like that.

Mr. PREWITT. What handling was necessary prior to October 21 with reference to Schine?

Mr. CARR. He didn't tell me. I had no great interest in the matter. I assume, and it is an assumption on my part, I assume that this was a reference to the fact that on October 2, Secretary Stevens had said that he was going to let Schine go into the Army, do his training, and then use him, by sending him to intelligence schools, and things like that.

I also understood that—not at that time, now, this is looking back at it—I also understand at this time that Mr. Schine and Mr. Stevens had had a conversation concerning what Mr. Stevens was going to do with Mr. Schine.

Mr. PREWITT. With relation to your charges or specifications, did anything of significance occur between October 21 and November 6 that is within your personal knowledge?

Mr. CARR. Not that I can now recall.

Mr. PREWITT. You were present on the occasion of the meeting in Secretary Stevens' office at the Pentagon on November 6; is that correct?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; I was.

Mr. PREWITT. On that occasion, what were the general subjects of conversation? I know they have been gone into very thoroughly, but I will ask you to state them.

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. It has been testified as to who was present. When Mr. Cohn and I arrived with Senator McCarthy, I recall that the Secretary asked Mr. Cohn where Mr. Schine was. Mr. Cohn said that Mr. Schine felt that since he was now a private in the Army, it would be a little unusual for him to be having lunch with the Secretary. In that regard, I know that there was a sixth place set at the table. It was an office table about this size [indicating]. There was a sixth place set there, and I assume, after that conversation, it was for Mr. Schine, since there were only five of us who did dine.

About the time we sat down at the table, the Secretary asked for a résumé of the evidence that had been developed concerning—during the course of our Fort Monmouth investigation. Mr. Cohn took the floor, I would say for several moments, and gave a résumé of all of the evidence that had been collected during the weeks of our investigation. Mr. Stevens was listening very intently.

When Mr. Cohn had finished his résumé, Mr. Stevens asked how long the public hearings could be expected to run. I might note here that Senator McCarthy on, I think, the preceding day, November 5, had made an announcement to the effect that the public hearings on Monmouth would begin on the following Thursday, I think the 12th of November. Senator McCarthy or Mr. Cohn told the Secretary that the hearings could be expected to run for approximately 6 weeks.

The Secretary was very upset about this. At least he appeared to be. He said that this was impossible; that if the hearings lasted anywhere near that length of time, that he would have to resign.

He said that he had been the Secretary of the Army for some 10 months at that time, and that the people would not understand his not having taken action sooner.

He asked if there was some way that the subcommittee could help take the pressure off of himself and the Army by holding hearings on other investigations.

I recall that there was an answer made to that question. I don't recall whether it was Mr. Cohn or Senator McCarthy, but the answer was that we were not ready to hold hearings on any other investigation; that we were ready to hold hearings on the Army.

Senator McCarthy made it very clear that there would be no whitewashing of this Army situation. He told the Secretary that he personally should not be worried. He didn't agree with the Secretary that because he had been in there 10 months he would be held responsible in the public eye. He said that nothing had been done so far in the investigation which was aimed at or had hurt the Secretary personally. He said that the Secretary had been trying to assist the subcommittee; that he himself had made public statements to that effect. He said, however, that he couldn't whitewash the situation by not having hearings.

There then followed a suggestion by the Secretary that the Defense Department proper, the Air Force and the Navy, also had security situations which would bear looking into by the subcommittee.

At that point Mr. Adams nodded and said that he would be able to furnish the subcommittee with information on that.

The Secretary seemed to affirm this. He nodded his head and acted like—in fact, he said that that might be the answer to the problem.

The next point that came up—I am not exactly sure of the order of this—but the next point that came up that I recall was a statement by Mr. Cohn that we were planning to investigate and eventually hold hearings on Communists in defense industries.

The meeting was left with an understanding that we would not stop the Fort Monmouth hearings; that we would have public hearings, but that in order to take some of the pressure off of the Army and Secretary Stevens personally, we would hold some public hearings on Communist infiltration of defense plants also.

That is about what I recall.

MR. PREWITT. Was the subject of Schine brought up during that meeting?

MR. CARR. Yes, sir; it was. During the course of the meeting, either Senator McCarthy or perhaps Mr. Cohn stated that Mr. Schine had been working on some of this work, and the Secretary then volunteered the suggestion that Mr. Schine might be made available to work weekends on committee business. He said that, if necessary, he could even work evenings on it, any time that he was not in training. This was said by the Secretary, and I assume at that point he was happy to do anything he could to keep us from having immediate hearings on the Army.

MR. PREWITT. Mr. Carr, did you make any statements with reference to Schine?

MR. CARR. No, sir, I didn't at that point.

MR. PREWITT. During that meeting?

MR. CARR. I don't recall any, no, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. You have been styled in this proceeding as the silent, strong man. Did you make any statement of any character at this luncheon meeting of November 6?

Mr. CARR. Well, sir, I might say that that is one of the more appreciative appellations that have been passed over me in the past few months. I don't object to that.

At the conference of November 6, I of course took part in the greetings. I took some minor part in the discussion when Mr. Cohn was describing the results or giving his résumé of the investigation that had been conducted.

If you will pardon me, I think I corrected him on one occasion. Generally speaking, it was pretty hard to get a word in.

Mr. PREWITT. We can all understand that problem.

Mr. CARR. It wasn't only Mr. Cohn at that point.

Mr. PREWITT. Mr. Carr, subsequent to November 6 did you have any conversation with Secretary Stevens with reference to the charges of Senator McCarthy and his staff?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. State when that was.

Mr. CARR. On November 16, I saw the Secretary of the Army. On November 16, I was going to pick up Mr. Cohn and go to the airport. We were flying to New York. He asked me or I suggested that I would pick him up at the Pentagon on my way to the airport. I had no appointment with Secretary Stevens.

Mr. PREWITT. For the purpose of clarity, this was the meeting that followed the November 13 press conference of Secretary Stevens, is that correct?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; it was.

Mr. PREWITT. That was the purpose of the meeting?

Mr. CARR. I understand it was, yes.

Mr. PREWITT. You did not go with Mr. Cohn to the Pentagon?

Mr. CARR. No, I didn't.

Mr. PREWITT. You had no appointment to see Mr. Stevens on that occasion?

Mr. CARR. No, sir; I had no appointment. And no intention of seeing him. When I arrived—I merely went to pick up Mr. Cohn to proceed to the airport. When I arrived, the Secretary's secretary, or at least the receptionist, announced that I had arrived. The Secretary was very gracious and ordered that I be ushered in. I went in. There were the usual greetings. The Secretary is very courteous. I sat down. They had apparently been discussing the November 13 press conference of Secretary Stevens. At the point when I arrived the Secretary was stating that he was very disturbed that the conference had been misinterpreted by some of the press present.

He was very disturbed that the misinterpretation could cause any anxiety or any disturbance on the part of Senator McCarthy. He said that he had not intended to say that there was no espionage at Fort Monmouth. He merely intended to say that he knew of no espionage at Fort Monmouth. He said he had not meant to affront Senator McCarthy and that he was most anxious to do whatever he could to straighten the matter out with Senator McCarthy. He said he would fly up to New York that night and have dinner with the Senator. He said he would come up and have breakfast. He said he would have lunch the next day. He was very anxious to see the Senator.

Mr. Cohn said that he would be seeing the Senator that afternoon, and I believe he said he would get in contact with him. As a result of the meeting, Mr. Stevens did come to New York the following day and met with Senator McCarthy.

Mr. PREWITT. And on the following day, November 17, you were present at the Merchants Club in New York City?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. Yes, sir, I was.

Mr. PREWITT. What, if anything, was stated by either Mr. Stevens or Mr. Adams at the Merchants Club meeting with reference to the possibility of your committee investigating the other services?

Mr. CARR. I have no personal knowledge of that conversation, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. On November 24, I will ask you if Mr. Adams made any additional suggestion to you with reference to stopping your investigation of the Army.

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. On the 17th, however, I think I might have gone ahead of myself a bit. On the 17th—

Mr. PREWITT. Do you care to make a further statement about the 17th?

Mr. CARR. While we are on the 17th, I might clear up one point if I could.

Mr. PREWITT. Very well, sir.

Mr. CARR. On the 17th, there was an arrangement made that the Senator and his staff would go to Fort Monmouth and then proceed to Boston in the Secretary's plane. I recall that when we arrived at Fort Monmouth—excuse me, Fort Dix I am talking about—I recall when we arrived—actually, it was McGuire Air Force Base adjacent to Fort Dix. When we arrived and were getting off the plane, I heard the Secretary say something to the effect that now would be a good time to get that picture with Dave. There was a general round of handshakes and introductions. Mr. Schine was there. General Ryan was there, two colonels—I believe—one was Colonel Bradley and one was Colonel Lavelle. There were some other officers, and there were some men there. There were some photographers there. After the introductions, I recall the Secretary motioned to Schine. I didn't hear him say anything, but they came and stood together against the plane. The photographers made ready to take pictures. I recall that I tried to get out of the picture. I saw it was coming, I tried to get out of the picture. I recall that General—excuse me, that Colonel Bradley was standing in the area. That is about all that happened there. I do recall that that evening when we were dining at one of the officer's quarters, Senator McCarthy told Mr. Schine in front of the two colonels, Colonel Bradley and Colonel Lavelle, that he wanted him to spend all of his free time when he was not in training working on the committee reports. That is about all of that conversation.

Mr. PREWITT. You stated the substance of the events of November 17th?

Mr. CARR. As I recall them.

Mr. PREWITT. Now, when was the next occasion on which either Mr. Adams or Secretary Stevens suggested that your hearings be concluded?

Mr. CARR. Well, the next that I know of, sir, was on the 24th of November. I had lunch with Mr. Adams and Mr. Cohn, and there

had apparently been some discussion that I was not in on. But at that point, during some point during the luncheon, Mr. Adams brought up the subject of General Lawton and his possible removal from his command at Fort Monmouth. And he was very anxious to get what he determined some good word from Senator McCarthy concerning his attitude on a removal of General Lawton from Fort Monmouth.

Mr. Adams said to Mr. Cohn that, "If you can give me some good word on the Lawton situation, maybe I can give you some good word on whether or not Schine will be available this weekend." I think, I am sure it was, the Thanksgiving weekend. I recall that Mr. Cohn was a little annoyed at this for what he termed the reason that he didn't like Mr. Adams tying up the Lawton situation with Schine's availability over the weekend. He said that the Secretary had made an arrangement whereby Private Schine would be available on non-training hours and that he didn't like Mr. Adams interjecting himself into the situation. There was a little discussion about that, nothing unpleasant, and we left.

Mr. PREWITT. Mr. Carr, was that the first occasion on which Mr. Adams brought up this question of favors to Schine in consideration of your taking steps to stop the investigation?

Mr. CARR. Yes, I think that is the first one that I know of. I think that on October 8 or 9, when we were talking about stopping the hearings, Mr. Adams may have said that the Secretary was going to do something for Schine, and that that should be some sort of an inducement to us. But the October 8 conversation on that matter is not exactly clear.

Mr. PREWITT. Now, do you want to tell this committee that Mr. Adams, commencing around November 24, used Private Schine as bait to gain his desires? Is that the substance of what you mean?

Mr. CARR. I think that Mr. Adams was aware of the fact that throughout the entire period of our association, beginning back in early October, that Mr. Schine was going to be in the Army, was in the Army, and that he had come from our subcommittee. I think he was aware of that fact. I think he was smart enough, clever enough, to keep that in the back of his mind at all times. I think he was using it wherever he could.

Mr. PREWITT. Now, have you stated the substance of the events of November 24 insofar as they relate to your charges or specifications?

Mr. CARR. As I now recall them.

Mr. PREWITT. And when I say your charges, I am, of course, referring to Senator McCarthy's charges.

Mr. CARR. Right.

Mr. PREWITT. What occurred November 25, Mr. Carr, that relates to the matters which we are now discussing?

Mr. CARR. Well, on November 25, Mr. Adams and I missed our plane connection from Newark to Washington, because of the holiday traffic, I believe, and we took a train from the Newark depot to Washington. I would like to clear up at this point one part of Mr. Adams' testimony. He implied that perhaps the entire train trip was consumed, the time of the train trip was consumed, with a conversation about Dave Schine.

I say that isn't so. I can recall several things we talked about on that train trip. We talked about General Lawton. We talked about the Fort Monmouth investigation. We talked about Mr. Adams' background. I recall him telling me about his early youth out in the West. We talked about my background. We talked about the FBI. We talked about Mr. Adams' baby, who was giving him trouble at night. We talked about my three children. We talked about a press agent who was hired by the Pentagon. We talked about several things. We did talk about Schine, also.

Mr. PREWITT. Was any suggestion made on that train trip with reference to termination of the Fort Monmouth hearings?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; there was. This, I believe—and I am subject to correction on this, but I believe I am right—this period of time, November 24 and November 25, these were the first open hearings on the Fort Monmouth situation. They were held in New York. Mr. Adams—and I don't say that there is anything wrong in his wanting to stop the hearings—Mr. Adams on the train ride suggested that since we had held numerous executive sessions on Fort Monmouth and since we had now held 1 or 2 public hearings on Fort Monmouth, it would be a good time to drop the hearings. The Army was now ready to handle and the Army would handle the situation.

That was the substance of the conversation concerning termination of the hearings.

Mr. PREWITT. Tell us how the Schine subject came up during that train ride.

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir, but I think it would relate better, it follows in sequence the conversation we had concerning General Lawton. It is entirely up to you, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. Very well. We will go on to another subject. There has been considerable testimony—

Mr. CARR. Sir, I don't mean to interrupt you. On this train ride I think it is important that I discuss some of the subjects of the train ride, since Mr. Adams has made it a point.

Mr. PREWITT. Very well, you may do that.

Mr. CARR. I would like to say that on this train ride, Mr. Adams asked me for my opinion of what Senator McCarthy's real reaction would be to the removal of General Lawton from his post at Fort Monmouth. Mr. Adams said that he thought that perhaps I would be able to give him a real insight into what the Senator would actually do.

I recall telling him that the Senator would probably take the position that he couldn't do anything about the proposed removal if it were done. However, I knew that Senator McCarthy would not sit back and not make some statement concerning this—I think the word I used was "blast"—because of the removal of a man who had throughout the investigation shown that he was anxious to help the subcommittee, and a man who had a reputation for wanting to get rid of Communists at Fort Monmouth.

Also on the train ride—I think I mentioned the fact we talked about a Pentagon press agent.

Following this conversation about General Lawton, Mr. Adams turned to Private Schine, turned the conversation to Private Schine, and the substance of his conversation on that matter was that since the Senator and Mr. Cohn were feeling the way they did about General Lawton, and the Army would undoubtedly not take any stand at that

moment on General Lawton because of Senator McCarthy's expected attitude, it might be a good thing if they could be a little nicer to him and he could be a little nicer to Private Schine.

What he meant about being a little nicer, I can only guess.

Mr. PREWITT. How did you construe it?

Mr. CARR. I thought that he was doing a little bargaining.

Mr. PREWITT. Was he offering up, shall we say—

Mr. CARR. A little tidbit.

Mr. PREWITT. A little tidbit in the form of small favors?

Mr. CARR. I frankly thought that this was an instance of dangling favors concerning Schine.

Mr. PREWITT. Have you stated the substance of your conversation with Mr. Adams on November 25?

Mr. CARR. Yes, with the exception of one thing that I overlooked, and that is concerning the conversation about General Lawton. Mr. Adams made it very clear to me that he thought and had thought for some time that General Lawton had made a big mistake. He said that General Lawton was fawning all over Senator McCarthy. He said he acted like Senator McCarthy is more important than the Army. He said that this was embarrassing to the Army, that it was embarrassing to Mr. Stevens. He said that the general had been attending the executive sessions on Fort Monmouth in New York, and that it didn't look right for the general to be traipsing in to the executive sessions behind the Senator and more or less rubberstamping everything the Senator did or said.

He said this was embarrassing to the Army, and that Lawton seemed to forget who he was working for.

Mr. PREWITT. Did you report that conversation that you have just related?

Mr. CARR. Concerning General Lawton?

Mr. PREWITT. To Senator McCarthy?

Mr. CARR. Yes; I did.

Mr. PREWITT. Now have you stated the substance of the November 25 train ride insofar as it relates to your charges?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir, I think I have.

Mr. PREWITT. Did anything of any significance occur between November 25 and December 9, concerning the matters we are talking about?

Mr. CARR. Not that I now recall.

Mr. PREWITT. Will you give me your version of the so-called map incident of December 9 as briefly as possible? I will ask you first, of course, if you were present on the occasion when it has been testified to here that Mr. Adams drew a rough map of the United States and divided it into nine sections. Were you present?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Following the hearing on that day Mr. Adams, Mr. Cohn and I walked down the corridor. Mr. Cohn and Mr. Adams were, I would say, close together. I was more to the side. I noticed that Mr. Adams had a piece of paper in his hand and that he appeared to be drawing on it. I came over to them. The paper seemed to be one of these pads, this size [indicating] and Mr. Adams—somebody had sketched a rough outline of the United States on the paper. Mr. Adams had a pencil and was separating it into rectangles. There has been testi-

mony—I believe the number was nine, but I am not sure. I know he had it broken into rectangular portions.

I asked Mr. Cohn what was going on, and he smiled and said, "John is trying to trade us some homosexuals in the Air Force for information about our next investigation."

As I recall it, I just laughed and walked on down the hall. I didn't stay with them at that point, although you might say that I was still with them. I walked a little bit ahead and to the side of them. They were engaged in other conversation.

Mr. PREWITT. You merely heard Mr. Cohn make that statement?

Mr. CARR. That is correct.

Mr. PREWITT. You heard no statement made by Mr. Adams?

Mr. CARR. I heard no statement made by Mr. Adams. Mr. Adams neither affirmed nor denied it at that time. I didn't stay long enough to know whether he did or didn't.

Mr. PREWITT. He remained silent in your presence when Mr. Cohn made the statement to you that you have just related?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; and it was a matter of a few seconds. When he told me that I moved on. I wasn't particularly interested.

Mr. PREWITT. Did you confer with Mr. Adams after this so-called map incident?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. When Mr. Cohn, Mr. Adams and I all arrived at the subcommittee offices down in room 101 in this building at the same time, for some reason, perhaps a telephone call, Mr. Cohn went ahead, and Mr. Adams and I were standing in the corridor outside of room 101. We were discussing the hearings. I think Aaron Coleman had been a witness that morning or the day before. Mr. Adams said that it would be impossible to hold public hearings with all the witnesses that we had in executive session on the secret laboratories at Fort Monmouth. He said that since we now had had in the public session the principal, shall we say, Communists at Fort Monmouth, the best subject, it would now be a good note to end the hearings on. This was the same general approach that he had used before.

I told him that I thought maybe he had better see Senator McCarthy about ending the hearings.

Then the conversation drifted to some other subject. What it was, I don't know.

Then Mr. Adams asked me quite casually how the hostage was making out at Fort Dix.

Mr. PREWITT. Mr. Carr, had he ever used that term "hostage" previous to that?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; he had. Mr. Adams uses many terms, just as all of us do, which are perhaps facetious, but he used that term. I know he uses the term "Indians" to refer to staff members. He used the term "hostage" almost from the time that Schine went into the Army. I don't know—I couldn't tell, frankly, which times he was using it in a serious vein and which times he was just kidding about it. At this point, he used the word "hostage." He asked me how the hostage was making out at Fort Dix.

I told him that I guessed he was doing all right. And then he said to me, "Well, maybe he could do a little better with some help from us." I assume he meant himself or Secretary Stevens. I said that as far as I was concerned, he was doing all right. And he said, "Well, now, let's see. Maybe he could do a little better with a little help,"

and he said, "What's there in it for us if we do something for Schine?" He didn't say, "What's there in it for Stevens and me?" He said, "What's there in it for us if we do something for Schine?" And I told him that I didn't think there would be anything in it for him if he did something for him. I recall that that afternoon I wrote a memorandum to Senator McCarthy in which I said, "Again, today, John Adams came down here after the hearings and using clever phrases tried to find out 'what's there in it for us,' if he and Stevens did something for Schine. He refers to Schine as our hostage or the hostage whenever his name comes up. I made it clear that, as far as I was concerned, I don't personally care what treatment they gave Schine, and that, as far as I was concerned, he was in the Army. I did say that I thought it wasn't fair"—

Senator MUNDT. The committee members are asking for the date of that memo.

Mr. CARR. This is the memorandum of December 9:

I did say that I thought it wasn't fair of them to take it out on Schine because we were investigating the Army, or to keep using—

him

to try to stop our investigations. I told him the only contact we were authorized to have with him about Schine was on Investigations Committee business.

There were other things in the memorandum. That is about the substance of that conversation.

Mr. PREWITT. You now affirm the statements that you just read as contained in your memorandum of December 9?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. I dictated that memorandum following our conversation.

Mr. PREWITT. Have you stated the substance of your conversation with Mr. Adams on December 9?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; as best I recall.

Mr. PREWITT. Were you present on the occasion of the luncheon at the Carroll Arms on December 10?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; I was.

Mr. PREWITT. State very briefly the conversation there. I believe Mr. Adams, Mr. Stevens, and Senator McCarthy were also present.

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. That morning the Senator asked me if I wanted to have lunch with him at the Carroll Arms. He said that the Secretary would be there and Mr. Adams. We had lunch. The Secretary and Mr. Adams and the Senator were discussing the possibility of some end to the hearings at Fort Monmouth. The Secretary and Mr. Adams brought up the argument that the Army now had all of the information they needed, and that the subcommittee had helped the Army by having some of these hearings, and that the Army now could handle the situation. They thought that the hearings should be terminated. Senator McCarthy was noncommittal about the ending of the hearings. He pointed out that he wanted to have some hearings, at least, executive hearings, with members of the loyalty boards who had allowed some of these Communists at Fort Monmouth to remain in their jobs after investigations had been conducted of them. That is about the—

Mr. PREWITT. What was the attitude of Mr. Stevens and Mr. Adams with reference to the Senator's statement about calling the loyalty board?

Mr. CARR. Well, throughout the entire period of the Fort Monmouth investigations, it began, I believe, back in October, sometime, when a man referred to here as Mr. X had appeared, John Adams had taken the position that it would not be a good thing for the loyalty board members to be called in. The Secretary seemed to affirm that position at this luncheon. I don't specifically recall what the Secretary said at that luncheon.

Mr. PREWITT. Was Schine discussed at this luncheon?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir, very briefly. There was some conversation concerning him. Somebody, I don't know who it was, brought up the fact that he was at Dix. The Secretary said that he was doing well in his training, or words to that effect, and he mentioned that basic training was an important thing and that everybody had to do it. I remember that that touched off a rather long dissertation by Senator McCarthy concerning his own basic training in the Marine Corps. That included a vivid description of crawling through mud, and I think it was good for 20 minutes.

Mr. PREWITT. Was any bait offered up on that occasion with reference to Mr. Schine?

Mr. CARR. Not that I recall. I wouldn't say, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. Did Secretary Stevens ever refer to this young man Schine as a hostage?

Mr. CARR. No, sir, not to my knowledge.

Mr. PREWITT. Mr. Carr, have you stated the substance of the conversation with December 10 in connection with your charges?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir, as best I recall.

Mr. PREWITT. Let's go to December 17, the date of the celebrated luncheon and car ride. You were present?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. I take it you were present at the hearings on the morning of December 17?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. There were hearings that morning on the Fort Monmouth investigation.

Mr. PREWITT. What was the subject of conversation during the luncheon and subsequent car ride on December 17?

Mr. CARR. When Mr. Cohn and I arrived at Gasner's restaurant which is about a block away from the courthouse in New York, Mr. Adams and the Senator were already there. There was some general conversation, and then I recall the Senator saying that John has brought up the subject of Lawton again. This touched off a conversation at some length by—I wouldn't say a conversation, it was a monologue by Mr. Cohn, at this point, on the subject of General Lawton and reprisals made against persons who had helped the subcommittee in some way.

He said that to remove General Lawton would be a disgraceful thing. He said that a man should not be punished for helping a subcommittee, and certainly Senator McCarthy should not sit by and allow a man of General Lawton's stature to be punished in any way for assisting in the investigation of the subcommittee. He brought up the fact that as a result of previous investigations of the subcommittee, several persons in the Voice of America had been conveniently dropped at the end of the investigation. He made quite a point of this. He said that the subcommittee, and no investigative agency, could last very long if it would sit back and allow persons who help it to be the

subject of reprisals. I recall that—there was some conversation about the Senator being subdued. The Senator was in agreement with Mr. Cohn, and because he was quiet, I don't think it means that he was subdued. He agreed with Mr. Cohn. He said that he felt that he could not order the Army about and tell the Army what it could do with its generals, but he fully agreed with Mr. Cohn's appraisal of the situation.

Throughout the conversation Mr. Adams did not get many words in, but Mr. Adams kept trying to interject himself by making statements which I recall, in substance, as this:

Let's talk about Schine. All right, let's talk about Schine.

Now, Mr. Cohn replied rather heatedly, "I don't want to talk about Schine. Let's talk about Lawton. We are talking about Lawton." And we did talk about Lawton.

When the luncheon had been served and eaten, we proceeded outside the building. Mr. Cohn's car was parked nearby, and he offered us a ride uptown. Mr. Adams said that he was going to Penn Station, and he would grab a cab. I recall Mr. Cohn said he would give him a lift. Adams was concerned about making a certain train. I don't know which one it was.

We went uptown and as we got to Fourth Avenue, I am not sure whether at that point it is Fourth or Park Avenue, but it is all the same in New York at various points, we got to about 34th or 33d Street and Park Avenue, and Mr. Cohn tried to make a left turn. There was an officer there who was not much influenced by Mr. Cohn.

We went through, we had to, a tunnel arrangement in the middle of the avenue, which made the next available exit something like Park Avenue and 46th or 48th Street. I am not sure of the number of the street.

As I recall it, Mr. Adams was getting a bit disturbed about the train. He thought that he might not make it.

Mr. Adams kept saying, "Let me out, let me out. I have got to make the train."

Roy said, "I will take you over. Don't worry about it."

When we got to this intersection at about 46th Street, Mr. Adams said, "I will take a cab," and at that point I think Mr. Cohn said—I don't know whether he said it, I just assume that he would say it—at any rate, we were near the curb in the first lane of traffic, as I recall, and Mr. Adams got out. Mr. Cohn said, "O. K., take a cab," and Adams left. I think he testified that he did make his train.

The Senator and I and Mr. Cohn continued uptown to the Waldorf where the Senator was staying.

The Senator was not ejected from the car, I might say.

As we got uptown, after Mr. Adams had left the car, the Senator said to Roy that the Lawton situation would work out all right. As I have since learned, both the Senator and Mr. Cohn contacted either the general or his aide that day or the next.

Mr. PREWITT. To recap the events of December 17, I will ask you if I am correct when I state that your testimony, in substance, is that the animated monolog which you spoke of, of Mr. Cohn, was precipitated by a discussion of General Lawton?

Mr. CARR. That is correct.

Mr. PREWITT. And not by any discussion of Private Schine?

Mr. CARR. That is correct. Mr. Adams tried on several occasions to swing the subject to Schine, but it never got there.

Mr. PREWITT. Was Mr. Adams the emanating factor as far as the subject of Schine was concerned?

Mr. CARR. Yes. He tried, but it didn't get to Schine.

Mr. PREWITT. The subject was almost exclusively around General Lawton?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. Is that correct?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir, and the general subject matter of reprisals against persons who had helped the committee.

Mr. PREWITT. In what manner was the subject of Schine injected into this heated conversation?

Mr. CARR. At the luncheon.

Mr. PREWITT. Yes, sir.

Mr. CARR. It didn't get injected in beyond the point of saying, "Let's talk about Schine," and that is as much as it got in.

Mr. PREWITT. Was that the extent of it?

Mr. CARR. That is. Mr. Cohn wouldn't talk about Schine. He wanted to talk about Lawton.

Mr. PREWITT. He made no references to the treatment of Schine at Dix?

Mr. CARR. No, sir, not that I recall, at all.

Mr. PREWITT. Have you stated the substance of the events of December 17?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir, as I recall them.

Mr. PREWITT. Let's go to January 14, which I believe was the occasion of Mr. Adams' visiting your office, is that correct?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir, January 14.

Mr. PREWITT. What was his purpose, if you recall, in visiting your office on January 14?

Mr. CARR. I don't know his purpose. I can tell you what happened.

Mr. PREWITT. Do so.

Mr. CARR. Mr. Adams came to the office in room 101. Mr. Cohn and I were both present. He asked if the hearings on Fort Monmouth would resume. There had been a recess of a few weeks while the staff was getting out its reports. Mr. Cohn said he was sure that the chairman would resume the hearings when we had finished with the reports. He said that there was the question of the loyalty board yet to be considered, and that he was sure the Senator would be interested in those.

Mr. Adams argued, again the same type of argument—he argued that the executive sessions had been held, we had now had several public sessions, and he didn't think there was any need to go into the loyalty board situation. Mr. Cohn did not agree with him. In fact, I didn't agree with him, either.

Mr. Adams was a little upset by this—not terrifically so, but somewhat upset by this, and said that he thought that we, meaning Mr. Cohn and myself, could have cooperated with him a little more. He said that he had been trying to work with us and that we could cooperate with him. He said that since we didn't want to cooperate with him, maybe he could try a little bit of quote cooperation end quote, himself.

He asked Mr. Cohn how Mr. Cohn would like it if Private Schine were shipped overseas. Mr. Cohn said that he wouldn't like it. He said that Schine had not even finished his basic training, and that he didn't see any reason why Adams should link this up with the subject of cooperation. He said that if, after his training, and as far as he was concerned as soon as the reports were out, they wanted to ship Schine overseas, that was perfectly all right, but he said that because he had been with the subcommittee, he should not be shipped overseas without completing his training.

That is about the substance of that conversation. I frankly thought that Mr. Adams was baiting Mr. Cohn at this time.

Mr. PREWITT. Is that the subject which you had in mind when you dictated a memorandum to Senator McCarthy dated January 15, 1954?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

That afternoon, I went upstairs to see Senator McCarthy. As I recall, I either dictated or scribbled a note to him, saying that I thought he would do well to try to talk to John Adams and see if they couldn't sort of calm him down on this subject. I thought John Adams was baiting Roy a little more than necessary at this time. That was the purpose of my memo.

Mr. PREWITT. The example which you have just stated—was that the worst baiting that you noted insofar as Mr. Adams was concerned?

Mr. CARR. Yes; I think it was about the worst attempt of baiting; yes.

Mr. PREWITT. It is your testimony that Mr. Adams' question about what would happen if Mr. Schine was sent overseas came about after a rather heated discussion concerning the production of members of the loyalty board?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; that and the termination of the hearings.

Mr. PREWITT. Mr. Carr, what occurred of any significance on January 19?

Mr. CARR. On January 19, Mr. Adams appeared before Senator McCarthy at a hearing at which loyalty board members had been requested to come. He appeared himself and said that he didn't think they should appear.

The Senator said that he had information that he wanted to question members of the loyalty board concerning several matters, including such things as fraud and misconduct, and that he felt that the board members, just as any other Government employees or citizens, had to respond to subpoenas, and then they might answer certain questions and not answer certain questions.

Mr. PREWITT. When had the Senator requested the production of members of the loyalty board?

Mr. CARR. I think that morning or the afternoon before.

Mr. PREWITT. You are speaking of January 19?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. Mr. Adams came along?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. That is correct?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. What was the Senator's reaction to the failure to produce members of the loyalty board?

Mr. CARR. It would be difficult to say. I don't know what his reaction was. I know what happened. I know that as a result of Mr. Adams' appearance and the conversation that followed, Senator McCarthy and Mr. Adams agreed that by the following Friday Mr. Adams would either produce, send over the persons requested, or he would at a certain time of the day telephone me and subpoenas would be issued. There was no argument.

Mr. PREWITT. Were subpoenas for production of members of the loyalty screening board ever actually prepared?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; subpoenas were prepared.

Mr. PREWITT. But they were never issued?

Mr. CARR. Never issued.

Mr. PREWITT. Do you know when those subpoenas were prepared?

Mr. CARR. In the day or so following this 19th meeting I had them prepared.

Mr. PREWITT. Around January 20, is that correct?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. On the 22d, Mr. Adams was to call me and I had the subpoenas ready.

Mr. PREWITT. Did you have a conversation with Senator Dirksen on January 22?

Mr. CARR. Yes, on the morning of January 22, Senator Dirksen called me and said—and asked me if I had issued subpoenas, if subpoenas had been issued, to certain members of the loyalty board. And I told him that they were ready but they were not to be issued until later that day. The Senator told me that he had had a conversation with John Adams, and that if the subpoenas were issued, Adams told him that there would be an embarrassing report issued concerning Mr. Cohn. He asked me not to issue the subpoenas until he could speak with the chairman, Senator McCarthy. I, of course, agreed with him.

Mr. PREWITT. On whose direction did you prepare the subpoenas, Mr. Carr?

Mr. CARR. The subpoenas were prepared at the direction of the chairman.

Mr. PREWITT. Prior to the preparation of these subpoenas, on or about January 20, I believe you stated, had you ever prepared any subpoenas for production of loyalty board members?

Mr. CARR. No, I don't think—I don't think so. I think one time one appeared but Mr. Adams produced him.

Mr. PREWITT. Was there any relation to the demand for production of the loyalty board members to the Schine matter, Mr. Carr?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. And is it your testimony that regardless of the treatment accorded Private Schine, your committee would have demanded production of the loyalty board members?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. Senator McCarthy had always stated that he wanted members of the loyalty board.

Mr. PREWITT. And those two subjects had absolutely no relation one to the other?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. When was the next attempt or suggestion by either Mr. Adams or Mr. Stevens concerning your termination of the investigation of the Army or your foregoing issuing subpoenas for production of the loyalty board?

Mr. CARR. Well, the following week, that is the week following January 19th and the 22d, quite by accident, I ran into Mr. Adams in the downstairs cafeteria, and we sat down and either had lunch or a cup of coffee. Mr. Adams asked me if Mr. Cohn were angry about the business of the threatened report concerning him. I told him that I was sure that he was. I told him what Mr. Cohn had told me, that he thought that John Adams had no business threatening to put out a report on him. He thought that it was a dishonest act on John's part, and that he was through with John, he would have nothing further to do with him. Mr. Adams told me that as far as he was concerned, he was very sorry about Mr. Cohn's attitude, because he said that he liked Mr. Cohn personally, and he didn't want to have any disagreements with him. He said that this putting out of the subpoenas—excuse me, this stopping of the subpoenas, was something that he just had to do. He said he would stop at nothing to prevent the loyalty board members from coming in.

There then followed some discussion about the subpoenas being stopped, and he told me that this was nothing for Roy Cohn to be angry with John Adams about. He said that the whole affair concerning the loyalty board and the stopping of the subpoenas, was not a John Adams' decision, he said it was not an Army decision. He said that this was a high administration decision. He told me that he had had a conference with Bill Rogers of the Department of Justice, and he also told me that there had been conferences with the Attorney General's office. That is about the substance of the conversation.

Mr. PREWITT. Did Mr. Adams, prior to January 27th, ever register any complaint with you concerning alleged abuse by Mr. Cohn?

Mr. CARR. Abuse?

Mr. PREWITT. Abuse or mistreatment with relation to Private Schine.

Mr. CARR. No, he hadn't.

Mr. PREWITT. Now, Mr. Carr, on March 5, 1954, did you have a luncheon engagement with Mr. Adams?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; I did.

Mr. PREWITT. What, if anything, was said by Mr. Adams on that occasion? I will ask you first to tell us where the luncheon was held and the approximate time.

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. What, if anything, was said with reference to the issuance of a report on the Schine matter?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. The luncheon was held—Well, we met for lunch at the Methodist Building across the street. Incidentally, a lot of people go there and the food is fine. Mr. Adams and I sat at one of the tables, and I recall asking Mr. Adams was there going to be some sort of a report concerning Roy Cohn. I told him that I had read in the papers or had heard discussion, talk, that several Senators had requested of the Army or the Defense Department, an alleged report concerning Roy Cohn.

Mr. Adams told me that—Mr. Adams said that, yes, that Senators had asked for a report, but he said he didn't think they were going to get it. He told me not to worry about it. He said there is nothing to it.

That was the end of that portion of the conversation. We then talked about Mr. Adams' own personal position.

Mr. PREWITT. Was anything else stated on the occasion of the luncheon of March 5 that relates to your specifications or charges?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; I think so.

Mr. PREWITT. Will you state it, please?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. Mr. Adams said that he wanted to reestablish himself on a friendly relationship with Senator McCarthy and Roy Cohn. He said that Mr. Cohn had not been friendly with him since sometime in January. He said that Senator McCarthy had let it be known that he wouldn't have anything further to do with John Adams. He said that the position of the Senator had reached the Pentagon and that it was damaging to him, the man assigned to contact with the committee, if both the chief counsel and the chairman of the committee would have nothing to do with him.

He asked me if I would help him in more or less patching up the differences as far as he was concerned. I told him that I would see what I could do.

Mr. PREWITT. Now have you stated the substance of the conversation of March 5, insofar as it relates to your charges.

Mr. CARR. Well, there was one other—I believe there is 1 other topic of conversation at that time, perhaps 2 others.

Mr. Adams told me in connection with this getting back on friendly terms with the Senator and Mr. Cohn, that he knew that Mr. Cohn and Senator McCarthy would never believe that he had had nothing to do with the incidents that followed the General Zwicker testimony. He said that the matter had been taken out of his hands entirely and that it was a high policy matter.

There was another portion of the conversation which concerned the fact that the subcommittee had, at that period of time, been calling before it individual uniformed members of the Communist Party in executive and public session.

Mr. Adams had volunteered the appearance of the Secretary of the Army before the subcommittee to explain the Army's position on policy concerning Communists and the alleged Communists before the subcommittee.

I remember there was some more or less kidding and joking back and forth between us on that point, since he had volunteered the Secretary's appearance.

Mr. Adams said that there was some—well, he asked me how many more of the uniformed Communists we would call before the subcommittee. I told him that we know of several. He said that "There are probably 200 of them in the Army that you could call before the committee."

He asked me if there was any possibility of discontinuing calling any more of these uniformed members of the party or alleged members of the party, before the subcommittee, until after Mr. Stevens had testified.

I told him that I would see what I could do about that matter.

Mr. PREWITT. Mr. Carr, before we conclude your direct examination, I will ask you if there is any additional statement that you would like to make concerning the specifications filed with the committee by Senator McCarthy on your behalf and on Mr. Cohn's behalf, as well as his own? Do you care to make any other statement?

Mr. CARR. No, sir. I think we have covered it. If there is something we have overlooked, I am sure you will bring it out.

Mr. PREWITT. Mr. Carr, turning to an examination of you more in the nature of cross-examination, I should like to ask you, in your capacity as executive director of the committee—and I believe you state as chief investigator—do you have supervision and control over the other investigators on the staff?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. I am the administrative person in charge of the investigators; yes, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. Do you give orders and suggestions to other investigators?

Mr. CARR. Yes; I do, and they also give suggestions to me.

Mr. PREWITT. Are they under your supervision and control?

Mr. CARR. Generally speaking; yes.

Mr. PREWITT. When did you first meet Mr. Schine?

Mr. CARR. I think I first met him down here in Washington after I had come with the committee, although I have a vague recollection of having been introduced to him somewhere in New York prior to that time.

Mr. PREWITT. Did you know after you came to the committee that Mr. Schine and Mr. Cohn were close personal friends?

Mr. CARR. I assumed they were friends; yes, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. I will ask you to state, Mr. Carr, in a general sort of way, the qualifications of the other investigators on your committee. In general, are they men of experience with the FBI or the Justice Department, or lawyers?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. Most of them are. Some of them have gained knowledge through having worked their way up more or less with the committee. They started out as clerks and have become investigators. Yes, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. Do you have any investigators on your staff, under your supervision and control or otherwise, who have not had prior experience in the FBI, Justice Department, or who are not lawyers?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; we do.

Mr. PREWITT. State who that is, please?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. We have two men who are in the category that I have explained who started out with the committee as staff assistants, and who have been assisting in investigations and now conduct investigations themselves.

Mr. PREWITT. You mean they have had long practical experience as members of the staff of the subcommittee?

Mr. CARR. Yes and no. They have had experience with the staff of the subcommittee.

Mr. PREWITT. Mr. Carr, I would rather get an exact answer—

Mr. CARR. All right.

Mr. PREWITT. On that question, if we can.

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. One has had what I would consider long experience, and the other has had what I would consider somewhat less experience.

Mr. PREWITT. What do you mean by "somewhat less experience"?

Mr. CARR. I think experience of about a year prior to his doing investigative work.

Mr. PREWITT. With reference to Mr. Schine and his qualifications and his investigative experience, I will ask you if you assigned any investigative tasks to Mr. Schine after you became executive director?

Mr. CARR. No, sir; I didn't.

Mr. PREWITT. Did Mr. Schine undertake any investigative tasks after you became executive director?

Mr. CARR. Well, sir, I had better explain it this way: When I came with the subcommittee, Mr. Schine was already a consultant with the committee. Mr. Schine was doing this part time. He was in New York. When he was in Washington, he had some office space over in the old building, the HOLC building, I believe it is, and I had space here. He was not often in Washington after I came with the committee.

Most of Mr. Schine's work, thoughts, suggestions were channeled to me and coordinated with me through Mr. Cohn.

Mr. PREWITT. As I understand your testimony, then, Mr. Schine was a part-time consultant?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. He spent only a small portion of his time in his capacity as consultant with this committee; is that correct?

Mr. CARR. No, sir. When I say parttime, I mean that he didn't devote his full time to that. He also was running a business. He did spend a good deal of time with the committee on committee work.

Mr. PREWITT. After you came with the committee July 16 of last year, and until November 3, 1953, did Mr. Schine spend the greater portion of his time in New York running his business, or did he spend the greater portion of his time in work on the committee? I take it you are familiar with what all of the employees of the committee do.

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; I am familiar with the employees of the committee and the work that they do. As I have explained, however, Mr. Schine was a consultant for the committee. He did committee work in New York City; he did some down here. As I say, after I came with the committee, most of his time was spent in New York.

Mr. PREWITT. Approximately how much time would you say Mr. Schine spent in Washington during that period, that is, July 16 until November 3?

Mr. CARR. I would say he spent a fair portion of his time. It would be hard for me to say how many days. I did see him here. We had hearings in Washington in August and September. Later in the fall he was here on other occasions.

He was not here every day, as most all the other investigators were.

Mr. PREWITT. In a general sort of way, what service did Mr. Schine render to the committee during the period that you have just indicated?

Mr. CARR. Since I came to the committee?

Mr. PREWITT. Yes, and prior to November 3.

Mr. CARR. Right. Mr. Schine as a consultant was working on the development of information which would be of assistance to the committee. He had done a good deal of work prior to the time I came with the committee on the Voice of America. He maintained his contacts with that investigation. He had more or less projected a plan for continued investigation of the Voice of America, some phases of the Voice of America. He contacted confidential informants to

assist in the development of the Government Printing Office case. As a matter of fact, it was from knowledge that he learned through the Voice of America case that we first got onto the fact that there were Communists employed at the Government Printing Office.

He had an informant who was of great assistance in connection with the Fort Monmouth investigation. He had another contact who furnished information concerning the General Electric Co. in upper-State New York, which is the area of his home.

Mr. PEWITT. Mr. Carr, who supervised the work of Private Schine or Mr. Schine?

Mr. CARR. Well, sir, I don't know that it was supervised in any strict sense as you might say that of the other investigators was. The work of the subcommittee is an informal work until we get around to having hearings. It is preparation for hearings. As I say, Mr. Schine's activity and his work was reported and coordinated with me through Mr. Cohn.

Mr. PREWITT. Through Mr. Cohn, did you say?

Mr. CARR. That is right.

Mr. PREWITT. Was Mr. Schine responsible to you for the work which he did?

Mr. CARR. No, sir; I wouldn't say so. I always felt that Mr. Schine was responsible to the Senator. He was a consultant, Mr. Cohn was the chief counsel, and I was the staff director. I felt that we were all responsible to the Senator, and that we should as best we could coordinate our work.

Mr. PREWITT. Mr. Carr, there has been introduced in evidence a monitored call of November 7 between Senator McCarthy and Secretary Stevens, in which the Senator stated in substance, I believe, that on the subject of Schine Mr. Cohn was completely unreasonable. Mr. Carr, do you subscribe to that statement of the Senator's?

Mr. CARR. As far as I am concerned, no, he was never unreasonable with me.

Mr. PREWITT. Unreasonable to any degree?

Mr. CARR. No, sir; not as far as I am concerned.

Mr. PREWITT. It is your testimony that Mr. Cohn was not unreasonable on the subject of Schine?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. You stated at length here the efforts or baiting tactics on the part of Mr. Adams, holding up small favors or tidbits in order to gain a termination of your investigation. You recall your testimony in that regard?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. Now, what effect would it have on Mr. Cohn, this baiting that Mr. Adams used? I will address myself particularly to the instance of January 14.

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. Mr. Cohn—the effect it had on Mr. Cohn was that it annoyed him. Mr. Cohn felt very strongly that, since, he was responsible in some measure for bringing Mr. Schine with the subcommittee, that Mr. Schine should not be discriminated against by the Army; he should not be used by the Army. An example of what Mr. Cohn apparently had in mind was the fact that Mr. Adams brought up this business of shipping him overseas before he had finished his—actually finished his, training. Another example I might

think of is this publicized statement by a general in the Army that he would give a hundred dollars to anyone who would poke Schine in the nose. That type of thing. Mr. Cohn felt that Schine should not be discriminated against because he had worked with the committee.

Mr. PREWITT. Was this a sensitive subject with Mr. Cohn?

Mr. CARR. What do you mean "sensitive"?

Mr. PREWITT. On the question of Schine, when Mr. Adams baited him, as you have stated.

Mr. CARR. No, I wouldn't say it was a sensitive subject with Mr. Cohn. Mr. Adams baited him. Mr. Cohn, for a long time, took a good deal of baiting. Once in a while it would get under his skin, as it would anyone else.

Mr. PREWITT. I want to refer you to Mr. Adams' testimony on page 2606 of the record, that relates to the conversation of January 14. Do you have it?

I will read from Mr. Adams' testimony:

Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir; that is right. I asked him what would happen if Schine got overseas duty. He responded with vigor and force "Stevens is through as Secretary of the Army." I said, "Oh, Roy," something to this effect, "Oh, Roy, don't say that. Come on, really, what is going to happen if Schine gets overseas duty?" He responded with even more force, "We will wreck the Army."

Is the statement which I have just read, attributable to Mr. Cohn, correct?

Mr. CARR. No, sir. I was there in the room. Mr. Adams had mentioned this shipping of Schine overseas, Mr. Cohn did not make these statements.

Mr. PREWITT. There is no question but what that question was brought up? Mr. Adams asked Mr. Cohn what would happen if Schine were sent overseas?

Mr. CARR. I don't recall his saying what would happen if Mr. Schine were sent overseas. I recall he said something about, "I will cooperate with you fellows a little bit now. How would you like it if I sent Adams overseas," something to that effect—"Sent Schine overseas."

Mr. PREWITT. And it is your testimony that Mr. Cohn did not make any response, in substance, "We will wreck the Army"?

Mr. CARR. That is correct. That is correct.

Mr. PREWITT. Very well. I will read further from Mr. Adam's testimony on page 2607:

Then he said, "The first thing we are going to do is get General Ryan for the way he has treated Dave at Fort Dix. Dave gets through at Fort Dix tomorrow or this week, and as soon as he is gone, we are going to get General Ryan for the obscene way in which he has permitted Schine to be treated up there."

He said, "We are not going to do it ourselves. We have another committee of the Congress interested in it."

Then he said, "I wouldn't put it past you to do this. We will start investigations. We have enough stuff on the Army to keep investigations going indefinitely, and if anything like such-and-such double-cross occurs, that is what we will do."

Did you follow me as I read, Mr. Carr?

Mr. CARR. Yes, pretty much, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. Did Mr. Cohn make any such statement or the substance of any such statement?

Mr. CARR. No, sir; he didn't. I am sure I would have recalled it if he had said anything concerning General Ryan. My contacts with

General Ryan had been most pleasant and I thought he was a fine gentleman. I am sure I would have recalled it.

Mr. PREWITT. Were you within hearing distance of Mr. Cohn and Mr. Adams during the entire time of their conversation on this particular day?

Mr. CARR. Yes, I was, except for the very beginning of the conversation on the 14th; yes sir.

Mr. PREWITT. But after the subject of Schine was interposed, you say by Mr. Adams—

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. You were within hearing distance of these two gentlemen as they conversed?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; I was in the room.

Mr. PREWITT. And it is your testimony that no such statement as I have just read, which is attributable to Mr. Cohn by Mr. Adams, was made by Mr. Cohn?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; that is my testimony.

Mr. PREWITT. And this statement concerning, "What we are going to do about General Ryan for the way he has treated Schine at Fort Dix," is just a figment of the imagination of Mr. Adams?

Mr. CARR. Well, I don't know what it is. I know that it didn't happen. I know if it had happened, I would have gotten into the conversation at that point.

Mr. PREWITT. Well, what was stated by Mr. Cohn in response to the inquiry of Mr. Adams concerning the possibility of Schine's shipment overseas?

Mr. CARR. At that point, Mr. Cohn said that he could see no reason for Schine being sent overseas, that he was disgusted with Mr. Adams for tying that in with this statement of cooperation and with the statement about a request for ending the hearings.

I recall something about "He has not had enough training to go overseas."

Mr. PREWITT. Did Mr. Cohn on that occasion or any other occasion, make the statement, "Stevens is through as Secretary of the Army"?

Mr. CARR. No, sir; not that I ever heard.

Mr. PREWITT. And if he made any such statement on January 14, you don't know anything about it?

Mr. CARR. That is correct.

Mr. PREWITT. Now, Mr. Carr, shifting back to an earlier date, I will ask you if you recall Mr. Adams' testimony that around the time that Dave Schine was inducted into the Army, November 3, Adams had a conversation with Mr. Cohn in which you were present, page 2533 of the record, that that conversation occurred in room 101, Senate Office Building, at which time in substance Mr. Adams stated to Mr. Cohn that the national interest would preclude Mr. Adams doing anything in a preferential way for Mr. Schine. Do you recall the substance of that testimony?

Mr. CARR. No. I am just looking it over over here.

Mr. PREWITT. I will read from the record, Mr. Carr, page 2533:

Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir; I pointed out to him that I was 15 years his senior, and although I did not at all presume to be as good a lawyer as he was, and I am sure that I am not, that I did feel that there was one field in which I could give him some friendly advice if he would take it. I pointed out to him that the national interest required that Schine be treated just like every other soldier.

Mr. JENKINS. What was his reply to that, Mr. Adams, if you have finished—

Mr. ADAMS. It was the wrong clause to use, because he exploded at that and said if the national interest was the thing we were interested in, he would give us a little bit. He outlined how they would hold a series of hearings and point out to us—he would give us a little national interest if that was what we were interested in. This was the subject, Schine, which caused the degeneration of an otherwise friendly relationship over the months.

Did you follow me, Mr. Carr?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. Do you recall any such conversation between Mr. Adams and Mr. Cohn?

Mr. CARR. No, sir, I don't.

Mr. PREWITT. In which the induction of Schine was discussed?

Mr. CARR. No, sir, I don't.

Mr. PREWITT. You were not present if any such conversation did in fact occur?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. I don't recall any such conversation.

Mr. PREWITT. Now let's go to December 17. I will ask you if on the morning of December 17—that was preceding this automobile ride—Senator McCarthy reprimanded you or was critical of you with reference to the intervention of the committee on behalf of Schine at Fort Dix?

Mr. CARR. No, sir, he did not.

Mr. PREWITT. Did he discuss that matter with you?

Mr. CARR. Not at that time; no, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. I will ask you to refresh your memory, if you can, by turning to Mr. Adams' testimony, page 2586 of the record, and I will read it:

Mr. Carr was in the room.

And this is Thursday, December 17.

When we walked into the room he began to speak to Mr. Carr about the subject, and he began to criticize Mr. Carr about the matter that he had spoken to me about.

To clarify it, I will read the preceding paragraph on page 2585:

Mr. ADAMS. Senator McCarthy stated to me that the purpose of his call the night before was that he had just learned, I deduced on the previous day, of the amount of interference with the officials at Fort Dix which his staff had accomplished, and that he wished to tell me that as of then and now it was through, it had ceased; that he was not going to permit it any more. I told him I was gratified to get that information, but it would be absolutely of no value to me unless be stated it to Cohn in front of me.

Do you recall that testimony, Mr. Carr?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. It is your testimony now under oath that Senator McCarthy did not speak to you on the morning of December 17 with reference to any intervention on behalf of Schine by members of the committee?

Mr. CARR. That is correct, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. You deny that any such reprimand as testified to by Mr. Adams took place?

Mr. CARR. No. Senator McCarthy reprimanded me, but not on that subject, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. He did not reprimand you concerning Schine?

Mr. CARR. Right.

Mr. PREWITT. He did not reprimand you concerning Schine?

Mr. CARR. Right.

Mr. PREWITT. Did he discuss with you on that morning the subject of Schine?

Mr. CARR. No, he didn't.

Mr. PREWITT. Concerning his activities at Fort Dix?

Mr. CARR. Not on that morning, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. When did he discuss it with you, if he did?

Mr. CARR. Later in the day. In fact, it was on the telephone after I had left Senator McCarthy at the Waldorf Astoria. He told me that he had been hearing rumors, and he said that he thought that there was some talk that some of the press were going down to Fort Dix to stir up trouble. He asked me if I would be sure to check and make sure that the staff was not abusing any privilege that Secretary Stevens had given.

Mr. PREWITT. So it is your testimony that Senator McCarthy did discuss the question of Schine's activities at Fort Dix and the relationship of the staff of the subcommittee to Schine later in the day?

Mr. CARR. That is right.

Mr. PREWITT. I will ask you to turn to your memorandum dated December 21, 1953, to Senator McCarthy. Do you have that in front of you?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. Did you dictate that memorandum?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. I will read from it:

Following my conversation with you on last Thursday in New York, I think you should know that the staff of the subcommittee has not called upon Dave Schine's time or services except when necessary to the committee work.

Was it Senator McCarthy's telephone call that prompted you to make this memorandum?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir, it was. Actually, it was a telephone call from me to the Senator.

Mr. PREWITT. Did the Senator ask you to look into the matter and give him a report?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. And you did look into it and this memorandum is your report to the Senator?

Mr. CARR. Yes, in effect. I also talked to him.

Mr. PREWITT. Mr. Adams is not correct when he says that the Senator reprimanded you on the morning of Thursday, December 17, with reference to the subcommittee staff's intervention on behalf of Schine at Dix?

Mr. CARR. That is right.

Mr. PREWITT. He is in error there?

Mr. CARR. He is in error.

Mr. PREWITT. On the question of your memoranda, Mr. Carr, I will ask you if the purpose of your dictating the various memoranda which are contained in the document which I am sure you are referring to now, was to convey information either to Senator McCarthy or to Mr. Cohn?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir, convey information, and other reasons.

Mr. PREWITT. What other reasons entered into that?

Mr. CARR. To make a record.

Mr. PREWITT. So the memoranda had two purposes, is that correct?

Mr. CARR. My memoranda did; yes, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. To convey information and for the purposes of keeping a record?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. Did you attempt to dictate memoranda concerning all of your contacts with Mr. Adams?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. Was there any particular reason that you dictated the memoranda which in fact appear in this document which I have in my hand?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir, there was a reason for each of them.

Mr. PREWITT. All right.

Now let's turn to your memorandum dated January 9, 1954, from yourself to Roy Cohn. Did you dictate that memorandum?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. Where were you when you dictated it?

Mr. CARR. In Senator McCarthy's office.

Mr. PREWITT. Here in Washington?

Mr. CARR. Yes.

Mr. PREWITT. Where was Mr. Cohn?

Mr. CARR. In New York.

Mr. PREWITT. That is the date, is it not, Saturday, January 9, when you talked to Mr. Adams who was in Amherst, Mass.?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir: that is correct.

Mr. PREWITT. As I recall the testimony, that call concerned two factors: One, the question of the insert for the annual report with relation to the change in the Army's security program?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. And secondly, Private Schine?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. Is that correct?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. I read from your memorandum:

I called John Adams about the question of the insert for the annual report re the change of the Army security program. Also told him you had been trying to reach him about Dave not being free Sunday to help with the report. He was up in Amherst, Mass., stated that he was snowbound and that he couldn't do a thing about it from Massachusetts. I am sure that he doesn't want to do anything but I told him you would call. I think he will duck you. It is obvious that he doesn't want the part about Army laxity in the report, so don't expect Dave to get off to help.

Have I correctly read your memorandum, Mr. Carr?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. You knew, I take it, that Mr. Schine was assigned to do K. P. duty, the following day, Sunday, January 16?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

At the time of the call; yes, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. And the purpose of your call, among other things, was to get Private Schine relieved from that obligation?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. I was not?

Mr. CARR. No, sir. The purpose of my call was to discuss a matter concerning the annual report with Mr. Adams. I had discussed it with his assistant, Mr. Haskins, on the day before. I wanted to

get—Mr. Haskins was not in a position of authority to give me an answer to what I was interested in. I called Mr. Adams. The Schine memorandum, the Schine matter, is incidental to my call. I merely told Mr. Adams, as incidental to my call, that Mr. Cohn had been trying to reach him.

Mr. PREWITT. Who brought up the subject of Schine on that occasion?

Mr. CARR. I brought up the subject of Schine in the telephone call.

Mr. PREWITT. Did you ask Mr. Adams to attempt to secure a release for Private Schine from duty on the following day?

Mr. CARR. No; I didn't. The conversation went something like this. I said that Mr. Cohn had been trying to reach Mr. Adams and that he wanted, that Mr. Schine had been assigned some duty over the weekend, and Mr. Cohn wanted him to work with him on the report. I told him that Mr. Cohn would try to contact him.

Mr. PREWITT. And you dictated this memorandum to Mr. Cohn who was in New York on Saturday, January 9. Why did you insert in that memorandum—

It is obvious that he doesn't want the part about Army laxity in the report so don't expect Dave to get off to help.

Mr. CARR. I can't say why I inserted any particular part of this thing in here, any particular words. As a matter of fact—

Mr. PREWITT. Let me ask you this, Mr. Carr: Were you trying to convey the impression to Mr. Cohn that Private Schine would not be able to get off on the following day?

Mr. CARR. No, sir. I had already conveyed this information to Mr. Cohn by telephone, before I wrote this memorandum.

When I told Mr. Cohn by telephone, concerning the conversation I had had with Mr. Adams, Mr. Cohn said, "All right," he would call him. He called him. Mr. Cohn, later in the day, told me that he had called Mr. Adams at some inn at Amherst, Mass., and that the phone had rung, he heard it ring several times, he knew from the sound that somebody had picked up the receiver. He said something like "Hello, John" or "John?" and there was no answer.

He felt that from the sound that somebody had hung up the receiver. He told me that he was sure that Adams had been there and had received the call. It didn't make much difference to me at that point. Mr. Cohn said, "How about putting this in a memorandum. I want to know—I want to have this on the record."

Mr. PREWITT. Mr. Cohn requested that in the memorandum?

Mr. CARR. That is right. Yes.

Mr. PREWITT. So it wasn't for the purpose of conveying the information to him on that particular day?

Mr. CARR. No. He had the information.

Mr. PREWITT. Now, Mr. Carr, I refer you to page 2573 of the record, which refers to your train ride with Mr. Adams on November 25, and I will read from Mr. Adams' testimony:

... The train trip takes about 3 hours 45 minutes. As I recall now, and as I felt at the time, fully one-half of our entire conversation was directed to Schine and was filled with Mr. Carr's observations to me to the effect that for so long as Schine was not satisfactorily assigned, satisfactory insofar as Mr. Cohn was concerned, that we were in trouble. Mr. Carr pointed out to me that he thought—that he wasn't proposing this as an independent proposal, in my opinion, but I felt that he was passing on to me a feeling he had that as long as the assignment of Schine was not satisfactory, we could expect trouble.

You recall that testimony?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. Did you state on that occasion, on that train ride, on November 25, in substance, that for so long as the assignment of Private Schine in the Army was unsatisfactory to Mr. Cohn, that the Army was in for trouble?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. You deny making any such statement?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. Using the words of Mr. Adams or the substance of it?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. You have testified, though, have you not, Mr. Carr, that the subject of Schine was brought up on that train ride?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. Did it consume, as Mr. Adams has testified to, nearly one-half of your time?

Mr. CARR. No, sir. I have testified to that this morning.

Mr. PREWITT. You already stated that there were numerous other subjects—

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. In the conversation.

Now, in what manner was the subject of Schine injected into your conversation?

Mr. CARR. On the train trip?

Mr. PREWITT. Yes, sir.

Mr. CARR. Yes, it followed the conversation we had concerning General Lawton

Mr. PREWITT. Do you deny, Mr. Carr, that you ever stated to Mr. Adams that as long as the assignment or the treatment of Schine was unsatisfactory to Mr. Cohn, that Cohn would make trouble for the Army?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; I never made that statement.

Mr. PREWITT. You never made any such statement as that?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. Either on this occasion—

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. Or the occasion of your luncheon on March 5, or at any other time?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Mr. PREWITT. And it is your testimony that the subject of Schine was injected into these conversations by Mr. Adams in the form of using Schine as bait in an effort to halt the Army's investigations by this committee?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. Is that how the subject of Schine was injected into these conversations?

Mr. CARR. Into this train-ride conversation and the conversations I have testified to. Oftentimes Schine's name would just come up in conversations.

Mr. PREWITT. You heard Mr. Adams' testimony, did you not, that on December 20 and on December 23 you called Mr. Adams in South Dakota. Do you recall that?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir, I do.

Mr. PREWITT. Did you telephone, Mr. Carr, Mr. Adams at his home in South Dakota, on those two dates, December 20 and December 23?

Mr. CARR. Sir, I recall talking to Mr. Adams in South Dakota on one date. He says two dates. Undoubtedly, I did.

Mr. PREWITT. And what was the purpose of those calls?

Mr. CARR. Those calls had to do with General Lawton.

Mr. PREWITT. Did the calls relate to Private Schine in any degree?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. Was that subject brought up?

Mr. CARR. Not by me, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. Is it your testimony that the subject of Private Schine was interposed by Mr. Adams?

Mr. CARR. No, sir. I don't recall Private Schine's name being mentioned in either of those phone calls, if there were two.

Mr. PREWITT. Why do you state, then, that Mr. Adams brought up that subject?

Mr. CARR. I didn't state Mr. Adams brought it up. I said I didn't bring up the subject.

Mr. PREWITT. And if it was brought up, it was not brought by you?

Mr. CARR. And if it was—that is correct.

Mr. PREWITT. Let me read from Mr. Adams' testimony, page 2594:

On the 20th of December, I received a long-distance call from Mr. Carr, in which the subject—on the 20th of December and on the 23d of December, while I was in Sioux Falls, S. Dak., I received long-distance calls from Mr. Carr. On one, and I think on both of the occasions, the principal subject of the call seemed to me to be Schine, and I restated that I had told them that if they would just wait until between Christmas and New Year's I would try and find out what was going to happen—

Mr. JENKINS. You say that in 1 or 2 calls the subject seemed to be Schine. Was there not Schine discussed by Mr. Carr long-distance while you were visiting your mother in Sioux Falls, S. Dak.?

Mr. ADAMS. It was, and as I say, the principal purpose of one of the calls, as I recall it, was Schine. My recollection is that both calls alluded to Schine.

Now, Mr. Carr, do you now state that the principal purpose of either of these calls was Schine?

Mr. CARR. I do.

Mr. PREWITT. And you deny the statement by Mr. Adams to the contrary?

Mr. CARR. I do.

Mr. PREWITT. Mr. Carr, there is one other subject that I want to discuss with you, and I believe we can do it before adjournment.

Mr. CARR. All right, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. That is the subject of work performed by Mr. Schine subsequent to November 3 while he was at Fort Dix. I will ask you if Mr. Schine interviewed any witnesses while he was stationed at Fort Dix, to your knowledge?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. Do your records or memoranda kept in your office reflect that?

Mr. CARR. I don't think they do.

Mr. PREWITT. There was no written data or memoranda kept to document any interviews which Mr. Schine made of witnesses while he was at Fort Dix?

Mr. CARR. I don't know of any.

Mr. PREWITT. Who assigned him to the task of interviewing witnesses while he was at Fort Dix?

Mr. CARR. I don't know that he was assigned to the task of interviewing witnesses. He had been working on the Fort Monmouth case along with the rest of us. He had some informants. He had one witness that I can readily recall that he interviewed. I don't know that it was an assignment. I think it might have been just a followthrough.

Mr. PREWITT. Why was Mr. Schine permitted to do that type of work while he was on duty at Fort Dix? As I understand it, you have a staff of trained investigators, men with experience in the FBI. Why was this young man, with no appreciable prior experience in interviewing witnesses, given that task or why was he permitted to do it?

Mr. CARR. First, I might say that he was not permitted to do it while he was on duty at Fort Dix. All of these things happened during his nontraining hours.

I might also state that as far as that period of time is concerned, he had had prior experience in interviewing witnesses and investigation flowing from his work on the information program and the Voice of America investigation.

Mr. PREWITT. Is it the practice of your office when an investigator interviews a witness to make no written memorandum of his interview?

Mr. CARR. No, sir, I don't want to say it is the practice of the office. It is the practice of the office to run itself as efficiently as possible. Sometimes memoranda are dictated, sometimes they aren't.

During the course of preparation for hearings, many times notes are maintained; scribbled notes are used in interrogating witnesses.

Mr. PREWITT. Did you expect to use the information gathered by Private Schine in his interviews with these various witnesses?

Mr. CARR. We did use information in at least one instance that I recall.

Mr. PREWITT. How did you get that information from Private Schine?

Mr. CARR. Usually it came through Mr. Cohn.

Mr. PREWITT. Private Schine was able to retain in his head all the information gathered from these witnesses which he interviewed at Fort Dix without making any written memoranda of them? Is that your testimony, Mr. Carr?

Mr. CARR. No, sir; it isn't.

Your question—could I have that question read, please?

(The reporter read from his notes as requested.)

Mr. CARR. Part of it. The first part of the question, Private Schine didn't retain it in his head. He conveyed it to Mr. Cohn, who made use of it. The second part, I don't recall that he interviewed these people at Fort Dix.

Mr. PREWITT. This practice of interviewing witnesses and making no memoranda of it, is that consistently followed by other investigators in your office?

Mr. CARR. It is not consistently followed by anyone. However, Mr. Cohn very infrequently makes memoranda. During the haste of preparing for hearings very frequently interviews are conducted and information is received which appears in the printed interview at the hearing. There is no need in many cases for a memorandum prior to that time.

Mr. PREWITT. Mr. Carr, why weren't these interviews of witnesses by Mr. Schine conducted while he was at Fort Dix conducted before he entered the Army? You knew he was going in the Army.

Mr. CARR. Right, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. Why weren't they?

Mr. CARR. If I understand your question, you want to know why weren't the interviews that he conducted after he was at Fort Dix conducted prior to that time.

Mr. PREWITT. Yes, sir.

Mr. CARR. Right. Prior to Mr. Schine's going into the Army I discussed with Mr. Cohn and Senator McCarthy the fact that he would probably be in the Army. The main reason that I had for discussing it with them was the reports. The other information he had was valuable, but I was concerned with the reports. I felt that if the end of the year came around and the interim reports and the annual report were not out, it would be a reflection on the committee and a reflection on me.

They advised me that they had given this work to Mr. Barslaag and that Mr. Barslaag was going to write the report. It later revealed that Mr. Barslaag was unable to write the reports, through no fault of his own. Information which Mr. Schine had in his possession was used in the staff interrogatories of witnesses in October. He cleaned up as much as he could at that point.

Mr. PREWITT. You still haven't answered my question with reference to Schine's interviewing witnesses while he was in the Army and stationed at Fort Dix.

Mr. CARR. These, as far as I recall, were incidental matters. The prime reason—the prime work, rather, that he had was in connection with the writing of the reports.

Mr. PREWITT. Is it your testimony that he did or did not interview witnesses?

Mr. CARR. Yes, he did. He interviewed some witnesses. When you say witness, I can think of one who was a witness offhand and others were confidential informants.

Mr. PREWITT. Did you not have other investigators at your command to do that sort of work?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. PREWITT. Weren't they fitted to do it?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; but this was more or less a followthrough on work that Mr. Schine had done before. For instance, one of the persons he talked to insisted that he only talk with Mr. Schine. These are things that happen in an investigation.

Mr. PREWITT. Is it your testimony that young Mr. Schine was indispensable to the work of the committee, and that it was compelling that he interview witnesses after he was inducted into the Army?

Mr. CARR. No, sir; it is not.

Mr. PREWITT. Why was it done, Mr. Carr?

Mr. CARR. As I have said, Mr. Schine did interview a few witnesses. I can recall one, offhand. He interviewed informants with whom he had had contact prior to his going into the Army. That was incidental to his main task which was preparing the reports.

Mr. PREWITT. I have no further questions.

Senator MUNDT. The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock, (Whereupon, the hearing recessed at 12:37 p. m., to reconvene at 2 p. m., the same day.)

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SPECIAL SENATE INVESTIGATION ON CHARGES
AND COUNTERCHARGES INVOLVING: SECRE-
TARY OF THE ARMY ROBERT T. STEVENS, JOHN
G. ADAMS, H. STRUVE HENSEL AND SENATOR
JOE McCARTHY, ROY M. COHN, AND
FRANCIS P. CARR

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Res. 189

PART 65

JUNE 14, 1954

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SPECIAL SENATE INVESTIGATION ON CHARGES AND COUNTERCHARGES INVOLVING: SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ROBERT T. STEVENS, JOHN G. ADAMS, H. STRUVE HENSEL AND SENATOR JOE McCARTHY, ROY M. COHN, AND FRANCIS P. CARR

MONDAY, JUNE 14, 1954

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
Washington, D. C.

AFTER RECESS

(The hearing was resumed at 2:13 p. m., pursuant to recess.)

Present: Senator Karl E. Mundt, Republican, South Dakota, chairman; Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen, Republican, Illinois; Senator Charles E. Potter, Republican, Michigan; Senator Henry C. Dworshak, Republican, Idaho; Senator John L. McClellan, Democrat, Arkansas; Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat, Washington; and Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat, Missouri.

Also present: Ray M. Jenkins, chief counsel; Thomas R. Prewitt, assistant counsel; Charles Maner, assistant counsel.

Principal participants present: Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, a United States Senator from the State of Wisconsin; Roy M. Cohn, chief counsel to the subcommittee; Joseph N. Welch, special counsel for the Army; and James D. St. Clair, special counsel for the Army.

Senator MUNDT. The committee will please come to order.

The Chair would like to welcome the guests of the committee who have come to the hearing this afternoon, and to tell you that you are very welcome to be here, and to repeat the standing rule of the committee, if you have not heard it before, to the effect that there are to be no audible manifestations of approval or disapproval of any kind from the audience at any time. The uniformed members of the Capitol Police force whom you see before you, and the plainclothes people scattered through the audience, have standing instructions from the committee to remove from the committee room immediately, politely, but firmly, any who might elect to violate the terms under which he entered the room, namely, to comply with the committee regulation against audible manifestations of approval or of disapproval. I am sure that we will continue to enjoy the cooperation from our friends in the audience that we have enjoyed in the 63 or 64 sessions that we have had so far, and I again express my appreciation to the Capitol Police force and their associates in the plainclothes corps for helping to maintain the decorum that we have had in the committee room.

TESTIMONY OF FRANCIS P. CARR—Resumed

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Prewitt, I understand that you had concluded your cross-examination with the morning session; is that correct?

Mr. PREWITT. That is correct.

Senator MUNDT. We will start, then, with the customary 10-minute go-arounds under the terms of the regulations of the committee, each member of the committee having 10 minutes in which to ask questions and counsel for each side having 10 minutes in which to ask questions.

The Chair has the first 10 minutes and, Mr. Carr, I will ask you first of all whether you had ever met Mr. Schine before he came to work for our committee?

Mr. CARR. I think I said this morning, and I am sure it is correct, that I was probably introduced to him one time. I have a vague recollection of having shaken hands with him at one time. It may have been at some function. I don't recall it definitely.

Senator MUNDT. At all events, you had no special background of friendship for him?

Mr. CARR. No.

Senator MUNDT. And you had no better or worse relationship with him as a friend, I presume, than 6 or 7 or 8 other members of our staff; is that correct?

Mr. CARR. I would say even less. I only shook hands with him at an introduction, as I recall it.

Senator MUNDT. I think I understood the testimony this morning that most of your relations with him, since he was a consultant rather than an investigator, came either through Senator McCarthy or Mr. Cohn?

Mr. CARR. That is correct.

Senator MUNDT. You had no personal interest, or did you have, in what his career in the Army might lead into?

Mr. CARR. No, sir; I didn't.

Senator MUNDT. A statement was made this morning which I am not sure I understood because it is subject to various kinds of interpretation. You were discussing one of your numerous luncheons with Mr. Adams, Mr. Cohn, and Mr. Carr. I think it was the one dealing with the first information that was given you that Schine might be heading toward overseas duty. You quoted Mr. Cohn as saying that you thought Schine should not be "used by the Army." That is subject to quite a few interpretations. Let me ask you the first that pops into my mind. That might very well imply that Mr. Cohn thought that Schine should not be recruited into the Army or drafted into the Army.

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Senator MUNDT. What did you mean by "used by the army"?

Mr. CARR. I am sure I meant, and I thought I made it clear later, that he should not be discriminated against by the Army because he had come from the committee.

Senator MUNDT. What you should have said to convey what you had in mind, perhaps, was that he was not to be misused by the Army?

Mr. CARR. "Misused" is probably the better word.

Senator MUNDT. I went back and looked at the record. You said "used." I heard you say "used," and it could be interpreted and, in view of some of the charges, might very well be interpreted that Mr.

Cohn thought he should not be used as a member of the Army by draft or recruitment. You are sure that was not the intention of those words?

Mr. CARR. No; it was not.

Senator MUNDT. I want to ask you some questions now that I asked Senator McCarthy and I asked Mr. Cohn.

As one interested in the past and also interested in the impact of the past on the future, it would seem to me that for a while in the investigation at Fort Monmouth, you as director of the staff, Senator McCarthy as chairman, and Mr. Cohn as chief counsel, had worked out a rather salutary relationship of cooperation, whereby the instrumentality that you were investigating, sharing as it did your desire to eliminate the Communists from strategic positions, cooperated toward that goal. Do you feel that that is the optimum way in which we can conduct an investigation, if we can work out some kind of co-operative performance such as you did have for several weeks and perhaps months in the investigation of Fort Monmouth?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator MUNDT. In your opinion, what was it that caused that co-operative era to fall apart?

Mr. CARR. Well, I think that it gradually deteriorated. I don't think that it ever had fallen apart during the Monmouth investigation. There was still some limited cooperation between us right up to the very end. I was talking to Mr. Adams.

Senator MUNDT. What caused the feeling of cooperation to end whether it occurred during the Fort Monmouth investigation or afterward? What was the attribute that seemed to change the status of the cooperating forces?

Mr. CARR. I think probably the important period was in connection with the calling in of the loyalty boards. That seemed to be the point that Mr. Stevens and Mr. Adams didn't want us to go beyond.

Senator MUNDT. In your opinion, is there anything else growing out of the effort, the experience of the effort, in trying to work cooperatively, which would lead you to believe that such a cooperative, joint effort could not again be resumed, provided it is possible to resolve the problem as to what to do about calling in people on a loyalty board, for example, issues of that kind?

Mr. CARR. Yes. I think the problem can be resolved.

Senator MUNDT. Do you think it is worthwhile to try to make an effort to endeavor to establish that kind of cooperative approach to a security problem which should be of equal concern and undoubtedly is to all good Americans?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Carr, you said that on numerous occasions, John Adams referred to Dave Schine as a hostage, is that right?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator MUNDT. In your presence and to you?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator MUNDT. Did he do it in overtones which you would consider to be facetious or in overtones which you might consider to be ominous and threatening?

Mr. CARR. I think that on most occasions he was being facetious. I don't think the use of the word "hostage" itself was considered—it was certainly not considered by me as a threat. I think facetious.

Senator MUNDT. You know John Adams rather well. I know him rather well. He is what you might call sort of a master of a flip phrase, is he not?

Mr. CARR. Yes.

Senator MUNDT. That is, sometimes the thing he says when reduced to print, divested from its inflection, might convey an altogether different meaning than if you can hear the inflection and watch the pantomime of his face, is that correct?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. That is true of any of us.

Senator MUNDT. Yes; but do you agree that John G. Adams, perhaps, is more inclined to the flip phrase than maybe Frank Carr?

Mr. CARR. Yes.

Senator MUNDT. Yes, sir; perhaps more than the average. He picked that up as a young man. And, consequently, knowing the individual, I would be led to believe that even though he used the word hostage, he didn't do it in terms of a man about to make a threat, that "we are going to chop off the head of Dave Schine" or "we are going to put him in a dungeon." It was done, perhaps, more or less I think between friends, and you were a friend of John Adams. Is that right?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator MUNDT. With the feeling that what he said might be understood by you as a facetious remark.

Mr. CARR. I don't think the use of the word hostage in itself is a threat; no, sir.

Senator MUNDT. You have heard a lot of testimony, Mr. Carr, through this hearing, about the desire of the Army to call off the hearings, or to change the nature of the publicity growing out of the hearings—depending upon which witness happens to be on the stand—they put a different emphasis on what they would like to have had happen concerning the hearings, but it was agreed by all sides of the controversy that the people in the Army would have relished some kind of change, at least, in connection with the hearings.

Now, did you ever have Mr. Stevens complain to you directly about the type of hearing that you were conducting as chief investigator or chief of staff man at Fort Monmouth? Did he ever complain to you?

Mr. CARR. About the type of hearing?

Senator MUNDT. Yes.

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Senator MUNDT. He never registered with you then, as the head man of the committee, next to the Senator, any specific complaints and said, "Carr, I would like to have you do it this way instead of that way," or "I would like to have you call them off." Nothing direct to you?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Senator MUNDT. Did he ever register with you a specific complaint about the nature of the publicity which emanated from the hearings after each executive session was concluded?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Senator MUNDT. So that if such a desire was present on the part of the Army, it was not conveyed to you, you tell us now under oath, as chief investigator?

Mr. CARR. Well, if I understand you, sir, such a desire, a desire to call off the hearings; yes. Any talk to me personally by Mr. Stevens

concerning the method or operation of the hearings, or newspaper results; no.

Senator MUNDT. In other words, your conversations with Mr. Stevens, you are telling us, were in the direction of suggesting that the hearings be dropped rather than in the direction that the hearings be changed?

Mr. CARR. That is right.

Senator MUNDT. Or that the publicity be changed?

Mr. CARR. That is correct.

Senator MUNDT. You tell us he did talk with you about the desirability of terminating them, but not the desirability of changing them or changing the publicity?

Mr. CARR. Well, yes, sir, I was present at the November 6 luncheon.

Senator MUNDT. At which time the publicity matter came up?

Mr. CARR. I don't recall it. It may have. I don't recall it.

Senator MUNDT. What did you mean when you said you were present at the November 6 luncheon? That dealt with calling it off, you mean?

Mr. CARR. Yes.

Senator MUNDT. Other than that, did he ever call on you individually or send word to you directly that he would like to have the hearings terminated or changed?

Mr. CARR. No, sir; not individually.

Senator MUNDT. Just on that one occasion?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator MUNDT. Senator McClellan, you have 10 minutes.

Senator McCLELLAN. Mr. Carr, when these hearings began you were regarded as one of the principals to the controversy; is that correct?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. As such, did you participate—

Senator McCARTHY. Senator McClellan, I can't hear you.

Senator MUNDT. Will the control man be sure to turn up the mike a little louder, please?

Senator McCLELLAN. Thank you.

As one of the principals in this controversy, did you participate in the drafting of this document entitled, "Statement Submitted at Request of Temporary Committee" on April 20, 1953, to which I have frequently referred and which I identify as the countercharges in this case?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. You did participate in the drafting of it?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. I was present in some of the drafting.

Senator McCLELLAN. At the time it was filed, did you then adopt it as your pleadings or your response to the committee's request?

Mr. CARR. Insofar as it applied to me; yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. Insofar as it applied to you, insofar as you were involved—

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. Either directly or indirectly in any of the charges or countercharges, you adopted this then as your response to the Army charges and as constituting your countercharges against the Army; is that true?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. I make no argument about the statement of charges. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. All right. Then I shall not have time or I shall not take the time to go through and identify each paragraph in which you are referred to and in which you make countercharges, but I want to ask you now if you state under oath that the countercharges you have made in this document are true?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. At the time you made them, did you regard them as serious or frivolous?

Mr. CARR. Serious.

Senator McCLELLAN. Do you now regard them as serious?

Mr. CARR. Serious.

Senator McCLELLAN. You began regarding these things as serious, as a controversy, much earlier than the time this document was filed, didn't you?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. You began regarding them as serious as of October 2, 1953; is that correct?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. That was the date you made your first memorandum, was it not?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. You marked it "Confidential" and placed it in the file?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. Now explain to us just what was serious about this controversy at that time. Why did you regard it as serious then? What had transpired before and what caused you to prepare this memorandum and file it?

Mr. CARR. I am not sure that I follow your last question, sir. I regarded this whole affair as serious. I so regard it now. I regarded the whole Fort Monmouth case as serious. I certainly regarded any contact I had with the Secretary of the Army as serious. I recorded this contact with the Secretary of the Army because Senator McCarthy was out of town, and I thought that this was something that he should know about.

Senator McCLELLAN. All right. There was something that developed at that time that caused you to feel that it required some specific attention to the extent that you did prepare a memorandum at that time?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. I thought this was something the Senator should know about.

Senator McCLELLAN. All right. What I want to find out, was this the customary procedure after you had conferred with the Secretary of the Army or someone else in a similar position in Government?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. This violated the custom, then?

Mr. CARR. No, sir; not necessarily.

Senator McCLELLAN. I didn't understand you, then.

Mr. CARR. You asked if this were a customary procedure. The customary procedure is either to write a memorandum or to speak to the Senator, to the chairman.

Senator McCLELLAN. I thought you had answered that it wasn't. That is the reason I asked you the next question.

I ask you again: Was this memorandum of October 2 in line with your customary procedures after you had had a conference with the Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy, or someone else in a similar position of Government? Was that customary, prior to that?

Mr. CARR. The word "customary"—I did it in this instance. I think it would be a good thing to do in all instances. I am not sure—

Senator McCLELLAN. I didn't ask what would be a good thing. I asked you what you had been doing before. Was it a common practice?

Mr. CARR. This was the first contact I ever had with the Secretary.

Senator McCLELLAN. It wasn't the first contact you had had with other high and important Government officials, was it?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. Have you got any other memorandums in the file, of conferences or contracts similar to this with other Government officials prior to this date?

Mr. CARR. I am sure I must have, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. Can you recall any?

Mr. CARR. No, not offhand; no, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. Let's see what was so serious about this that caused you to make a memorandum. We will read it briefly.

Mr. Cohn and I met with Secretary Stevens at the Pentagon to discuss General Lawton of Fort Monmouth and his blackout order re Fort Monmouth personnel speaking with our staff.

Had General Lawton blacked out conversations between members of his staff and others at Monmouth, in other words, prohibited them from talking to the staff of this committee? Is that correct?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. There was such an order.

Senator McCLELLAN. There was such an order. Who had issued it?

Mr. CARR. It was issued through General Lawton; yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. Issued through General Lawton. Do you know why he had issued it?

Mr. CARR. No, I don't.

Senator McCLELLAN. All right, then you refer to:

Jim Juliana had been advised by Colonel Allen that he couldn't talk with anyone because of an order by General Lawton forbidding talking to the McCarthy committee.

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN (reading) :

Mr. Stevens was very helpful—

you say.

He called Lawton and had the order immediately rescinded stating that it was his policy to cooperate with the Congressional committees.

Did he state that?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. Did he call and have the order rescinded?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. What was there in that action to indicate that the thing was serious? If he was cooperating, if he was getting the

order rescinded, what was there in an action which caused you to think you ought to make a memorandum of it?

Mr. CARR. This memorandum was made because Senator McCarthy was out of town. Ordinarily I think that I would have just spoken to the Senator and told him what the Secretary had done. The Senator was very interested in the Fort Monmouth situation. I left the memorandum for him.

Senator McCLELLAN. All right, your next sentence:

During the course of the conversation Dave Schine's pending induction into the Army came up.

Mr. CARR. At the conference with the Secretary, as I recall it the Secretary brought up the subject of Dave Schine by mentioning that he was not going or didn't think he would receive a commission.

Senator McCLELLAN. Had he previously applied for a commission?

Mr. CARR. Yes, I understand he had.

Senator McCLELLAN. Why did he bring that up in a conversation if you folks were not interested in it?

Mr. CARR. I don't know why he brought it up. It was the first I heard the Secretary—

Senator McCLELLAN. He brought it up because you were interested in it, didn't he? There wouldn't be any other reason to bring it up, would there?

Mr. CARR. I suppose he did bring it up for that reason.

Senator McCLELLAN. He brought it up because you were interested and because you had had previous contact about it; is that not true?

Mr. CARR. I had never had any previous contact about it; no.

Senator McCLELLAN. You had had none?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. There was nobody there, as I interpret this memorandum, except you and Mr. Cohn?

Mr. CARR. That is correct.

Senator McCLELLAN. And had he had previous contact with him about it?

Mr. CARR. I don't really know. I think he had. I think he had; yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. Is that what prompted the Secretary to bring up the conversation about Dave Schine?

Mr. CARR. I don't know what prompted him to bring it up.

Senator McCLELLAN. It was just uncalled for and unexplainable insofar as you know, then, that he would bring up such a conversation?

Mr. CARR. At the time; yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. At the time you didn't understand what he was bringing it up for?

Mr. CARR. That is correct.

Senator McCLELLAN. All right. [Reading:]

Mr. Stevens stated that he thought Schine should take his initial basic training and that after he had completed his basic, that he, Stevens, would be able to use Schine to his own advantage in the Army.

Did the Secretary make that statement?

Mr. CARR. Yes, he did.

Senator McCLELLAN. How did you interpret it at the time? What did he mean by it? What was the import of it?

Mr. CARR. Just what it says here, Senator.

Senator McCLELLAN. I beg your pardon?

Mr. CARR. Just what it says here, Senator.

Senator McCLELLAN. That he was going to use him to his advantage?

Mr. CARR. Correct.

Senator McCLELLAN. What did he mean by "to his advantage"?

Mr. CARR. As you read on further, he says something here about he would attend some security-type schools within the Army and report to Stevens his observations.

Senator McCLELLAN. After he had attended other schools?

Mr. CARR. Yes.

Senator McCLELLAN. Or had certain other training?

Mr. CARR. Yes.

Senator McCLELLAN. Did you get the impression—what I am trying to determine—this Schine matter has caused a terrible furor for quite a long time now. I am trying to find out whether the Army inspired this or whether there are other causes. Do you think now that the Secretary there just brought up the subject about Schine to discuss it with a view of trying to explain how he was going to handle him in the future, without anybody inquiring about it? Is that correct?

Mr. CARR. I don't really know why he brought him up, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. Well, nobody has inquired about him, according to you.

Mr. CARR. I didn't say that.

Senator McCLELLAN. Had they?

Mr. CARR. I had never.

Senator McCLELLAN. You were there?

Mr. CARR. That is right.

Senator McCLELLAN. And Mr. Cohn was there?

Mr. CARR. That is right.

Senator McCLELLAN. Had Mr. Cohn mentioned it before the Secretary said anything about it?

Mr. CARR. The Secretary brought it up by this reference to the commission, as I recall it.

Senator McCLELLAN. Without anybody making any comment about it or asking or making any inquiry about it?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. He just brought it up out of a clear sky and started talking about it?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. There had been nothing prompting him to bring it up. You had been talking about Fort Monmouth, and he brought it up out of a clear sky and began talking about how he was going to handle Schine in the Army?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator MUNDT. Senator Dirksen, you have 10 minutes.

Senator DIRKSEN. Mr. Carr, how old are you?

Mr. CARR. Thirty-seven, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. You have a family?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; three children.

Senator DIRKSEN. Three children?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. What is your legal residence. Is it Washington, D. C.?

Mr. CARR. Well, I live in Falls Church.

Senator DIRKSEN. You live where?

Mr. CARR. Falls Church.

Senator DIRKSEN. In Falls Church?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. Before you came to this area, where was your legal residence?

Mr. CARR. I am a native of Newport, R. I. I had been living for the last 6½—almost 7 years—in New York City.

Senator DIRKSEN. You got your bachelor's degree from Brown University?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. What did you specialize in while there?

Mr. CARR. Political science, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. And then you went to the University of Pennsylvania Law School and got your degree?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. But you did not secure admission to the bar, didn't make any effort, I take it, to become admitted to the bar?

Mr. CARR. No, sir. I went to law school primarily for the purpose of qualifying myself to enter the FBI.

Senator DIRKSEN. Did you join the FBI on application initiated by yourself?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. By yourself?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. And you entered the FBI service when?

Mr. CARR. June 1, 1942.

Senator DIRKSEN. And you continued on until how long?

Mr. CARR. For 11 years, 1 month and, I think, 15 days.

Senator DIRKSEN. Does a person take an oath when he joins the FBI?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. In substance, what is that oath?

Mr. CARR. It is an oath of allegiance to the country, and to the Constitution.

Senator DIRKSEN. I would assume, of course, that it requires some special qualifications to get into the FBI?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. Rather strict qualifications, are they?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. What is the physical qualifications for joining the FBI?

Mr. CARR. Well, you have to take a physical examination and be qualified. There are many things that you have to be able to do, but the prime thing is that you must be able to do arduous physical work.

Senator DIRKSEN. You must have some vigor, then, I take it?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. You have been referred to as the strong man in this drama, Mr. Carr. There are no weak men in the FBI, are there?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. So that strength is, after all, an inheritance of the days when you were in the FBI?

Mr. CARR. If there is strength there, that is where it came from, sir; yes, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. What are the requirements for thoroughness in the work of the FBI?

Mr. CARR. I think that the FBI is the most thorough investigative organization in the world, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. And what are the requirements for accuracy in pursuing your work?

Mr. CARR. I also think that the success of the FBI is an example of their accuracy.

Senator DIRKSEN. Do you get some charge from a very distinguished public servant, John Edgar Hoover, about veracity when you pursue your duties in the FBI?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. He speaks to all of the new agents as they enter.

Senator DIRKSEN. In other words, there is a high requirement for accuracy and thoroughness and veracity in the pursuit of that work?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. Are there any loose-lipped people who ever get into the FBI, and if they do, do they stay there very long?

Mr. CARR. I don't know of any that stayed; no, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. About how many agents and other personnel are there, Mr. Carr, so far as you know?

Mr. CARR. I don't know as of this moment, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. You know you have been referred to not only as the strong character in this drama, but as the silent character in this drama. You have seen that in the press, haven't you?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. Silence is almost a requirement in pursuing the secretive work of the FBI, isn't it?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir, you might say that.

Senator DIRKSEN. To be the best kind of a man in that field, you have to be not only strong, but, I take it, you have to be somewhat on the silent side, don't you?

Mr. CARR. It helps; yes, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. I would think so. They certainly articulate the old adage silence is golden, if they are going to get any work done.

Mr. Carr, of all the FBI agents who have ever called on me for information, every one of them always had a notebook. Does every FBI man carry a notebook?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. Every investigator carries some sort of a notebook; yes, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. He doesn't lean or trust to the slender road of memory, does he?

Taking notes, then, becomes a habit, doesn't it?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. So I presume in your work with the committee you have always been rather meticulous about making notes?

Mr. CARR. I have made notes; yes, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. All along the line as you go, to refresh your memory?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; whenever I could.

Senator DIRKSEN. Now Mr. Carr, I raise all this for a very definite reason. We are moving on toward the end of this high political adventure, if you want to call it that, and when we get to the end of the cause, it appears to me that what will confront this committee will be a conflict in veracity and a conflict in capacity to recollect where there is a variance in the testimony between witnesses. Have you refreshed yourself from time to time on notes that you have made as you have gone along?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. You feel then, Mr. Carr, rather reasonably sure of your recollection of many things that have been raised in the course of this investigation?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator McCARTHY. Senator Dirksen, I wonder if you would yield just for a few seconds?

Senator DIRKSEN. I yield.

Senator McCARTHY. I think you should have this in mind when you are examining any of the witnesses, and I think other members of the committee should have it in mind also, and that is this, that I have an unwritten rule, a rather strong one, that when any member of the committee interrogates any one who doesn't want his name known, doesn't want it bandied about, in other words the informants, if you can call them that, I have requested that no memorandum be placed in the file, knowing that too many people have access to those files.

So I wish you would keep that in mind when you discuss the difference in the procedure. In the FBI, I think everything is broken down, everything is put in the file. In my committee, I have the strong duty to any Government employee who wants to give us information. As I say, I have given instructions that their names not go into the file, that no memorandum be prepared, that I be informed of what the information is, if it is of value.

Senator DIRKSEN. When recollection comes into issue, Mr. Carr, you are willing to stand upon your recollection, based upon the refreshment you receive from notes taken as you had gone along?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. And you are willing to stand on the record of your veracity in making answer to the questions that have been addressed to you?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. Now, I think for the moment, Mr. Carr, I have only one other question and that is this:

Is it possible for a person to express an interest in another, in your judgment, without being charged with undue influence? And by that I mean this: It would be natural, of course, in your associations in the committee room, with all members of the staff, and that would include Mr. Schine, that you might express an interest without carrying it to such an aggressive point that it can be construed as undue influence on your part. Have you an opinion as to where the dividing line might be?

Mr. CARR. Well, I think it is possible and commendable that one person has an interest in another.

Senator DIRKSEN. So you believe that you could express an interest in the military future of G. David Schine and still not transgress the proprieties—

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. And invite the charge that there had been undue influence on your part?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. That is all, Mr. Chairman, for the moment.

Senator MUNDT. Senator Jackson, you have 10 minutes.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Carr, do I understand from the answer you gave in response to Senator Dirksen's questions that you took notes in connection with all of these various meetings and get-togethers?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Senator JACKSON. In other words, the only notes that you have are the notes that have been transformed into the form of memoranda which are included in this document?

Mr. CARR. That is correct, the only notes I have at this time.

Senator JACKSON. So it is not accurate, then, to say that your recollection would be better than parties on the other side of this controversy because you had taken notes at the time of these various incidents?

Mr. CARR. I agree with you, sir. I didn't say that.

Senator JACKSON. I got the impression, you see, that you had notes on all of these other incidents that took place that are not included in the memoranda.

Mr. CARR. No, sir. I will stand on my recollection.

Senator JACKSON. Pardon me?

Mr. CARR. I stand on my recollection.

Senator JACKSON. You stand on your recollection. So you are not relying on notes, then, in connection with the other conversations not included in the memoranda?

Mr. CARR. Yes. I have some notes of some things, yes, sir, throughout the course of the—

Senator JACKSON. But insofar as this dispute is concerned that we have been listening to for 8 weeks, the notes taken, memoranda, and everything, are contained in the document, for all practical purposes?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Carr, in your memorandum of December 9, 1953, in the first paragraph, you state the Army is trying to use Schine as a hostage. In substance that is it, in the first paragraph.

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. You go on to say that John Adams refers to Schine as "our hostage" or "the hostage" whenever this name comes up. I wonder just how you are using the term "hostage" in your memorandum. The dictionary definition in part is that "the state of a person given or kept as a pledge pending the fulfillment of a future demand, as a threat." That is Webster's definition. Webster also defines "hostage" as "the state of a guest, hence the state of a hostage treated as a guest."

As you use it, is it the former or the latter?

Mr. CARR. You say the last was the state of a guest?

Senator JACKSON. There are two alternative definitions. They are not quite reconcilable. Let me give you the latter.

I am asking how he used the word "hostage" in his memorandum.

Senator McCARTHY. I would like to have you go over it again, if you would.

Senator JACKSON. Webster's dictionary—that is a pretty good source—states that "It is the state of a person given or kept as a pledge pending the fulfillment of a future demand, as a threat." That is the first definition.

Then the second one is that "It is the state of a guest, hence the state of a hostage treated as a guest."

How did you use the word "hostage"?

Mr. CARR. I think that I first used the word hostage from association with Mr. Adams. He first used the word "hostage." I had in mind, to make a long sentence, I had in mind that he had in mind that this was a person whom they could—that this was an object or person that they could hold over our head in order to put pressure on us.

Senator JACKSON. In other words, you were using it in the sense of a threat?

Mr. CARR. I would say loosely in the sense of a threat; yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. What did the Army threaten to do to Schine if the hearings were not called off?

Mr. CARR. What did they threaten to do with Schine?

Senator JACKSON. Yes; what did the Army threaten to do with Schine if the hearings were not called off?

Mr. CARR. One thing that they threatened to do was to ship him overseas before he had finished his training. I shouldn't say "the Army." Mr. Adams made that statement.

Senator JACKSON. Are you sure that—I wasn't quite certain from previous testimony—that Mr. Adams had definitely threatened to send him before he had finished basic training?

Mr. CARR. That was the interpretation I placed on it. I don't know what day he intended him to go.

Senator JACKSON. When was that first date when he threatened to send him overseas before finishing basic training?

Mr. CARR. It was on the 14th of January.

Senator JACKSON. How could you have in mind that threat when—

Mr. CARR. I didn't say I had in mind that threat, sir.

Senator JACKSON. But this memorandum was written on December 9. You used the word "hostage" in the first paragraph.

Mr. CARR. That is right, and you gave the term "threat" to it from the dictionary, and I have adopted the dictionary. I said that I had in mind—

Senator JACKSON. What threat did you have in mind on December 9 when you used the word "hostage"?

Mr. CARR. I didn't say I had in mind a threat on that date. I used the word "hostage" as a word that Mr. Adams had used and as a word that I meant to mean holding somebody over our head to use pressure on us.

Senator JACKSON. As I read the second sentence in your December 9 memorandum:

What I want to tell you—

this is to Senator McCarthy—

is that I am getting fed up with the way the Army is trying to use Schine as a hostage to pressure us to stop our hearings on the Army.

What could they have done to Schine at that time?

Mr. CARR. What could they have done to Schine?

Senator JACKSON. Yes. This was December 9. He was getting his passes right along, wasn't he?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. The use of the word "hostage" goes back to Adams' use of the word "hostage." I don't claim that I am using the word "hostage" in this sense or in any sense in the strict dictionary sense. I am using it as Mr. Adams used it, as I thought he used it, I should say, as a means of dangling a little bit of pressure over us or indicating that he could do favors for him if we would do favors for the Army.

Senator JACKSON. Then with reference to the December 9 memorandum of yours, Mr. Carr, when you used the word "hostage" you didn't have in mind then that the Army could do anything to hurt Schine?

Mr. CARR. I wouldn't say that I had in mind they could do anything to hurt Schine.

Senator JACKSON. They had been pretty fair with him up to that time, hadn't they? He had been getting extra passes, more than the normal draftee was getting, isn't that correct?

Mr. CARR. Yes, the Army had been fair with him at that time.

Senator JACKSON. As far as you knew at that time, you didn't know of anything that they were doing or contemplated doing that would come within the category of a threat?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Senator JACKSON. You also state in the memorandum down in the next paragraph that:

I did say that I thought it wasn't fair of them to take it out on Schine because we were investigating the Army, or to keep using it to try to stop our investigations.

Actually at that time were they taking anything out on Schine? I am just reading the—

Mr. CARR. No, that is a statement that I think—at this point is a little difficult for me to say exactly what I had in mind when this thing was dictated. I think that the statement you just read, which is in the second paragraph, is the—

Senator JACKSON. Yes. It is the next to the last sentence in the second paragraph.

Mr. CARR. Right.

Senator JACKSON. You see you talk in terms as if it were going on now. In other words "I did say I thought it wasn't fair of them to take it out on Schine."

You didn't have in mind that they were taking it out on Schine at that time.

Mr. CARR. No. If you will recall my testimony—

Senator McCARTHY. May I have a copy of that memorandum? Do you have one there, Jim?

Senator JACKSON. In the next paragraph—

Senator McCARTHY. Will you hold it, Senator, until I get the memorandum? All right, sir.

Senator JACKSON. In the next paragraph you say:

I am convinced that they will keep right on trying to blackmail us as long as Schine is in the Army.

Senator McCARTHY. What page are you on, Senator?

Senator JACKSON. The memorandum of December 9. That is what I have been referring to all the time. It is on page 5 of the printed one.

Senator McCARTHY. Thank you very much.

Senator JACKSON (reading) :

I am convinced that they will keep right on trying to blackmail us as long as Schine is in the Army.

Do I understand that they were blackmailing you during this time?

Mr. CARR. This is a reference to the part of my testimony this morning where Adams said to me, "What's there in it for us if we do something for Schine?"

The use of the word "blackmail" here by me is as sort of an extortion, use for extortion.

Senator JACKSON. A pretty serious charge. Blackmail is a felony, isn't it?

Mr. CARR. Well, I—

Senator McCARTHY. Could I suggest, Senator Jackson—

Senator MUNDT. Senator Jackson's time has expired.

Senator POTTER, you have 10 minutes.

Senator McCARTHY. Point of order, then.

Senator POTTER. Senator Dirksen explored with you adjectives that have been used to describe you in connection with this hearing, one being strong and the other silent. And I believe that under your oath to the committee there is some reason to call you both strong and silent. I believe another adjective also has been applied to you also during the course of the hearing, not only strong and silent but a hungry man.

Mr. CARR. There is some evidence of that, too, I dare say.

Senator POTTER. Do you care to let your physical being stand in mute evidence that you are at times a hungry man?

Mr. CARR. Yes. I might say that hungry means for food.

Senator POTTER. Yes. I think that evidence could speak for itself. Mr. Carr, what is the status—what is your status within the committee staff organization? Do you receive orders from the chief counsel or does he receive orders from you, or are both of you on a par and receive orders from the chairman?

Mr. CARR. I would say we are more or less on a par, if you wanted to make an organizational chart of the thing. We both receive orders from the chairman and members of the committee, and we attempt to coordinate them between us and correlate our duties between us.

Senator POTTER. If there is a certain investigation to be held, for example, would the chief counsel tell you, "We are going to this field and there are certain areas, certain things we should look for," and then you would take over from there, is that essentially correct? or would you say—go ahead.

Mr. CARR. Not exactly, sir. The chief counsel works along with us in connection with our investigation. I feel that, as the investigative arm, as you might say, that it is more or less my function and the function of the investigators to do everything we can to see that counsel who is going to present the case, as it were, in the hearings, has what he needs.

Senator POTTER. As the chief administrative officer of the committee staff, do you supervise the entire personnel or just the investigators?

Mr. CARR. Well, all of the personnel on the staff, aside from the clerical, are really investigators. Some five of them are lawyers. But the amount of legal work, as such, is not too great. It is mostly investigative work. I do supervise them. A question involving some more serious, or a need for a serious knowledge and more complete knowledge of legal aspects of a particular matter, it is always turned over to Mr. Cohn to be sure to check.

Senator POTTER. What about the women members of the staff, the clerical personnel. Do you supervise them?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator POTTER. Now, Mr. Carr, you have testified to the fact that during your FBI work, it was customary procedure to make many memoranda, and I believe Senator McCarthy mentioned that you had been instructed for your committee work here when informers were brought into it, no memorandum was made. Is that correct?

Mr. CARR. That is the Senator's instructions, yes.

Senator POTTER. But I notice the memorandum that you have submitted here—is this typical of the subject matter of the memoranda that you would make as staff director of the committee?

Mr. CARR. Well, I don't know about typical. These are memoranda that I did make.

Senator POTTER. These are memoranda where no informer is mentioned. It is on a problem with which the committee is confronted. The reason I am asking the question, Mr. Carr, is because I assume that there are probably other memoranda dealing with other general subjects, is that correct, in your files?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator POTTER. So the memoranda that are submitted here are not all the memoranda that you have prepared?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Senator POTTER. Mr. Carr, you heard Mr. Adams testify concerning what took place on that famous automobile ride in New York from the courthouse to the hotel, when Mr. Adams missed his train, he claims, three times. I believe you testified this morning that during that automobile ride, Mr. Cohn, I believe, was the driver, there was quite an animated conversation. Do you agree that it was quite animated?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator POTTER. But it is your testimony that the discussion during that automobile trip concerned General Lawton, is that correct?

Mr. CARR. It did, sir.

Senator POTTER. Was David Schine mentioned during the course of that conversation?

Mr. CARR. As I said this morning, his name was mentioned at the luncheon when Mr. Adams said, "Let's talk about Schine." It is my recollection that his name was not mentioned at any point during the automobile ride.

Senator POTTER. When Mr. Adams testified, he intimated that there was a certain amount of friction between Mr. Cohn and Senator McCarthy at the same time, and he stated that after he had returned and

talked with you about this automobile ride, when Mr. Adams stated that he was left off in the middle of the street and had to catch a cab to get to the depot in a hurry to catch his train, that you stated that "You should have seen what happened to Senator McCarthy."

I would like to quote to you from the testimony of Mr. Adams on that, so I will be quoting correctly. This is Mr. Adams stating—this is on page 2592:

Mr. Carr told me a few days later that he didn't think that I should feel badly about the way I was put out of the car because he said I should have been there to see the way Senator McCarthy left the car a few blocks later.

Did you say that, Mr. Carr?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Senator POTTER. Did you say anything in substance that would give Mr. Adams any reason to make that statement under oath?

Mr. CARR. No, sir; I didn't. I can see no reason why I would have said it, since Senator McCarthy and Mr. Cohn appeared to be in agreement about this subject of possible reprisals against persons who had helped the committee.

Senator POTTER. And you heard Mr. Adams state that the main source of—that the main subject of conversation was Mr. Schine, and you state that was not so; it was General Lawton?

Mr. CARR. He is mistaken; yes, sir.

Senator POTTER. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MUNDT. Thank you.

Senator SYMINGTON, you have 10 minutes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Carr, you are the executive director of the staff, is that right?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you tell me briefly what your functions are in that capacity?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. Briefly I am the administrator of the office staff. I supervise and follow the work of the investigators and the clerical force. I also, however, investigate myself, as I understand and I know Mr. Cohn does.

Senator SYMINGTON. I think you want to change the way that sounded a little bit.

Mr. CARR. Well, I also investigate, myself, and Mr. Cohn investigates.

Senator McCARTHY. I think Senator Symington has a good point.

Senator SYMINGTON. You act as an investigator yourself?

Mr. CARR. Right.

Senator SYMINGTON. And you came out of the FBI where you had a great desire for efficiency and office routine and clerical routine?

Mr. CARR. The FBI does have great efficiency in office and clerical routine; yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you assign all investigators to their particular jobs? Are they all under you?

Mr. CARR. Yes, I think you could say all the investigators are under me.

Senator SYMINGTON. So you know what each investigator is doing at any particular time in a general way? He is assigned a mission and he carries out that mission under your supervision; is that right?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. In a general way, yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do the members of your staff, as director, do they report back to you the results and accomplishments of their investigations periodically?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. When they report, do they make written reports or oral reports, or both?

Mr. CARR. Both.

Senator SYMINGTON. If they made an oral report, do you write a memorandum or do they write a memorandum for the files on the contents of that report?

Mr. CARR. Not in all cases; no, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Tell me a little about it, how they decide or you decide that it is to be done or not to be done?

Mr. CARR. For instance, an investigator might tell me of a certain bit of information he had received which was a decisive bit of progress in some investigation he was carrying on. He might tell me what had happened up to that point. He might go back and write a memorandum to that point. He might go back and not write a memorandum. He might do additional work and subsequently write a memorandum.

Senator SYMINGTON. But generally he would have a memorandum when the job was closed, wouldn't he?

Mr. CARR. In most cases, he would, yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Don't you think it is important to have written records of the results of any investigations in the files?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; I think it is important.

Senator SYMINGTON. Wouldn't it be important to have a record in the files? For example, a staff member might get sick or go to work on another job or go to another town. It would be important, therefore, for him to leave a record if possible, wouldn't it?

Mr. CARR. It might.

Senator SYMINGTON. Are you familiar with this mimeographed document I have here, called Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Filing and Administration?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me read to you a paragraph from page 7.

Senator McCARTHY. May I have a copy of that first, Senator?

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me read to you a paragraph on page 7, quote:

The results of all interviews and investigations should be made a matter of record for the appropriate investigative file by preparing memorandums or reports for that file. In most cases the preparation of a memorandum by the staff member will be sufficient to keep a case file record of the investigation being conducted.

On that basis, it would seem to be routine, wouldn't it, except in extraordinary cases, to have a file of any particular investigation?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. As I understand this morning, Private Schine does not report to you, is that correct?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. To whom does he report?

Mr. CARR. Usually—

Senator SYMINGTON. Or did he report?

Mr. CARR. Usually he reports to the Senator, and as I said this morning, his work was coordinating with me through Mr. Cohn.

Senator SYMINGTON. I see. As administrative head of the staff, are you also in control of the files of the investigating subcommittee, the files themselves?

Mr. CARR. Technically, I assume you are right, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you want to—

Mr. CARR. I am not in physical control of them.

Senator SYMINGTON. But technically they are under your supervision, is that right?

Mr. CARR. That is right.

Senator SYMINGTON. Are all documents which relate to committee investigations placed in these files?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. If they are not in the files, where are they placed?

Mr. CARR. For instance, an investigator might receive information from a confidential informant, which information would be of value in connection with an executive or a public hearing which might be conducted. He may have notes on that. The fact that the witness testified before the subcommittee and was asked questions which the investigator had in his notes or had turned over on a slip of paper to the counsel or the chairman might not be recorded in the files. That is one example. His notes or penciled memorandums might be destroyed and undoubtedly would be.

Senator SYMINGTON. Ultimately, do all summarized reports get into the file, or do all final reports get into the files, or do you have in effect two sets of files, one that are too secret to be in the general files, and one that are not too secret?

Mr. CARR. No, sir. There is only one set of files.

Senator SYMINGTON. Only one set of files. Is there any committee classification put on material going into the files? In other words, are some documents marked "Secret" and some not?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do Senators on the committee also have access to these files?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do the investigators on the staff have free access to the committee files?

Mr. CARR. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do the secretaries and clerical assistants also have free access to the files?

Mr. CARR. No, sir. That is another matter. There is a girl who handles the files, the filing clerk. She has access to the files. She files the material as it comes in. She takes care of the file room. She has access to them, of course, physical access. The personnel, the clerical personnel aside from her would have physical access, yes, but they are not supposed to and do not go down and look through the files.

Senator SYMINGTON. Suppose your secretary wanted to get a file, Mr. Carr, could she go down and lift the file out of the files, or would she have to ask the file clerk?

Mr. CARR. Physically she could do it. The proper way to do it and the way I think she would do it would be to go down and ask the file clerk.

Senator SYMINGTON. She would be violating the regulation if she did it herself?

Mr. CARR. I don't think she would be violating a regulation; no sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. In other words, if any file clerk or any secretarial help really wanted to see the files, they could, is that correct?

Mr. CARR. No. My secretary—

Senator SYMINGTON. I am only trying to find out.

Mr. CARR. My secretary would not be violating any regulation if she went down to get the file for me. If she went down on an afternoon just to browse through the files—

Senator SYMINGTON. I understand. She has access to the files for you.

Mr. CARR. Right.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do all the investigators have access, too?

Mr. CARR. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do members of the staff of other committees have access to the files of this committee?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do members of the staff of Senators who are on the committee have access to the files?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Of this committee?

Mr. CARR. No, sir. I have never known one to go to the files.

Senator SYMINGTON. Does the minority counsel have access to the files?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Could I ask you to prepare a list for me, Mr. Carr, showing persons of all categories who have free access to committee files and the approximate time involved in each category?

Mr. CARR. I could do that for you right now if you want to take the time.

Senator SYMINGTON. All right; fine.

Mr. CARR. The committee members have free access to the files. I, as staff director, have free access to the files.

Senator SYMINGTON. Who is that?

Mr. CARR. I do, myself.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

Mr. CARR. Mr. Cohn does. Mr. Kennedy does. The rest of the legal counsel and the investigators do. Those are the only persons that I would say have free access to the files. I might qualify that by saying this, that—

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me interrupt you a minute to be sure. The file clerk has access to the files?

Mr. CARR. The file clerk.

Senator SYMINGTON. And any clerical supporter, or rather aid, your secretary, Mr. Cohn's secretary, Senator McCarthy's secretary—they have access to the files if they go down to get the files for you, isn't that right?

Mr. CARR. No, sir. Your statement is just a little too broad there. My secretary or Mr. Cohn's secretary would have access to the files if she went down there for me. The access would be through the file clerk. However, I don't preclude the possibility that if the file

clerk wasn't there, they could physically find the file. The secretary, your secretary, the secretary of Senator McCarthy or any other member of the committee, would not, if the question came to me, have access to the files. If you wanted something, if your secretary wanted something for you, it would come by request and then the clerk would get the file for you.

Senator MUNDT. Senator McCarthy or Mr. Cohn, you have 10 minutes.

Mr. COHN. No questions.

Senator MUNDT. I beg your pardon, it is not your time.

Senator Dworshak, I am sorry. Senator Dworshak, you have 10 minutes.

Senator DWORSHAK. Mr. Carr, you have not been present throughout all of these hearings, because you were released a few weeks ago, but I am sure you have observed that there has been created the impression that the Department of the Army has been somewhat lax in dealing with subversives and security risks within the Department. You have had extensive experience with the FBI. I realize you joined this committee only about 11 months ago, but based on your experience in dealing with the various agencies and bureaus of the executive department, I would like to have your observation as to whether you believe the Department of the Army under Secretary Stevens is doing an efficient job in rooting out these subversives.

Mr. CARR. Well, sir, I think that I will have to qualify any opinion that I might make to my own knowledge. The only knowledge I have of the operation of the Army in regard to security risks, or perhaps anything else, is in connection with the investigations that I have been connected with. They had a situation at Fort Monmouth. That is the biggest problem that I know they had. They did have some—at least two—persons who were Communists or extremely pro-Communist whom they suspended in the New York area.

Senator DWORSHAK. Do you think comparable conditions exist in other Army installations?

Mr. CARR. I don't know. I have read pieces in the paper, but I don't know of my own knowledge that they do exist in other places.

Senator DWORSHAK. In your experience as an official of the FBI, did you have an opportunity to contact and work with the Department of the Army? Haven't you been aware of the activities of the Department in regard to this subversive program?

Mr. CARR. Well, in my own personal experience with the FBI, I had very little contact with the Army intelligence agencies, personal contact with the Army intelligence agencies.

Senator DWORSHAK. We realize that as a result of the prodding of the investigations subcommittee at Fort Monmouth, the Army probably has been accelerating its work there. Do you think that if the subcommittee were to withdraw entirely from its investigation there and in other Army installations, that there would be a tendency to coddle subversives and security risks within the Army?

Mr. CARR. I don't think at this time the Army is going to coddle any security risks; no, sir. I think enough attention has been drawn to it. I think the Army will do a fast job of trying to get rid of Communists.

Senator DWORSHAK. You can conceive of no reason why they should do otherwise, can you?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Senator DWORSHAK. Therefore, you will concede that the American people have no reason to be apprehensive about the possibilities of having espionage actively working within the Army?

Mr. CARR. I think that the American people might well be apprehensive about questions of espionage at all times, within the Army and without it. The Communists are always vigilant and I think the American people should be vigilant also.

Senator DWORSHAK. You also will concede that Secretary Stevens, as a patriotic American, ought to be interested in rooting out and exposing these subversive forces wherever they may be found within the Army?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. And I may say in that regard, with the subcommittee there was never any question of Secretary Stevens not being anxious to rid the Army of Communists. The only trouble came when the subcommittee wanted to find out who was responsible for allowing the Communists to be there.

Senator DWORSHAK. Do you think, then, at lower levels there was a tendency to cover up and protect those who had been too lenient and too coddling in dealing with this particular problem?

Mr. CARR. I think there had been. I don't know whether it still exists.

Senator DWORSHAK. You don't know what?

Mr. CARR. I don't know whether it still exists now. I think there has been.

Senator DWORSHAK. You think in the future there will be a greater inclination to do an effective job?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. I think that is true of not only the Army but the Navy and all executive branches, or legislative branches whenever you have an exposé of some laxity in another agency that doesn't take advantage of finding out somebody else's faults, it itself is very much at fault.

Senator DWORSHAK. It is essential if we are building up a national preparedness and defense establishment, we must be absolutely certain that we do not have these subversive forces within our armed services. That is very apparent; is it not?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; and I think as a result of this Investigations Subcommittee, the Department of Defense in April revised many of its regulations concerning the Communist threat.

Senator DWORSHAK. And we can look for a decided improvement in the future in the handling of this program?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; I think so.

Senator DWORSHAK. From the standpoint of the top echelon and also from the security boards?

Mr. CARR. I look for it, sir; yes, sir.

Senator DWORSHAK. One more question. What do you think the Army could have done for David Schine if the relations between the Army and this subcommittee at Fort Monmouth had been more agreeable?

Mr. CARR. Could I have that question again, please?

Senator MUNDT. Will the reporter read the question, please?
(The reporter read from his notes as requested.)

Senator DWORSHAK. In other words, it has been pointed out that David Schine was more or less a hostage, and that there may have been discrimination because of the lack of adequate response or full cooperation on the part of the staff of this committee. Now, what do you think—what treatment might he have expected if this relationship had been more agreeable?

Mr. CARR. Well, I think that—I can't complain about Schine's treatment.

Senator DWORSHAK. You don't?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Senator DWORSHAK. You think, then, that David Schine was not discriminated against, and that while he may not have received any preferential treatment, because he is still a private, that you think he got about what he was entitled to, the same as any other enlistee or draftee entering the Army?

Mr. CARR. Well, General Ryan has testified that he got no special privilege. I don't have any knowledge that he got less than special privilege; no, sir.

Senator DWORSHAK. You don't think, then, that he should have received a commission—

Mr. CARR. No; excuse me. He received less than the ordinary—

Senator DWORSHAK. He should have followed the regular routine and qualified, and if he were competent in every way, then he should have received a commission; otherwise none?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. I think that the ordinary procedure, yes.

Senator DWORSHAK. But if you did have any interest or made any contacts with the Department of the Army to urge some preferential treatment, I will say alleged preferential treatment, for David Schine, you feel that he was not discriminated against, and that it is not justifiable to say that he was held as a hostage?

Mr. CARR. Well, the word "hostage" is Mr. Adams' word. I think that they were trying to use Dave Schine as they were trying to use other things, to stop the hearings; yes, sir.

Senator DWORSHAK. In other words, David Schine has received about the same treatment that other young men entering the Army receive, is that right?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; I think so.

Senator DWORSHAK. That is all.

Senator MUNDT. Now, Senator McCarthy or Mr. Cohn, you have 10 minutes.

Senator McCARTHY. I will yield my time that I have to Mr. Cohn. Do you have any questions, Mr. Cohn?

Mr. COHN. No, sir; I don't.

Senator McCARTHY. I have no questions.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Welch or Mr. St. Clair, you have 10 minutes.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Mr. Carr, it has been said that some time previous to the start of these hearings, there was a loyalty oath circulated in your office. Is that correct?

Mr. CARR. It has been said, yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Is that correct? Was there such an oath circulated?

Mr. CARR. No, sir. I don't think so.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Did you sign anything that anyone could call a loyalty oath?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Did you sign any form of paper that indicated your support of Mr. Cohn?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. To your knowledge, did anyone under your supervision sign such a paper?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. It is your testimony, then, sir, that no such paper exists?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. And never did exist?

Mr. CARR. No, sir. My testimony—it is not my testimony that no such paper exists. It is my testimony that to my knowledge no such paper exists.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Have you heard others talk about it?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. I have seen it in the newspaper.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Have you heard Mr. Juliana talk about it?

Mr. CARR. No; I don't think I have, although I won't say that I haven't. I have heard a lot of talk about it; yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Would such a paper be in the files of the committee, subcommittee?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Insofar as you personally know, no such paper exists; is that correct?

Mr. CARR. I have never seen any such paper; no, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. And you have not signed it?

Mr. CARR. I have never been asked to sign it; no, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Now, Mr. Carr, when you first came to this committee, it was in the middle of July?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. I take it that you must have met Mr. Schine about that time; is that correct?

Mr. CARR. I can't be sure of this, sir, but I don't believe that I saw Mr. Schine until sometime in August, I think around the time we were holding the hearings on the Government Printing Office.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. About when would that be, Mr. Carr?

Mr. CARR. The second week in August, the second or third, maybe the last week in August.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. So you were on the job for a month before you met him; is that correct?

Mr. CARR. With the exception of—

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Of the handshake?

Mr. CARR (continuing). Of the handshake, I think that is about correct. I can't swear to that. I may have seen him before, but my best recollection is sometime in August.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. So it was about the 1st or 2d week in August before you met him in connection with your duties as staff director. That is what I am getting at.

Mr. CARR. About the 2d or 3d.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. About the 2d or 3d week?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Do you know what he was doing during the period from July 16, when you first came to this committee, and the 2d or 3d week of August, Mr. Carr?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Was he working for the subcommittee, sir?

Mr. CARR. That is my understanding; yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. I take it he was not working under your direction?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. I also understood you to say this morning, Mr. Carr, that Mr. Schine was a part-time consultant. Is that correct?

Mr. CARR. That is correct.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. At the same time he was acting as a part-time consultant for this subcommittee, he was also running a business, didn't you say?

Mr. CARR. That is my understanding; yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. That was a fairly substantial business, was it not?

Mr. CARR. I understand it is.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Involving the affairs of several hotels, theaters?

Mr. CARR. That is my understanding.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Therefore, it follows, does it not, that not too much of his time was available for this subcommittee; is that correct?

Mr. CARR. I wouldn't say that.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Well, would you say that he spent half of his time running this large business and half of his time working for this subcommittee?

Mr. CARR. No, sir, I couldn't say that.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Could you make any estimate as to what portions of his time were used in running the affairs of the business and what portion was used in working for this subcommittee?

Mr. CARR. I don't think I could make any good estimate; no, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Is it fair to say, Mr. Carr, that you saw Mr. Schine infrequently?

Mr. CARR. Yes.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. I think you have told us that whatever work Mr. Schine did come to you through Mr. Cohn.

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Is that correct?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. I take it, then, that if Mr. Schine wrote any reports or memoranda, they would have been handed to Mr. Cohn and Mr. Cohn handed them to you, is that correct?

Mr. CARR. Not necessarily. Mr. Cohn might tell me about them.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. He might tell you about them. Just so we can get at it a little quicker, did you ever see any memorandum that Mr. Cohn said had been written by Mr. Schine?

Mr. CARR. Yes.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. When did you see the first such memorandum or report?

Mr. CARR. I don't recall seeing any report in the sense that I think you are using it.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Some writing that would evidence some work for the subcommittee in the form of either a report or a memorandum?

Mr. CARR. Right. I believe I saw a memoranda from Mr. Schine during the period of late July, August, around there.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. That was something Mr. Cohn handed you for the files?

Mr. CARR. No, I don't recall he handed it to me.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. He simply told you about it?

Mr. CARR. As I recall, he said, "Here is a memoranda of Schine's," and I never saw it other than his saying that. He said, "Here is a memoranda of Schine's," and he told me something about it. I recall one of those occasions.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Did you ever have occasion to refer to it again?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. So you can tell us nothing about it?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. When you first came to this subcommittee, did you at some time learn that Mr. Schine was being considered for a commission in the Army?

Mr. CARR. Not when I first came with the subcommittee.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. When did you first learn that fact?

Mr. CARR. I think it was some time after I had been with the committee, a few weeks.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. A few weeks?

Mr. CARR. Maybe. I am not sure.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You talked with Mr. Cohn almost daily, I take it, when you first came with the subcommittee?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. During that time, he never told you about Mr. Schine's possible commission in the Army?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. I have said he had. He did. I heard about it.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Yes, but you said it would be several weeks after you came. I am trying to find out when you first learned about it.

Mr. CARR. I can't say. I don't know when I first learned it.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You came with the subcommittee in the middle of July?

Mr. CARR. That is right.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Would you say you had heard of it before the end of July?

Mr. CARR. I really couldn't say. I may have. I knew that he was applying for a Reserve commission.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Did you not learn that General Reber is supposed to have promised him such a commission?

Mr. CARR. I learned that not during that period.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. When did you learn that first?

Mr. CARR. Some time later.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. That doesn't help me very much, Mr. Carr. Give me at least a month, if you can.

Mr. CARR. I am not sure that I can. I did learn it some time later.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. It would have been important to you as the staff director to learn, would it not, that your principal consultant was about ready to get a commission in the Army, wouldn't it?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You were counting on his services in running the affairs of this subcommittee, weren't you?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; but I would like to state, if I may, from what information I had he was applying for a Reserve commission. At that point I didn't know whether he was going in the Army or not.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. It was important for you to know that, wasn't it?

Mr. CARR. It might become important for me to know that.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You considered that his function was an important function for the subcommittee, didn't you?

Mr. CARR. Yes, I did.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. And therefore you would like to know what availability this man would have to the committee in the immediate future, wouldn't you?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; I think I would.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. So you now say you didn't even inquire as to whether or not he was going to get a commission soon?

Mr. CARR. No, sir; I didn't inquire about the commission.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You paid no attention to the matter, is that right?

Mr. CARR. No, sir; I think it was—

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You paid some attention to the matter?

Mr. CARR. I think we must be sure we are talking about the same thing.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Let's be sure. I am talking about the matter of a commission for one G. David Schine.

Mr. CARR. Right.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. What are you talking about?

Mr. CARR. I am talking about the matter of a Reserve commission for one G. David Schine.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. All right. I will amend mine by putting in a Reserve commission.

Mr. CARR. Right. Since it was a Reserve commission, and at that time I had no great interest in it, I didn't know whether he was going in the Army or not.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Well, when did you learn that that commission would not be forthcoming?

Mr. CARR. I think the first time I learned that it would not be forthcoming was when Secretary Stevens talked about it on October 2.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. At that late date. That is when you first learned that it would not be forthcoming.

Mr. CARR. I think so. It may have been earlier.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Then the matter was still open and active insofar as you as staff director were concerned at that time.

Mr. CARR. Would you read the question, please, Mr. Reporter?

(The reporter read from his notes as requested.)

Mr. CARR. Could you explain the question, please, sir?

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Perhaps it is not a very clear question. I thought you testified that the first you learned that Mr. Schine was not going to get a commission was as late as October 2?

Mr. CARR. That is it. It may have been earlier—

Mr. ST. CLAIR. So prior to October 2 you must have thought he might still be going to get that commission?

Mr. CARR. I might have; yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Are you not very sure about it, Mr. Carr?

Mr. CARR. No; I am not.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You could be mistaken?

Mr. CARR. I could be mistaken.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Could you be—

Senator MUNDT. Your time has expired, Mr. St. Clair.

The clock on the wall seems to indicate it is 3:30, so we will take our customary 5-minute seventh-inning stretch at this time.

(Brief recess.)

Senator MUNDT. The committee will please come to order. The Chair feels confident that about the same audience is here now as was here before the recess, so it is unnecessary to remind you of the committee rule against audible manifestations of approval or disapproval. I will assume a risk by saying, like Calvin Coolidge's relationship to sin, "We are agin it." I'm sure you will comply with that admonition.

We had concluded one go-around with our questioning, and I will ask counsel Prewitt whether he has any other questions at this time.

Mr. PREWITT. I will pass.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Prewitt passes.

The Chair has just a few questions.

Mr. CARR, I was interested in your replies to the questions propounded by Senator Dirksen, that you had, after graduating from Brown University, gone to the law school specifically to become a member of the FBI. I might say one of the good things about these hearings is we are getting better acquainted with our staff members than we ever had the opportunity to do before. I didn't know that. Let me ask you a question or two about your work in the FBI, with which you say you were connected for 11 years. What were you doing in the FBI immediately before you came to the committee, insofar as you do not violate FBI regulations in discussing your duties and functions?

Mr. CARR. I was supervisor of the security matters section in the New York field division of the FBI, engaged in the investigation of communism, sir.

Senator MUNDT. As supervisor, did you have men under you, over whom you were in control?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator MUNDT. About how large a staff did you have there if that is permissible to tell?

Mr. CARR. A very large number, sir.

Senator MUNDT. By that you would say as large as your staff here, or considerably larger?

Mr. CARR. Many times larger, sir.

Senator MUNDT. Many times larger. In the course of your experience with the FBI, did you take some of the in-training courses that the FBI has for its agents and operatives?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir, I did; several of them.

Senator MUNDT. Is that what they call the FBI Academy?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir, at Quantico, Va.

Senator MUNDT. Once or twice during my 16 years down here, it has been my high pleasure and happy honor to be invited to give the commencement address at the FBI Academy, and I want to say that I think it is as good a demonstration of a governmental in-training program as I have seen anywhere. Is part of your instruction there teaching you to become accurate and meticulous and precise and exact in your work and in your procedures?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator MUNDT. And you took that course on more than one occasion?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. The original training course and then approximately every year or 18 months a retraining course here in Washington and at Quantico, Va.

Senator MUNDT. The Chair is correct, I believe, in his recollection, is he not, that you came to our committee direct from the FBI?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator MUNDT. You had no intermediary period of either employment or unemployment?

Mr. CARR. That is correct, sir.

Senator MUNDT. Another question I want to ask relates to this train ride that we have heard so much about. I am not sure that we can throw any additional light on that. But, at any time in that 3½-hour train ride, did you endeavor to put pressure on Mr. Adams in any way to induce him to do something favorable to Mr. Schine?

Mr. CARR. No, sir; not at that time nor any other.

Senator MUNDT. Nor at any other time?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Senator MUNDT. Your testimony is that at no time did you ever, directly or indirectly, contact Secretary Stevens or Mr. Adams, pressuring them to do something toward Schine which they would not have done had there been no such man in this world as Frank Carr, is that right?

Mr. CARR. That is right, sir.

Senator MUNDT. I think Mr. Adams testified that you had talked to him about certain difficulties which had arisen between your shop and his shop in the course of these investigations. I suggested to him that perhaps, as he had testified to us, it was part of his, Adams, to quote him, "business" to keep this cooperative program going, to keep the train on the track, to keep a workable arrangement between the members of his staff and the members of your staff. Do you recall that testimony?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir, I think I do.

Senator MUNDT. I wondered if it would be a fair statement to say that on occasion, in conversing with Adams, you considered it part of your "business" to use his phrase, likewise to try to keep the members of his shop and the members of your shop working together on this cooperative formula?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir, I did.

Senator MUNDT. You were interested in getting the investigation concluded, to bring out the best possible results, and to do that, your major concern, as I take it, was to get these minor irritations behind you and out of the way and to develop and maintain working relationships between the Army side of this investigation and the committee side?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; and I maintained my relationships with Mr. Adams right up until the time of the original chronology of events was made public.

Senator MUNDT. Until that paper with the 34 events was published?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator MUNDT. Until that time, you and he continued, each from his own corner, to do what you could to keep this cooperative program continuing?

Mr. CARR. I did from my corner, sir; yes.

Senator MUNDT. Was it your feeling that he did from his corner, and when he would talk to you, sometimes, what he was ultimately

trying to do was to see to it that this thing didn't break down and fall apart and become an open controversy?

Mr. CARR. I think that he was trying to prevent an open controversy; yes.

Senator MUNDT. I think that concludes my questions.

Senator McClellan, you have 10 minutes.

Senator McCLELLAN. Mr. Carr, we were on your memorandum of October 2, when my time expired before.

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. I want to read the concluding paragraph of it, and I quote:

I think you should know that Mr. Stevens was very helpful and certainly indicated that he had no intention of allowing General Lawton to place his blackout of Army personnel re their possible contact with this committee.

Is that correct?

Mr. CARR. Yes, that is what it says, sir; yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. That indicates to me that up to that time Mr. Stevens was cooperating beautifully, is that correct?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. I had no trouble with Mr. Stevens.

Senator McCLELLAN. Well, I am talking about cooperating at Fort Monmouth.

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; he cooperated. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. And your complaint there, then, was against General Lawton and not against Mr. Stevens; isn't that correct?

Mr. CARR. No, sir; not specifically. I might say had I known these memoranda were going to become historic documents I might have written them a little more carefully. This was intended to mean that Mr. Stevens had been helpful in removing the, what I termed "blackout order" preventing the staff from talking to personnel at Fort Monmouth.

Senator McCLELLAN. That is exactly. But whose blackout order was it?

Mr. CARR. Well, I don't know whose blackout order it was, sir. I know that it was issued through General Lawton.

Senator McCLELLAN. Well, you refer to it as his blackout order, meaning General Lawton, don't you, in this memorandum?

Mr. CARR. Right, sir, at that time I considered it was his blackout order.

Senator McCLELLAN. Well, whose do you consider it was, now?

Mr. CARR. At this point I don't know, sir. I don't know who may have issued an order to General Lawton.

Senator McCLELLAN. Well, do you have the information—

Mr. CARR. I have none, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. That one was issued to him?

Mr. CARR. I have none, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. At that time, insofar as you know now, it was General Lawton's order, wasn't it?

Mr. CARR. The order was General Lawton's.

Senator McCLELLAN. And you went to the Secretary and got it corrected?

Mr. CARR. That is correct.

Senator McCLELLAN. Now let's go to the next one on page 5, I believe, of December 9. I don't think—well, I might ask you about this one of November 6. I quote from it:

Stevens said that if we brought out everything, he would have to resign.

You are referring there as to bringing out everything at Fort Monmouth, is that correct?

Mr. CARR. Well, this isn't my memorandum. I take that to mean, however—

Senator McCLELLAN. You were present?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. At the conference.

Mr. CARR. However, I didn't dictate the language. I take this to mean, I take this to mean that if we brought out everything that Mr. Cohn had related to him in his résumé concerning Fort Monmouth.

Senator McCLELLAN. Were you present?

Mr. CARR. At the November 6 luncheon, yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. Did you hear the résumé that Mr. Cohn gave?

Mr. CARR. Yes, I did.

Senator McCLELLAN. Then it referred to what Mr. Cohn has said as to the information they had and could develop, is that correct?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. What was in it made him think he would lose his job?

Mr. CARR. I don't know what made him think he would lose his job. As we pointed out to him—I say "We"—that is, as Senator McCarthy pointed out to him, there was nothing there that would make him lose his job or that he should consider would make him lose his job.

Senator McCLELLAN. Let me ask you now if you have developed all that information and evidence at your hearings?

Mr. CARR. I am sorry, sir, I didn't hear you.

Senator McCLELLAN. Was there developed at the subsequent hearings on Fort Monmouth all of the information in the outline as given to Secretary Stevens by Mr. Cohn? Has it all been made public yet? Have you developed it in sworn testimony, whatever he related to him that day?

Mr. CARR. All that Mr. Cohn outlined to him that day, I think, has been—this is a long time now—I think it has been developed in sworn testimony.

Senator McCLELLAN. What I am trying to determine is, is there anything else that should be developed that hasn't been that might cause him to lose his job? In other words, has there been any withholding or failure to develop whatever was outlined that day?

Mr. CARR. No, sir. If I follow your question, I don't believe that the Secretary, as the Secretary of the Army, needed to have this worry about his job.

Senator McCLELLAN. Maybe he didn't. What I am trying to determine is whether he had any basis for it or not. I am trying to determine what followed thereafter. Have you developed in the investigation of Fort Monmouth all that was outlined to the Secretary that day, or is there some more to be developed that might still have some impact upon his retaining his job?

Mr. CARR. Whether it would have an impact on his retaining his job, I don't know, but there is at least one phase of it that has not been fully developed which was called to his attention that day.

Senator McCLELLAN. That is more serious than the other that has been developed?

Mr. CARR. No, sir, I wouldn't say it was more serious, although I consider it serious.

Senator McCLELLAN. There is still some work to be done, then, on the Fort Monmouth hearings?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. I would say that there are two phases to an investigation of this type. The first phase, and a very important one, is to get rid of the Communists or the subversives or security risks found there, to get rid of them.

The second phase is to find out who was responsible for leaving them there. In many cases, who was responsible for allowing them to be reinstated.

Senator McCLELLAN. Was he referring to the fact that if you found out who was responsible for leaving them there, if you developed that, it might get his job?

Mr. CARR. I don't think so. I think what he was referring to, I think he thought if we had public hearings concerning just the amount of information that we did have public hearings on, that worried him.

Senator McCLELLAN. What you think he thought at that time has been developed up to now, hasn't it?

Mr. CARR. That is pretty hard for me to say what I think he thought, and things like that.

Senator McCLELLAN. You just said what you think you thought he thought.

Mr. CARR. I am using your words. I am trying to go along with this line of questioning. I think that the Secretary was disturbed that if public hearings developed or showed as much as Mr. Cohn outlined to him that day, he was most concerned.

Senator McCLELLAN. I will ask you this question, then: Have they up to date shown as much as Mr. Cohn outlined to him that day?

Mr. CARR. I think generally speaking, with the exception of the loyalty phase, loyalty board phase.

Senator McCLELLAN. Don't you regard that pretty serious? If somebody is responsible for keeping Communists and subversives in there and protecting them, don't you regard it as very serious?

Mr. CARR. I regard it as serious, yes.

Senator McCLELLAN. Do you think that is being done now?

Mr. CARR. I don't think it is being done now; no, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. Has it been done up until now or until just recently?

Mr. CARR. I think it was being done. I don't know because, you see, we didn't get the loyalty board people here.

Senator McCLELLAN. You have your preliminary investigation, haven't you?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. You know what it shows. You know what you think you can prove; don't you?

Mr. CARR. I don't know too much about what we can prove from the loyalty board thing, because the preliminary investigation has not

developed to the point where I could say something conclusive about it. We would have to have some of these people in to ask them some questions.

Senator McCLELLAN. I am talking just about Fort Monmouth, not the loyalty board.

Mr. CARR. Oh. Then we are not talking about the same thing. I am talking about the loyalty board, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. You haven't investigated the loyalty board yet, have you, as far as public hearings?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. Now let's go to the one of December 9. Apparently, judging from the one that I have just referred to, the first one, on October 2, everything was getting along pretty well at that time, but a month and 7 days later it seemed they had already begun to deteriorate; is that correct, judging from this memorandum?

Mr. CARR. Two months later, I thought they had; yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. Two months later?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. Two months later. You are correct.

In this you refer to a statement that you testify under oath that Mr. Adams made when he asked you, "What's there in it for us?" if he and Stevens did something for Schine. Just what do you mean by that? What did you understand him to mean at the time?

Mr. CARR. I understood him to mean when he made that statement—I understood it to be an attempt to bargain with us, to trade off shortening or ending the hearings by his making some arrangement to do something for Schine.

Senator McCLELLAN. Mr. Carr, as an investigator and a former FBI man, do you not regard such charges as that against anyone as very serious?

Mr. CARR. I certainly do.

Senator McCLELLAN. You think, then, these charges are not frivolous; that they ought to be looked into?

Mr. CARR. I told you they were serious when you first asked me.

Senator McCLELLAN. If they are true, they should be dealt with; shouldn't they?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. That is my thought about it. There has been some reference to this whole matter as frivolous, a waste of time.

Mr. CARR. Not by me, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. Not by you. But do you agree with me that if these charges are true, they indicate that immediate and prompt action should be taken to correct the situation?

Mr. CARR. It is not for me to say that, but I believe with you; yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. Thank you.

Senator MUNDT. Senator Dirksen.

Senator DIRKSEN. Mr. Carr, when Senator Mundt was carrying on a very extensive cross-examination of Mr. Adams, it runs in my mind that it was all summed up by Mr. Adams saying that while there was no affirmative act on your part to indicate influence, that you failed to speak up, that you failed to protest, that you failed to remonstrate, that you sat silent.

Do you feel that you had a duty under those circumstances to speak up and interject yourself in any kind of controversy that may have existed at that time?

Mr. CARR. In the first place, sir, I wouldn't have any duty to speak up unless I thought there was something improper. In the second place, there was nothing improper that I observed. In the third place, I might say that it is not my duty to break into the conversation of the chairman of this committee and the Secretary of the Army and tell either side what they should do. I want to emphasize that I didn't see anything improper on the side of Mr. Cohn and Senator McCarthy and myself in anything that we had done.

Senator DIRKSEN. Referring now a moment to that celebrated train ride, when did that train leave Newark Station?

Mr. CARR. It is my recollection that it was sometime in the late afternoon. I would say probably 4:30 or 5 o'clock. We arrived down here around 8 o'clock the day before Thanksgiving.

Senator DIRKSEN. So it is roughly about 4 hours or 3 3/4 hours of travel time?

Mr. CARR. Approximately; yes, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. Did you sit in the same seat together?

Mr. CARR. We traveled in luxurious style, sir. We were in a club car. He had the chair next to mine, and we luxuriated; yes, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. Did you remain in the club car all the while that you were coming down to Washington?

Mr. CARR. No, sir. We went in to dinner, and following dinner we stopped in what I think is probably the real club car, a smoking car. We smoked. I smoked a cigar. I don't know whether Mr. Adams smoked or not. It was during that period that we talked about the Pentagon press agent.

Senator DIRKSEN. Did you encumber the dinner hour with conversation about committee business and incidental matters?

Mr. CARR. No, sir. I don't say positively no.

Senator DIRKSEN. Did you get on to more pleasant subjects at any time?

Mr. CARR. During the dinner hour I very vividly recall that we discussed our own background. I recall Mr. Adams explained his and I explained mine. We discussed our families. I recall his telling me about his baby that made noises in the night; yes, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. You sort of presented yourself to each other in the best possible light, I take it?

Mr. CARR. It wasn't exactly that, sir. We had known each other for some time now, seeing each other practically every day, at least talking to each other on the phone. But this was an opportunity to sit down and relax and in an unofficial way talk.

Senator DIRKSEN. That is a good train on which to take a snooze; isn't it?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. Did you take a snooze in the course of the trip?

Mr. CARR. No, I didn't. I did read the paper, though.

Senator DIRKSEN. I have been wondering how much of that 4-hour period was devoted to these various affairs, including one G. David Schine. But enough of the train ride, Mr. Carr.

Mr. Carr, if a member of the regular subcommittee came to procure something from the files, you would know about it; wouldn't you?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; I would.

Senator DIRKSEN. And if a member of the regular subcommittee sent a staff member from his office to procure something from the files, you would know about it, wouldn't you?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir, I would.

Senator DIRKSEN. You have been with the committee roughly about 11 months, haven't you?

Mr. CARR. That is correct, yes.

Senator DIRKSEN. And taking out the time of this investigation, we might say it was what, 9½ months?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. Now, then, in that 9½-months' period, how many members of the subcommittee actually came to the committee room to talk to you or someone else in authority and procure something from the committee files?

Mr. CARR. I can't recall any member of the subcommittee coming to my office or the subcommittee offices to procure anything from the file. I believe that on 1, maybe 2, occasions for some reason or another, an executive meeting of the committee was held in my office and some members of the subcommittee came to the office for that purpose.

Senator DIRKSEN. Would you interpret that—and I speak very impersonally because it includes me, you see, and I have to take my full share of the responsibility—as either being too busy or being a little indifferent, or having complete confidence in what the committee staff was doing?

Mr. CARR. I would say that it would be a combination of being too busy to personally come down there. I know that on many occasions—I can't say many occasions, I know on some occasions, members of the subcommittee have called me or other staff members on the phone, and requested things. They have been sent to them. I know during the course of Senator Potter's investigation concerning the war atrocities, that he was in contact with myself and Don O'Donnell on many occasions.

Senator DIRKSEN. May I say in behalf of Senator Potter, he did a magnificent job on that Korean atrocities picture. Would you agree?

Mr. CARR. I think so, too, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. Yes, sir. Now, then, what is your understanding of the reserve commission as distinguished from an Army commission?

Mr. CARR. My understanding is that a Reserve is a Reserve. He doesn't go into the Army until they call him. He is held in reserve.

Senator DIRKSEN. So you believe that you were right in assuming that Mr. Schine, if he got a Reserve commission, might or might not be called at some reasonably early date?

Mr. CARR. I believe that to be a correct assumption; yes, sir, although I didn't give it much thought at the time.

Senator DIRKSEN. Now, he was an uncompensated consultant of the committee, is that correct?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. He was, therefore, no charge upon the committee funds that have been approved by a vote of the Senate?

Mr. CARR. I didn't—was what, sir?

Senator DIRKSEN. I say his services were, therefore, no charge upon the committee funds that had been approved by the Senate?

Mr. CARR. No, sir. Perhaps incidental phone calls or something like that, but there was no charge to the committee.

Senator DIRKSEN. So if, for any reason, including induction into the United States Army, his services must be dispensed with, it would be possible, of course, to secure some other investigator to take his place?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; if an investigator was necessary it could be done, yes, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. That is all.

Senator MUNDT. Senator Jackson?

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Carr, in the last hour we were on the memorandum on page 5, December 9. I was referring to the language that you used in the next to the last paragraph with reference to blackmail. Do I understand that you did not intend to use the word "blackmail" in the usual sense of that word?

Mr. CARR. I intended to use the word "blackmail" yes, sir. I don't qualify it very much. I just tell you that sometimes I use words loosely and to me I was thinking at this point blackmail in one sense of its meaning. I think that the dictionary will show that one meaning of blackmail is to extort, and that is what I was thinking of.

Senator JACKSON. And to extort is a crime?

Mr. CARR. I consider to extort a crime; yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. So it was blackmail in a lawyer's sense of the term?

Mr. CARR. Well, I wasn't using it in a lawyer's sense. I was using it in a free sense, in the sense in which this memorandum was written.

Senator JACKSON. Well, were you using it in an FBI sense? I mean, that is your training.

Mr. CARR. I don't know that I was. However, I will tell you that I thought this was an extremely serious business, yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. So on December 9, the situation was serious?

Mr. CARR. It was to me, yes.

Senator JACKSON. This was your memorandum?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. And you were stating or giving your own state of mind on that date?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. You recall the testimony in the hearings that there was a feeling that the thing, this controversy with the Army, didn't get serious until January 21.

Mr. CARR. That is correct. I recall it.

Senator JACKSON. You don't agree with that, according to this memorandum, then, do you?

Mr. CARR. Yes, I agree with that in the sense in which it was used here. I agree with that. I believe it got really serious on the 21st or 22d of January. I believe, however, that it was serious at this time, and that is why I wrote the memorandum.

Senator JACKSON. This was all released to the press in March, after the chronological list of charges had been released by the Army, right?

Mr. CARR. That is correct.

Senator JACKSON. So that the public was advised that there was blackmail going on as of December 9, at least, and that is still your opinion?

Mr. CARR. That there was—

Senator JACKSON. That there was blackmail attempted as of December 9?

Mr. CARR. In the sense of extortion—yes, I believe that.

Senator JACKSON. So as far as you are concerned, the situation was serious prior to January 21?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. In the relations with the Army, I am referring to.

Mr. CARR. The situation, sir.

Senator JACKSON. Yes, but I say that is with reference to the Army.

Mr. CARR. Yes.

Senator JACKSON. Now if you will refer to page 4, that is memorandum 7, down along about the third paragraph—

Mr. CARR. Excuse me, sir.

Senator JACKSON. Maybe it is not the same—it is the same. You have the same memoranda.

Mr. CARR. The third paragraph?

Senator JACKSON. The third paragraph:

As you know, I have on many occasions been pretty curt with Dave about the prompt submission of memoranda. However, in this current situation in view of the change of plans I cannot criticize him.

Well, now, what memos did he submit to you? Or what memoranda did he submit to you?

Mr. CARR. As I said, I don't recall any specific one that he submitted to me. That is one of the things I was questioning him about, sir.

Senator JACKSON. So far as you know, he has never submitted any memoranda to you?

Mr. CARR. So far as I know, he has never submitted any memoranda to me.

Senator JACKSON. You see, as I read your sentence, and I am looking at it literally, I don't know what you had in mind, but I am quoting you now:

As you know, I have on many occasions been curt with Dave about the prompt submission of memoranda.

That statement would imply that he would get it in, but he wasn't very prompt.

Mr. CARR. No, it might imply that, if you—

Senator JACKSON. Isn't that a reasonable implication?

Mr. CARR. That is a reasonable implication, but I believe that I wrote this having in mind that I wished he would submit more memoranda, more memoranda, and I wished he would submit them promptly.

Senator JACKSON. But all the time that you were staff director, starting in July, through this period at Fort Dix, you never received any memoranda from him? Or a memorandum of any kind relating to his work, to your knowledge?

Mr. CARR. I don't recall any, although I may have.

Senator JACKSON. Now, Mr. Carr, as I recall, and I am sure you heard the testimony, Mr. Adams testified that you had suggested to him that he should get in touch with Mr. Sokolsky; is that true?

Mr. CARR. I heard the testimony. The statement is not true.

Senator JACKSON. Well, I say his is that—

Mr. CARR. His statement that I suggested to him that he get in touch with George Sokolsky is in error; yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. You never stated that?

Mr. CARR. I don't recall ever stating that. I can—I would tell you more if you want me to.

Senator JACKSON. I am trying to figure out why you would be suggesting to Mr. Adams that he should get in touch with Mr. Sokolsky.

Mr. CARR. I didn't suggest it to him.

Senator JACKSON. You never did?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Senator JACKSON. Is it partly correct, or how does Mr. Sokolsky come into this controversy with the Army?

Mr. CARR. The statement is not correct in any way. There is a situation which I have in mind that I believe he had in mind at the time. The situation was—this was around the first part of February. I recall that Mr. Adams recalled for me in the conversation with him how helpful he and the Secretary believed Mr. Sokolsky had been at the occasion of a luncheon meeting on November 17 when Mr. Sokolsky had discussed with them the preparation of a press release which I understand they didn't use. They held a joint press conference. This is in relation to November 17 at the Merchants Club when Secretary Stevens and Senator McCarthy gave a joint press conference.

Senator JACKSON. I just couldn't understand why someone outside the Government would be in this. Was he in as a sort of friend of the court and trying to arbitrate?

Mr. CARR. No, sir. It didn't happen that way. As I stated, Mr. Adams recalled to me that Mr. Sokolsky had been helpful to the Secretary and friendly to the Secretary and to Mr. Adams at that time. This was around the first part of February, as I recall. I think he told me—I think I told him at that time, rather, "Go ahead, call him." He suggested that maybe Mr. Sokolsky could be helpful to him in connection with, if I recall correctly, this letter that Secretary Stevens subsequently sent to Senator McCarthy.

Senator JACKSON. So it is your impression that Mr. Sokolsky was quite friendly to the Secretary and was trying to help the Secretary? Is that correct?

Mr. CARR. No. I want to make this clear. Mr. Adams was of the opinion—and I think correctly so—was of the opinion that at the time of November 17, Mr. Sokolsky had been friendly to the Secretary. I don't know whether that was his first meeting or not, but he thought that Mr. Sokolsky had been friendly to the Secretary. Therefore, he thought Mr. Sokolsky might possibly be of assistance to him.

Senator JACKSON. In ironing out the differences between the Army and Senator McCarthy and the staff over the press release?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. Over the Fort Monmouth hearings, basically?

Mr. CARR. Over this November 13 press conference which Mr. Stevens had held, yes.

Senator JACKSON. Yes. But it grew out of the Fort Monmouth executive hearings?

Mr. CARR. Yes; it grew out of the Fort Monmouth hearings.

Senator JACKSON. Now let me ask you whether the Secretary, Mr. Stevens, or Mr. Adams wanted the investigation at Fort Monmouth stopped or the executive sessions, the hearings, stopped?

Mr. CARR. I think they wanted both stopped.

Senator JACKSON. What did they seem to be discussing the most? Were they talking about the executive sessions and the press releases after the executive sessions, or were they insisting on a stopping of the entire investigation, as such?

Senator MUNDT. The Senator's time has expired. The witness may answer the question.

Senator JACKSON. There is a substantial difference, you will recall.

Mr. CARR. I recall no time when either Mr. Adams or Mr. Stevens spoke to me about the press releases after the hearings. I recall Mr. Adams attended many of the press conferences following the hearings. I know that Secretary Stevens attended at least a few. At no time did they say to me, and I don't believe to Senator McCarthy or Mr. Cohn, anything about the press releases. I think that they wanted the executive sessions of the subcommittee on Fort Monmouth discontinued. I think they wanted the investigation discontinued. They said so.

Senator MUNDT. Senator Potter, you have 10 minutes.

Senator POTTER. Mr. Chairman, reference has been made to the Korean war-crime atrocity hearings of which it was my privilege to serve as chairman. I would like to state that the work of the staff in preparation for the hearings was excellent, and Mr. Carr and Mr. O'Donnell rendered great service in preparing for those hearings.

Mr. CARR. I think Mr. O'Donnell should have most of the credit on that, sir.

Senator POTTER. He did an excellent job, and your counsel was greatly appreciated.

I might also add that the Army and the Navy, the Air Force, and the Department of State, who were called on for information, were also most cooperative.

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator POTTER. Mr. Carr, in referring to your testimony this morning, I believe you mentioned the plane trip—I believe it was November 17—when you and Senator McCarthy and Mr. Cohn and Mr. Stevens and others went to Fort Dix. You were met at the airport by some of the personnel at the camp there and Private Schine. I believe you stated in your testimony this morning that Mr. Stevens said, in essence, "This is a good time to have my picture taken with Dave." Is that correct? If not, I wish you would tell me your recollection of what Mr. Stevens did say.

Mr. CARR. That is it, in essence; yes, sir.

Senator POTTER. Who did he say that to?

Mr. CARR. It is my impression he said it to Mr. Cohn as we were getting off the plane.

Senator POTTER. You have heard the testimony of Secretary Stevens, and I think Mr. Adams and others, who say—testimony which is in contradiction to yours—who say that no mention was made about having the picture taken with Mr. Schine. Is that correct? You have heard the testimony?

Mr. CARR. I have heard the testimony; yes.

Senator POTTER. You are positive in your statement under oath that Mr. Stevens did make a statement stating that, this is a good time to have his picture taken with Dave?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir, and I think the proof is that the picture was taken.

Senator PORTER. I have no further questions.

Senator MUNDT. Senator Jackson?

Pardon me. Senator Symington?

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Carr, where are the committee files kept?

Mr. CARR. Most of the committee files are kept in room 160, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Where are the others kept?

Mr. CARR. The file room is room 160. On the occasion the files will be in my office if we are working on them.

Senator SYMINGTON. That will be the only other place besides the committee room.

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would that be temporary or permanent?

Mr. CARR. In my office?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

Mr. CARR. That would be temporary; yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. In effect you previously testified that under certain circumstances all committee staff and clerical help would be able to get at the files, wouldn't they?

Mr. CARR. I testified that physically the committee staff would be able to get at the files. I think I have made it clear that clerical employees are not supposed to go down and spend their time—

Senator SYMINGTON. But you made it very clear that if, say your secretary or somebody else's secretary went down and the file clerk wasn't there or was ill that day, didn't happen to be there, she could go ahead and get the files?

Mr. CARR. She could do that; yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. So in effect the files are available to every member of the committee under certain circumstances?

Mr. CARR. That is correct.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Carr, do you know what clearance each of your staff members have, that is, each investigator, each clerical, stenographer, file clerk, and so forth?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. What are those clearances? Let me put it to you this way: Have they all got clearances from the Department of Defense and if so, on what basis?

Mr. CARR. They have clearances, varying degrees of clearances. One of them has top secret clearance on a "need to know" basis which has never been retracted. Generally they all have clearance up to and including secret.

Senator SYMINGTON. Let's see. You say one staff member has top secret clearance?

Mr. CARR. I recall that one staff member was given top secret clearance. I don't know that it was ever rescinded.

Senator SYMINGTON. All the others from the Department of Defense have secret clearance, clearance through secret, is that right?

Mr. CARR. The other clearances are through secret, yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. And it really would not make any difference whether one had top secret and all the rest had secret or one had secret and all the rest had top secret if they all had access to the files, isn't that right?

Mr. CARR. I would say that it wouldn't make a great deal of difference whether it was secret or top secret; no, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Have you any clearance from the Atomic Energy Commission and, if so, on what basis?

Mr. CARR. I don't know of my own—I don't know of any clearance from the Atomic Energy Commission.

Senator SYMINGTON. Will you check into that and make it a matter of record?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. As you know, our budget, most of our budget, depends upon our estimate of enemy strength and that, of course, has a lot to do with the Central Intelligence Agency estimates. Have we any clearance of staff members in this committee, of this committee, from the Central Intelligence Agency? Has it ever been asked for? And, if so, on what basis?

Mr. CARR. I don't know of my own knowledge whether any clearance has ever been asked of Central Intelligence Agency. I think it would probably be useless to ask an agency for clearance to investigate it.

Senator SYMINGTON. I didn't say anything about investigating.

Mr. CARR. Well, or to use the documents. I don't—

Senator SYMINGTON. In other words, as long as you brought the word up, it would be unfortunate if we had a subversive on our staff and he hadn't had clearance, and then he examined an agency and in that agency he got information which made it possible for him to betray the country?

Mr. CARR. It would be unfortunate and most unusual.

Senator SYMINGTON. Klaus Fuchs was unusual, wasn't he, and so was Mr. May?

Mr. CARR. He certainly was.

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me ask you another question. Have the staff members got clearance from the FBI, and other clerical help, and, if so, on what basis?

Senator McCARTHY. Mr. Chairman?

Senator MUNDT. Senator McCarthy, have you a point of order?

Senator McCARTHY. No; I think it is a point of personal privilege for my staff. Senator McClellan was talking about the possibility of subversives on our staff. The implication is that he knows of some subversives on the staff. He does not. If he knows of any subversive then he should take the stand and tell about him. Otherwise, he owes a duty to apologize to the young men who have been working day and night to get rid of Communists, while Mr. McClellan and his friends—Mr. Symington.

Senator McCLELLAN. Get your names straight.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, may I proceed with my interrogation of the witness?

Senator McCARTHY. A point of personal privilege.

Senator MUNDT. You may state it, but I think you misstated it in talking about Senator McClellan.

Senator McCARTHY. If Senator Symington knows of no subversive on the staff, then he should say so. If he has any evidence of any subversive on any staff, then he should be willing to take the oath here and tell us about it. I don't like these innuendos against these young men who have been working so hard at very low salaries to dig out Communists without the help, may I say, of men like Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman?

Senator MUNDT. On the point of personal privilege, the Chair will rule that he did not hear Senator Symington mention any member of the staff being a subversive.

You may proceed.

Senator SYMINGTON. I thank the Chair.

Now, let's see where we were, Mr. Carr. I trust that does not come out of my time.

Senator MUNDT. It does not.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

Getting back to the question of clearance from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, you know a lot about those clearances?

Mr. CARR. No; I don't, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Don't you?

Mr. CARR. No.

Senator SYMINGTON. When you were in the FBI, you didn't know about clearances?

Mr. CARR. Yes; I knew about clearances. But you said I knew a lot about them. I really don't.

Senator SYMINGTON. You don't know much about them?

Mr. CARR. I want to make it clear that I was not in any section of the FBI which handled liaison matters. I don't know that—

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Carr, these people are on this staff or under your administrative control—is that correct—is that correct?

Mr. CARR. Yes, they were. I haven't finished what I was saying.

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me proceed, if I may, and I will strike the previous question, because I don't want my time to run out.

Mr. COHN. Mr. Chairman, I don't think Mr. Carr finished an answer to a previous question.

Senator SYMINRTON. We will go back and pick it up.

Senator MUNDT. You may finish the answer.

Mr. CARR. What I was leading up to was that I don't know about the FBI giving any clearance on any individual. As I think Senator McCarthy has testified, they have advised us from time to time that they had no derogatory information concerning members of the staff.

Senator SYMINGTON. They have advised you from time to time that they have no derogatory information concerning any members of the staff, is that correct?

Mr. CARR. Concerning members.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. Let me ask you this question: When I was in the executive branch of the Government, the FBI would investigate people provided that you had not hired them. That is, before they came with you. Is that now stopped also, do you happen to know?

Mr. CARR. I don't know that, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Does this include the clerical members too? Have the clerical members, the stenographers and the clerks, got secret clearance in the Department of Defense, for example?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir, I believe that is correct.

Senator SYMINGTON. Now, I would like—

Senator MUNDT. May the Chair inquire of the members of the committee. We have a rollcall vote, and it is 25 minutes to 5.

Senator SYMINGTON. May I ask one more question and I will be through.

Senator McCARTHY. Mr. Chairman, before we go to the rollcall vote, there is a point of personal privilege.

Senator MUNDT. The Chair has recognized Senator Symington for a question. I will then recognize you.

Senator McCARTHY. Could I raise the point of personal privilege?

Senator MUNDT. The Chair recognized Senator Symington for one more question and then I will recognize you.

Senator SYMINGTON. May I emphasize, Mr. Chairman, I have no information. I am simply asking for information.

Mr. Carr, under the present rules for access to files of this committee, if a former Communist who had not really reformed, or a subversive, or any security risk on this committee staff that might get on it, decided to betray his country by revealing the contents of a secret FBI document which he had found in these files to a possible enemy, it would be a relatively simple matter, would it not, for him to do that, based on the way these files are handled?

Mr. CARR. Well, sir. I don't agree with you. I don't know of any FBI secret documents that are contained in our files.

Senator SYMINGTON. There are no purported secret documents of the FBI, confidential documents in the files?

Mr. CARR. No, sir; I don't know of any FBI documents in our files.

Senator SYMINGTON. What would you say the 2 1/4-page document was?

Mr. CARR. That was from the Senator's office.

Senator SYMINGTON. That was not in the files?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. But if it were in the files, then it would be possible for someone to get it under these rules, would it not? Will you answer the question?

Senator McCARTHY. Mr. Chairman? I raise a point of personal privilege. You gave Mr. Symington the right to ask one question. I do want to raise that point before we leave this afternoon.

Senator MUNDT. Raise it briefly, then, because we have to adjourn for the vote.

Senator McCARTHY. I will raise it as briefly as I can. May I say, Senator Symington has been here by innuendo trying to smear the staff of young men who have been working to dig out Communists. He is talking about what might happen if there were a subversive on the staff. I would like to ask him now, even though he is not under oath, whether he has any information at all of any kind to justify this attempted smear against these 14 young men who have done such an excellent job uncovering Communists.

If he has no information, then he should be honest enough to tell us. If he has information, he should take the stand and take the oath as these young men have been taking it.

Now may I ask you, Senator, Do you have any information to indicate that there is anyone on my staff who is subversive, as you have indicated in your questioning?

Senator MUNDT. Senator Symington, you may answer the question and then we will have to recess for the vote.

Senator SYMINGTON. I will answer that question this way, Senator McCarthy: In all the years that I have been in this Government, based on the testimony that has been given before this committee under oath, I think the files of what you call, my staff, my director, my chief of staff, have been the sloppiest and most dangerously handled files that I have ever heard of since I have been in the Government.

Senator MUNDT. We will recess for the vote.

Senator McCARTHY. You can run away if you like, Stu. You can run away if you like. You have been here trying to smear the staff of this committee, the young men who have been working to uncover Communists. You jump up and run away without answering the question. I have asked you a simple question. Do you have any evidence of any kind to indicate that there is any subversive amongst these young men? If not, if not you are leaving here this afternoon, leaving a smear upon the name of each and every one of them. You shouldn't do that, Mr. Symington. That is just dishonest. That is the same thing that the Communist Party has been doing too long.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, apparently any time anybody says anything against anybody working for Senator McCarthy, he is smearing them and accusing them of being Communists.

Senator McCARTHY. Answer the question.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is the best answer I can give you and that is the only answer you are going to get.

Senator McCARTHY. You won't answer if you know of any subversive?

Mr. Chairman, even though the Chair is leaving, I want to make this record, and, Mr. Reporter, will you take this down; Mr. Reporter, will you take this down?

Mr. Symington, other members of the Democrat Party here have been intimating that they know of some subversive on the staff investigating Communists. I have asked Mr. Symington pointblank to tell us whether he knew of any such subversive. He runs away. He won't answer the question.

May I say that that is the most dishonest, the most unfounded smear upon some of the most outstanding young men that I have ever seen work to uncover Communists. And before this is over, the American people will have a better picture of it.

I guess we must go vote now.

(Whereupon, at 4:40 p. m. the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a. m. the following day, Tuesday, June 15, 1954.)

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SPECIAL SENATE INVESTIGATION ON CHARGES
AND COUNTERCHARGES INVOLVING: SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ROBERT T. STEVENS, JOHN
G. ADAMS, H. STRUVE HENSEL AND SENATOR
JOE McCARTHY, ROY M. COHN, AND
FRANCIS P. CARR

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
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SPECIAL SENATE INVESTIGATION ON CHARGES AND COUNTERCHARGES INVOLVING: SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ROBERT T. STEVENS, JOHN G. ADAMS, H. STRUVE HENSEL AND SENATOR JOE McCARTHY, ROY M. COHN, AND FRANCIS P. CARR

TUESDAY, JUNE 15, 1954

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10:13 a. m., pursuant to recess, in the caucus room of the Senate Office Building, Senator Karl E. Mundt, chairman, presiding.

Present: Senator Karl E. Mundt, Republican, South Dakota; Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen, Republican, Illinois; Senator Charles E. Potter, Republican, Michigan; Senator Henry C. Dworshak, Republican, Idaho; Senator John L. McClellan, Democrat, Arkansas; Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat, Washington; and Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat, Missouri.

Also present: Ray M. Jenkins, chief counsel; Thomas R. Prewitt, assistant counsel; Charles Maner, assistant counsel; and Ruth Y. Watt, chief clerk.

Principal participants present: Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, a United States Senator from the State of Wisconsin; Roy M. Cohn, chief counsel to the subcommittee; Joseph N. Welch, special counsel for the Army; and James D. St. Clair, special counsel for the Army.

Senator MUNDT. The committee will please come to order.

The Chair would like to begin by welcoming our guests who have come to the committee room and to tell them that the committee is happy to have you watching one of your congressional committees in operation.

The Chair would like to have the audience listen very carefully to what he is going to say next, because he observed before the meeting began that there was some applause as various principals and committee members entered the room. Perhaps you have not been following the hearings and do not realize that that is strictly forbidden.

The Chair, rather than to try to have anybody removed from the room for violating that committee rule, has instructed the officers again today to be particularly alert and to remove from the room immediately without any further notice, politely but firmly, with the authority that they have vested in them by the Congress of the United States, anyone applauding or anyone engaging in any other audible manifestations

of approval or disapproval. That is a fair rule. That is a continuing rule. That is a rule the committee expects our officers to enforce completely without any further instruction from the Chair.

Those instructions are from the committee and provide that they shall be carried out both by the uniformed members of the Capitol Police force whom you see before you, and the plainclothes men scattered through the audience.

You have all been warned, as you have been welcomed. If you decide to violate the terms under which you entered the room and are removed, you have removed yourself, because you have failed to comply with the regulations of this committee and of these hearings.

I feel that with that explanation we will not have any further interruption by people who seek to disrupt a hearing which they have come to observe.

As we concluded the hearings yesterday, Senator Symington had a few minutes left of his 10 minutes, but tells me that he had concluded his questions, so we will switch next to Senator Dworshak, who has not yet come into the committee room.

He not being here, the Chair recognizes Mr. Cohn or Senator McCarthy for 10 minutes.

TESTIMONY OF FRANCIS P. CARR—Resumed

Senator McCARTHY. Mr. Cohn?

Mr. COHN. I have no questions.

Senator McCARTHY. No questions.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Welch or Mr. St. Clair for 10 minutes.

Senator McCARTHY. One or two questions, Mr. Carr.

Senator MUNDT. You are recognized. Your microphone is not turned on or else your voice has gotten hoarse, and we cannot hear you.

Senator McCARTHY. Mr. Carr, I think yesterday you mentioned that we received FBI reports occasionally. From the answer I gather that there might have been the feeling that you had received the FBI reports. Any FBI reports come directly to me, is that right?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator McCARTHY. And any clearance, secret, top secret, confidential, would come to you and you would only learn about that by hearing about it from me; is that right?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; that is right.

Senator McCARTHY. Nothing further, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MUNDT. Thank you very much.

Mr. Welch or Mr. St. Clair, 10 minutes.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Mr. Carr, yesterday you may recall we were discussing the meeting that you and Mr. Cohn had with the Secretary on October 2. Do you recall, sir?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. And I believe you testified in substance that the Secretary in the course of that meeting brought up the question of Schine by stating in substance that Schine was not going to get a commission. Do you recall that?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. And I guess I fairly outlined your testimony, have I not?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. I didn't say that he—I didn't specifically say he brought it up. As I recall, I think I said that it was my recollection that the Secretary had brought this matter up, or started the conversation.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Well, do you now wish to suggest that perhaps you could be wrong, Mr. Carr?

Mr. CARR. No; I don't think I am wrong.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. That is your best recollection?

Mr. CARR. Right.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. The Secretary brought it up in the manner that you and I have discussed?

Mr. CARR. Right.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. We were discussing that fact in connection with what work you had outlined for Private Schine. Do you recall?

Mr. CARR. Not specifically; no, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Well, in any event, that news was the first you had heard of it, was it not, Mr. Carr?

Mr. CARR. Well, that, as I said yesterday I said I thought that was the first time I had learned that Mr. Schine would not receive a commission, a Reserve commission.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. That is right. Did you know that Mr. Schine had received formal notification that he was not going to get a commission on July 31 of 1953?

Mr. CARR. No, I did not.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Did you know that General Reber testified that he had told Mr. Cohn about that time that Schine was not qualified?

Mr. CARR. I think I heard General Reber's testimony.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. All right. But insofar as you were concerned, the first you heard of it was on October 2?

Mr. CARR. Yes, that is the best of my recollection.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. So that up to that time, apparently we agreed yesterday, but if not say so, you thought that Schine was likely to get a commission; isn't that correct?

Mr. CARR. I didn't know whether he was or he wasn't. I thought that he would. I thought—

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You heard that General Reber was supposed to have said he would.

Mr. CARR. I am not sure whether I heard that at that time or whether I—I heard General Reber say these things, I heard the testimony, but I am not sure that at that time I knew about it.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. I am not suggesting that General Reber testified that he promised a commission. I am just suggesting that your associates have so testified, and apparently must have told you that fact, too.

Mr. CARR. Well, I don't recall that they ever told me that at that time.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Well, in any event, you must have been counting on Mr. Schine as a member of your committee up until the date of October 2, hadn't you? On your staff, pardon me.

Mr. CARR. Until that time, I hadn't given it too much consideration. I thought he was getting a Reserve commission.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You thought he was going to get a commission?

Mr. CARR. That is right.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Well, then, you must have been counting on his not being available to you, then, in the reasonably near future?

Mr. CARR. After that time I was pretty certain of it; yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Well, up to that time you felt that he was going to get a commission and get it soon, didn't you?

Mr. CARR. Quite frankly, I didn't give it much thought as far as the commission was concerned. I knew he had applied for a Reserve commission. That is about the size of it.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Well, in any event, when you learned the fact that he was not going to get it, it meant that there had to be some change in your plans and it was an important event for you, was it not?

Mr. CARR. It wasn't an important event, but I did give it consideration.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. This man was important to the staff of this committee, was he not?

Mr. CARR. Yes; he was.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. And a change in his military status to you as a director must have been an important event, is that right?

Mr. CARR. It was worth considering, and I did consider it.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Well, I don't want to push you too far, but it was worth a considerable amount of consideration, was it not?

Mr. CARR. I gave it a considerable amount of consideration.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You did?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. That is right. Don't you consider it a rather singular event, Mr. Carr, that you did not mention that fact in your memorandum of October 2?

Mr. CARR. What fact is that, sir?

Mr. ST. CLAIR. That Schine was not going to get a commission.

Mr. CARR. No.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Well, it was an important thing, you said.

Mr. CARR. I don't think it was that important.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You mentioned a lot of things in that memorandum, but you did not mention this fact, did you?

Mr. CARR. That is correct. I might have left it out or I might have put it in.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. As a matter of fact, your memorandum of October 2 is slightly inconsistent with that fact, is it not, Mr. Carr?

Mr. CARR. I don't think so.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. I call your attention, sir, to the second paragraph of it and the fourth line. Let me read you that sentence, which begins in the third line of the second paragraph:

During the course of the conversation, Dave Schine's pending induction—and I emphasize the words "pending induction"—into the Army came up.

Have I read that sentence correctly?

Mr. CARR. That is correct.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. If his induction was pending on October 2, that is inconsistent with the fact that you have testified to, that you thought he was going to get a commission until the Secretary told you otherwise?

Mr. CARR. Yes, but I didn't write this memorandum until after I had talked to the Secretary.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Yes, but you are referring to a conversation concerning a pending induction. Now you testify the conversation was not concerning a pending induction, but was concerning the fact that he was not going to get a commission.

Mr. CARR. No; I haven't testified—you say as if I had testified only to that fact. I testified also to the fact that the Secretary said, as I say in my memorandum, that he intended to use Mr. Schine to the advantage of the Army by sending him to intelligence schools.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. That is certainly true, but let's get back to the fact that you testified, sir, that the Secretary told you on October 2 that Schine was not going to get a commission.

Mr. CARR. That is my recollection.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. In the first place, you make no mention of that fact in this memorandum, do you?

Mr. CARR. No.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Even though you consider it of some importance?

Mr. CARR. I consider it of some importance. I don't consider it of so much importance that I had to put it in the memorandum. Other things were left out of the memorandum, too.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Also, in view of the fact that you state in the memorandum the conversation concerned a pending induction. Have I refreshed your recollection to some extent, Mr. Carr, that perhaps you are mistaken about the conversation with the Secretary and the commission?

Mr. CARR. No; I am not mistaken.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You are not mistaken?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. So you state now that the Secretary brought it up by informing you that Schine was not going to get a commission.

Mr. CARR. No; he didn't bring it up by informing me. He brought up the subject of Schine, and he was the first one that, in my recollection, during this conversation said that Schine wasn't going to get a commission.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Now you say he did not bring it up by stating that Schine was not going to get a commission?

Mr. CARR. No, sir; no, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Let me ask you this: There was some discussion beyond that point, right?

Mr. CARR. Beyond the point of the commission?

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Yes.

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You said in substance, I believe, that Mr. Cohn indicated his assent to what you claim the Secretary had outlined for this private.

Mr. CARR. This intelligence school arrangement, and that sort of thing, yes, I think Mr. Cohn said "That is fine," or something like that.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Did Mr. Cohn put it any stronger than just agreement, or did he try to urge it on the Secretary?

Mr. CARR. No. As I recall, it was the Secretary's statement. The Secretary is the one who mentioned the schools, not Mr. Cohn.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. But Mr. Cohn indicated his assent, is that correct?

Mr. CARR. He indicated that was fine; yes.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Was it fine with you, Mr. Carr?

Mr. CARR. It didn't make any difference to me.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. It made no difference to you?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. But it made some difference to Mr. Cohn?

Mr. CARR. I don't think a great deal of difference, but he said "That is fine."

Mr. ST. CLAIR. All right.

I think you testified yesterday that as early as October 8 or October 9 John Adams indicated to you that he thought maybe the committee ought to call off their hearings on the Fort Monmouth investigation, is that correct?

Mr. CARR. At that point Mr. Adams indicated he thought there should be no hearings on the Fort Monmouth situation. There had been none—

Mr. ST. CLAIR. He made it a little stronger than I made it, then. He indicated to you there ought not to be any?

Mr. CARR. We had not started having hearings at Fort Monmouth.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. When was your first hearing?

Mr. CARR. I think the first executive hearing was on the 12th of October.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. If I suggested the 8th of October, would that refresh your recollection?

Mr. CARR. No. The 8th of October, as I testified, Mr. Adams was—and I think I am correct on this—Mr. Adams was in attendance at interviews of persons who worked at Fort Monmouth, staff interviews.

The executive sessions did not start until Senator McCarthy arrived in New York so that witnesses could be sworn.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. So it is your testimony that John Adams wanted to call the executive sessions off even before they started; is that right?

Mr. CARR. I don't say he wanted to call the executive sessions off. I say that John Adams on the 8th or about the 8th, during the period of these staff interviews, suggested that there was no need for having any hearings at all.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. That was before they had even started, was it not?

Mr. CARR. That is correct.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. So the sum and substance of it is that you testified John Adams wanted to call them off before they had even started?

Mr. CARR. If you want to put it that way, that will be all right.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. I don't want to be unfair with you but that is the fact.

Mr. CARR. That won't hurt me. That is all right.

Senator MUNDT. Your time has expired, Mr. St. Clair.

Mr. PREWITT, any questions?

Mr. PREWITT. No questions.

Senator MUNDT. The Chair will pass.

Senator McClellan, any questions?

Senator McCLELLAN. Mr. Carr, I have 2 or 3 more questions, I believe. When I concluded yesterday I believe you had agreed with me that the charges against the Secretary of the Army and Mr. Adams were quite serious.

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. Then from your testimony, as you have already stated and from the charges to which we have referred generally—I didn't call each one specifically to your attention, but you are familiar with them—would you agree with me that the conduct of the Secretary of the Army and Mr. Adams if these charges are true, were quite improper?

Mr. CARR. Well, I think they were improper; yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. Don't you think they are quite grave if you take into account the security of our country? If they were actually trying to protect, as charged, those who were protecting Communists in our Government and in the Army, wouldn't you say they are quite grave?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. I don't think it is my position to pass on such matters, but I agree with you they are serious and grave.

Senator McCLELLAN. And they should have been exposed if that was true?

Mr. CARR. I would be happy to have them exposed; yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. Would they have been exposed, in your judgment, had not this chronological report of the Army been published?

Mr. CARR. I think they would.

Senator McCLELLAN. How long do you think it would be before we had gotten to them?

Mr. CARR. I really don't know, but I think it would have come about.

Senator McCLELLAN. At any rate, the issuing of the chronological statement of events did bring about the exposure of this promptly, didn't it?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. So it accomplished some good if these charges are true.

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. That is a way of putting it; yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. All right. That is the way it is, in its proper perspective, if your charges are true. The issuance of that report immediately caused the response that called to the attention of the country a condition that the Defense Department or in the Department of the Army that certainly could not be tolerated if it is true. Don't you agree with me?

Mr. CARR. It called it to the attention of the country. I agree with you.

Senator McCLELLAN. And it is a condition, if true, that cannot be tolerated?

Mr. CARR. I wouldn't have tolerated it; no, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. All right. That is all. One other question, if I have more time. I did want to ask you this: As staff director, now, you helped check the files to determine the documents that you may have in them relative to Mr. Schine's work, did you?

Mr. CARR. Well, actually, I had very little part in it, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. Well, I don't know whether you can identify them or not, but are you prepared to say that the documents that have been turned over to the counsel are all that are in the files? Are you prepared to say that, as staff director?

Mr. CARR. Well, I am not the one who went through the files physically. I have been advised by those who did that—and by Mr.

Schine—that the work which appears here is—how do you say—the end result, I think is the term that has been used here.

Senator McCLELLAN. All I have been trying to do is to get all of them before us, and I am trying to find out who can tell us that they are all before the committee now. Can you?

Mr. CARR. I think Mr. Cohn can probably tell you that better than I can.

Senator McCLELLAN. All right. That is all.

Senator MUNDT. Senator Dirksen, any questions?

Senator DIRKSEN. No questions.

Senator MUNDT. Senator Jackson, any questions?

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Carr, I assume you formulated a file on Fort Monmouth?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. What is the date of the first document in that file?

Mr. CARR. I am not sure. I think it is some time in August or September, maybe.

Senator JACKSON. The first document in the file is in August or September?

Mr. CARR. I think that is right.

Senator JACKSON. What was the first document in that file?

Mr. CARR. I don't recall, sir.

Senator JACKSON. Well, I think you indicated yesterday that there were memos and certain information that you had dictated or had come to your attention that was put in the file.

Mr. CARR. Well, I don't recall that part of the testimony. If you would—

Senator JACKSON. As far as you know, there was nothing in the file prior to July or August, then, on Fort Monmouth?

Mr. CARR. Well, let me say this, Senator. The preliminary investigation of this case and all other cases, I can't say all other cases but other cases, is a very informal thing. Information is gathered, sometimes material is received, this is on an informal basis. Now, in connection with the Fort Monmouth investigation, it is my recollection, and it is only a recollection after these months, that when the investigation was well underway, much of this material which has been in the office, in the possession of the individuals working on the case, was assembled into a file.

Senator JACKSON. Yes, but I take it you just testified that the first memos or memoranda that went into the file was July or August; is that right?

Mr. CARR. I am only testifying that, as I recall, the first memorandum is dated some time during that period; yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. And prior to that time, you don't know of any work that was done on the Fort Monmouth investigation?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; I know of work. As I said, I don't know—I believe that is the first date of the memorandum.

Senator JACKSON. Well, actually, Mr. Carr, the work didn't get underway full speed, shall we say, until August, did it?

Mr. CARR. I would say, "Yes"; August.

Senator JACKSON. That was about the time when you found out that Mr. Schine was going to go into the Army?

Mr. CARR. No, sir. That was about the time when I got busy on this case.

Senator JACKSON. Well, you took over the Fort Monmouth investigation. Had there really been any work done as far as actual investigation at Fort Monmouth?

Mr. CARR. There had been preliminary work done, sir.

Senator JACKSON. What kind?

Mr. CARR. There had been informants developed and there had been information obtained concerning the situation at Fort Monmouth; yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. Well but actually there hadn't been any specific legwork done on Fort Monmouth?

Mr. CARR. The large amount of legwork began during that period, I would say, August-September; yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. But prior to that you had the Crouch document?

Mr. CARR. We had the Crouch document; yes, sir. I don't put too much stress on the Crouch document as such.

Senator JACKSON. As a matter of fact, that is a pretty general statement.

Mr. CARR. It is a general statement. I think it is a very good statement concerning Communist infiltration.

Senator JACKSON. But as an FBI agent, you were pretty well trained in the fact that it was well known that the Communists would try to infiltrate, have tried for years to infiltrate the Military Establishment, whether it is the Army, the Navy, or the Air Force?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir, I was aware of that. I don't wish to overrate or underrate the Crouch memorandum. The facts in there, the statements in there, are undoubtedly accurate. To me, sir—to me, the Crouch memorandum is more of a signal than important in itself.

Senator JACKSON. He said there were a thousand Communists in the Army. He didn't back up that statement with any specific bill of particulars, did he?

Mr. CARR. No. I didn't place that sort of stress on the Crouch memorandum.

Senator JACKSON. As a matter of fact, the Selective Service Act makes no prohibition against the drafting of Communists into the armed services, isn't that correct?

Mr. CARR. That is correct.

Senator JACKSON. So it is obvious that there is bound to be a certain number of Communists in uniform, particularly in the enlisted ranks?

It follows logically that you are bound to get some, isn't that right?

Mr. CARR. That is correct.

Senator JACKSON. So you come to the inevitable conclusion that there must be some in uniform.

Mr. CARR. I agree with you. But at some point, if you are going to give an investigation some serious consideration, at some point something has to be brought to your attention. I think the Crouch memorandum in this case served as a means of bringing it to our attention. I don't say that I agreed with him in the memorandum that there were a thousand or anything like that.

Senator JACKSON. But, Mr. Carr, you wouldn't want to leave the impression that with your long experience in the FBI that you need

to have someone like Crouch explain to you that there might be Communist infiltration in the Army. You knew that as an FBI agent?

Mr. CARR. That is correct. I didn't need the memorandum. I should say, the memorandum—

Senator JACKSON. The Crouch document didn't refresh your recollection or give you any new information that you didn't already have?

Mr. CARR. I don't know. I couldn't agree fully with your statement. I am agreeing with what you are talking about. There is some of your language that mixes us up.

Senator JACKSON. Can you point out anything in the Crouch document that you didn't know about before?

Mr. CARR. Well, no, I don't want to do that.

Senator JACKSON. All right. We won't go into any further detail about that. When did you first see the 2½-page FBI document?

Mr. CARR. I believe—I believe that I first saw the two and a—what is it, 2½-page document?—in this courtroom, or just before that, just the day that Mr. McCarthy handed it up here, or attempted to have the Chair read it.

Senator JACKSON. You had never seen it before?

Mr. CARR. I had never seen it. I knew about it, however.

Senator JACKSON. So it was never in the files?

Mr. CARR. It was never in the files downstairs; no, sir.

Senator JACKSON. How could you conduct this investigation? You are the staff director and if you hadn't seen it until the day you came in, how could you have conducted this investigation without having seen that document?

Mr. CARR. I didn't have to see the document, sir, I knew what was in it.

Senator JACKSON. You were told everything that was in it, but they wouldn't let you see it?

Mr. CARR. No.

Senator JACKSON. It was a pretty hot document, then?

Mr. CARR. No, I don't subscribe to that. There was no need for me to keep the document or to see the document. I was told what was in it. I was given the list of the persons who were in it. I had all the information contained in the document. I had no need for keeping the document.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Carr, isn't it quite unusual that you, as staff director of the committee, would not have access to this document and see it; yet it would be offered here in evidence to the public?

Mr. CARR. Well—

Senator JACKSON. How do you figure that out?

Mr. CARR. I don't think it is unusual. I think it would be quite unusual if I were given information by the chairman of the committee, and I insisted that I had to have the document to back up what he was telling me.

Senator JACKSON. But wasn't it the heart of the whole investigation of Fort Monmouth?

Mr. CARR. It was an important part of the investigation, sir.

Senator JACKSON. It pinpointed one of the key individuals, Aaron Coleman, did it not?

Mr. CARR. It did that, yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. Did you have any reason why you didn't want to look at the document?

Mr. CARR. No, I didn't have any. I would look at it. I looked at it here.

Senator JACKSON. You what?

Mr. CARR. I looked at it here in the courtroom.

Senator JACKSON. Yes, but you hadn't looked at it up until that time, although you were in charge of the entire investigation at Fort Monmouth, directing the staff work?

Mr. CARR. No. The day that it came down here I think is the first time that I actually looked at it.

Senator JACKSON. I say that is the first time you looked at it, even though you had directed the staff investigation in the Fort Monmouth hearings and investigation.

Mr. CARR. Yes, I think that is correct.

Senator JACKSON. That is all.

Senator MUNDT. Senator POTTER?

Senator POTTER. Mr. Chairman, I have concluded my examination of Mr. Carr. However, I would like to announce that I am chairman of the Communications Subcommittee of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, and we have hearings which I have postponed three times, most important hearings. They are hearings on the future of television. I have scheduled them for this afternoon. So I am going to ask to be excused for the afternoon session so that we can go ahead with these hearings. It will seem a little different to have hearings about television rather than hearings where you are on television.

Senator MUNDT. Very good.

Any questions, Senator Symington?

Senator SYMINGTON. I pass.

Senator MUNDT. Senator Dworshak?

Senator DWORSHAK. No questions.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Cohn or Senator McCarthy?

Senator McCARTHY. Just 1 or 2 questions.

Mr. Carr, Mr. Jackson was discussing the Crouch document. The Crouch document, as I recall, gives a fairly good résumé of the attempt of the Communist Party to infiltrate our Army, is that right?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; I think it is a good document; yes, sir; a good document.

Senator McCARTHY. Having worked with the FBI on the matter of communism for a number of years, having been head of the subversive desk, whatever you call it—

Mr. CARR. I call it security matters, sir.

Senator McCARTHY. O. K.—you wouldn't need any résumé by Mr. Crouch. You had all the information which you gathered over a number of years, I assume; is that correct?

Mr. CARR. Well, sir, it is some time since I actually read the Crouch document over, but I think I can generally agree with you, yes, sir.

Senator McCARTHY. I want to hand you a document, if you can call it that, a mimeographed two sheets of paper. Glancing through that, Mr. Carr, do you find that the Communist International, various Communist meetings, Communist writers, the Daily Worker, have over the past 20, 25, or 30 years reaffirmed that one of their principal targets was the army of every free nation?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator McCARTHY. So when you came with the committee, you didn't need any one individual to tell you that the military would be a target for the Communist Party?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Senator McCARTHY. Mr. Carr, is it correct that as of now we are all ready to go ahead with hearings, hearings of the committee of which Mr. Potter is chairman, having to do with the holding of prisoners of war, by the Reds, some of them even since World War I?

Mr. CARR. Yes. I think we will be ready when Senator Potter is ready.

Senator McCARTHY. We have been discussing whether or not this investigation was holding up the investigation of communism. Is it true that we have a tremendous backlog of work now, a great number of Communists in defense plants?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. We have knowledge of such.

Senator McCARTHY. Instead of investigating Communists now, as a result of this investigation we are spending the time and the very limited funds which we have to investigate, in effect, you and Mr. Cohn and myself?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator McCARTHY. Do you feel, Mr. Carr, that this calling off of the investigation of Communists in key industries, in the military, is a great victory for the Communist Party?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; I think it is.

Senator McCARTHY. Just one other question. When you came with my committee, Mr. Carr, did I have a long talk with you and warn you that you would be smeared completely if you had any success, that you would be accused of almost every type of improper conduct in the book, and I told you that was one of the penalties of working with my committee?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; you did.

Senator McCARTHY. Despite that, you said you were willing to quit a very good job which you had with the FBI, a job as head of the security desk, I believe you call it, in New York, and come down and work with my committee; is that right?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; I did.

Senator McCARTHY. In conclusion, Mr. Carr, may I say that I feel very strongly, as I think I may have indicated last night, that I must protect the young men who have come with the committee to do a job of exposing Communists. I feel very strongly about the smear leveled against them, sometimes not by the Communist Party, but sometimes by the Communist Party using megaphones, unknowing megaphones if I may say, men who don't realize what they are doing.

I just want to again assure you and assure Mr. Cohn and the rest of my committee that whenever any of these smears are attempted, you can be sure I will do everything I can to try and give the American people the truth. I think something has been accomplished by these hearings in that regard.

No further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Welch or Mr. St. Clair, you have 10 minutes.

Mr. WELCH. Mr. Chairman, Mr. St. Clair.

Senator MUNDT. We can't hear you, Mr. Welch. Will you turn on Mr. Welch's microphone, please. Try again, Mr. Welch.

Mr. Welch, you have 10 minutes.

Mr. WELCH. Mr. Chairman, I was about to say to you that Mr. St. Clair will continue to conduct a portion of this witness' cross-examination, but with an interruption from me on a small point at this time.

Senator MUNDT. You may divide the 10 minutes between you in any way you like.

Mr. WELCH. That is right.

Mr. Carr, first as to your joining this committee when you came from the New York desk.

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. WELCH. I take it that you looked on it as advancement, did you not, sir?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; I looked on it as somewhat an advancement, although looking back on it I am not sure.

Mr. WELCH. In any event—and I have no slight criticism of you, sir—you looked on it as a step forward in your career?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. I looked on it as an interesting challenge. I was interested in it, yes.

Mr. WELCH. One other item. We have often heard about the limited appropriation that you have. Would you know the amount of it, sir, for this year?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. It varies from year to year. This year I think it is approximately \$214,000.

Mr. WELCH. Pretty close to a quarter of a million dollars.

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. WELCH. It was what the Senator asked for, was it not, from Congress?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. I think during the period there was some debate back and forth, but I think it is generally what was asked for; yes, sir.

Mr. WELCH. What I really wanted to ask you about, Mr. Carr, was this 2 1/4-page document. I was somewhat surprised to learn that you first saw it in this courtroom. You told us that?

Mr. CARR. I said that I believe it was in this courtroom. I have a recollection that it was on the day that it was shown in this courtroom. I may have brought it down from the Senator's office. I am not sure. I know I saw it here, yes, sir, for the first time.

Mr. WELCH. You also told us, of course, that you knew about it.

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. WELCH. And that you were told what was in it?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. WELCH. And that you had all the information that was in it?

Mr. CARR. I think that is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. WELCH. How did you get that information, Mr. Carr?

Mr. CARR. How was it relayed to me?

Mr. WELCH. Yes.

Mr. CARR. It first I believe was relayed to me in a general conversation with Senator McCarthy and Mr. Cohn. Later I think in a conversation—or conference you might properly call it—with Senator McCarthy. He told me in detail what was in it and, as I recall, I made a list of the names in pencil.

Mr. WELCH. When they were talking to you about it, did you realize that it purported to be a confidential document of the FBI?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Mr. WELCH. Was that concealed from you?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

To answer your question, when we first talked about it, it was told to me that this was a document which substantiated the statements made by an informant within the Army.

Mr. WELCH. I didn't quite ask you that. Did you learn that it had at the top of it "confidential"?

Mr. CARR. I am not sure that I did. I may have.

Mr. WELCH. Was that—I would like to know whether you were told that or were not told that.

Mr. CARR. At this point I can't say whether I was or I wasn't.

Mr. WELCH. It would have impressed you had you heard it, would it not?

Mr. CARR. No; not particularly; no, sir.

Mr. WELCH. Not as an old FBI man if you saw a letter purporting to be signed by J. Edgar Hoover and marked at the top "confidential" you say you wouldn't have been impressed by it?

Mr. CARR. I have seen many such letters, sir.

Mr. WELCH. In your files?

Mr. CARR. No, sir. In my files?

Mr. WELCH. When you were in the FBI?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. WELCH. But, Mr. Carr, you are out of the FBI now, you know.

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. WELCH. Have you seen many of them since you got out?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Mr. WELCH. You never even saw this one until this courtroom, did you?

Mr. CARR. That is correct.

Mr. WELCH. Now, once again, remember that you are not now on the FBI, or a member of the FBI, had you known that that document, the two-and-a-quarter-page document, was purportedly carrying J. Edgar Hoover's signature and was marked at the top "Confidential" would that have impressed you?

Mr. CARR. I don't think it would have impressed me, particularly; no, sir.

Mr. WELCH. You just wouldn't have been impressed, is that right?

Mr. CARR. Well, I am not sure what you mean by impressed. I say that it wouldn't have particularly impressed me; no, sir.

Mr. WELCH. Suppose I were to produce a document like that now, purporting to carry J. Edgar Hoover's signature and marked at the top "Confidential," would you be amazed to find it in my possession?

Mr. CARR. No, sir; I wouldn't at all.

Mr. WELCH. Then you think so-called confidential documents purporting to carry Hoover's signature are bouncing around Washington by the dozen?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Mr. WELCH. This is the only one you heard of bouncing around; is it not?

Mr. CARR. No, sir. If you produced one, sir, I would say it was one that was directed to the Army.

Mr. WELCH. Were you in the courtroom when we heard from the messenger to J. Edgar Hoover, when we heard it should not be made public or transmitted to anyone?

Mr. CARR. I was in the courtroom. I don't recall that he said that.

Senator McCARTHY. Just a minute. Keep the record straight. Mr. Hoover did not say that. It was Mr. Brownell.

Mr. WELCH. Were you in the courtroom when Mr. Brownell said it should not be disclosed to anyone?

Mr. CARR. I think I was; yes, sir.

Mr. WELCH. What happened, as I understand it—strike that out. When Mr. Carr—strike that out. When the Senator and Mr. Cohn talked to you about it, did they have some document in front of them?

Mr. CARR. As I recall, when they first talked to me about it, they didn't. I think when I talked with Senator McCarthy about it, I think he may have. I know he told me in detail what the document contained. I can't at this point say that he did or he didn't. He may have.

Mr. WELCH. Did they tell you, sir, that they didn't want to give you a copy of it?

Mr. CARR. No, sir. No, sir.

Mr. WELCH. Did you get the impression they were being very careful about it?

Mr. CARR. Oh, no, sir. I could have had a copy of it, I suppose, if I wanted it.

Mr. WELCH. Then, I think we understand each other. If you on the first time you heard about it had said, "May I have a copy of it," you could have had it?

Mr. CARR. I have no reason to believe that the Senator wouldn't trust me with a copy; no, sir.

Mr. WELCH. Then you could have put that in the files of your committee?

Mr. CARR. I probably could have. I didn't.

Mr. WELCH. Yes. Now, what did you do—strike that out. Did either Mr. Cohn or the Senator give you a typewritten list of the names that were in the document?

Mr. CARR. No—

Mr. WELCH. Did they read them to you and you wrote them down?

Mr. CARR. As I recall, the Senator—I don't know whether you would say he read them or perhaps he knew them all by heart. I don't know, but I copied down a list of names; yes, sir.

Mr. WELCH. In longhand?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. WELCH. And did that list of names become the basis of the Fort Monmouth investigation as you suggested to the Senator?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Mr. WELCH. You used them; did you not?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir, we looked into this list of names; yes, sir.

Mr. WELCH. And examined a portion, at least, of the men who were named in it?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. WELCH. How many of the men who were named in it did you examine either in executive—strike that out. How many of the men whose names were listed in it did you examine in any form whatever?

Mr. CARR. I couldn't say exactly, but I would say a good portion of them.

Mr. WELCH. A good portion of them?

Mr. CARR. Yes.

Mr. WELCH. Then isn't it a fact, sir, that the Fort Monmouth investigation was substantially based on the names that you got out of the 2½-page document?

Mr. CARR. That was one of the main sources for the beginning of the investigation; yes, sir. There were other—

Mr. WELCH. I understand.

Mr. CARR. Other things, also.

Mr. WELCH. But that was really the base for it?

Mr. CARR. That was not really the base for it; that was one of several things.

Mr. WELCH. Well, but the point is you took those names and started with those?

Mr. CARR. Well, we had those names and we had some other names, sir.

Mr. WELCH. I understand, but as you questioned the people whose names you had, they, in turn, turned up other names for you?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; but what I am trying to say is that at the time we had these names, we had information concerning other situations at Fort Monmouth.

Mr. WELCH. Well, did you have the names of other witnesses?

Mr. CARR. We had the names of, as I recall, a few other witnesses. We had also other informants concerning Fort Monmouth.

Mr. WELCH. By the way, do you have your own personal list of informants?

Mr. CARR. No, sir; I have no list.

Mr. WELCH. You have no list of informants that come to you with material—

Mr. CARR. No, sir; I have no list.

Mr. WELCH. Whose names you protect. Does Mr. Cohn, to your knowledge, have a list of informants?

Mr. CARR. I don't know what Mr. Cohn has in that regard.

Mr. WELCH. The answer is you don't know?

Mr. CARR. I don't know.

Mr. WELCH. The Senator, of course, you do know has such a list?

Mr. CARR. No, I don't know that he has a list.

Mr. WELCH. You understand, do you not, that he has informants whose names he will protect?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; and I have them, too.

Mr. WELCH. That is what I am asking about. Do you have your own list, sir?

Mr. CARR. I have no list, sir.

Mr. WELCH. I don't mean a written list. Is there a collection of informants who report to you rather than anyone else?

Mr. CARR. No, there is no collection. There are no set group of informants that come steadily to me. I have people who tell me things. The Senator, I am sure, has people who tell him things. Mr. Cohn does. And I am sure you do. I don't intend to ever reveal the names of persons who tell me things in confidence; I am sure you wouldn't; I am sure the Senator wouldn't.

Senator MUNDT. Your time has expired, Mr. Welch.

Any questions, Mr. Prewitt?

Mr. PREWITT. I will pass.

Senator MUNDT. The Chair will pass.

Senator McClellan?

Senator McCLELLAN. Just two more questions.

Mr. Carr, you agree with me that these hearings have also investigated the Army as well as you and Mr. Cohn and Senator McCarthy, don't you?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; to some extent I think they have.

Senator McCLELLAN. Do you mean slightly?

Mr. CARR. I am in agreement with you, Senator.

Senator McCLELLAN. Haven't I asked just as hard questions against the Army as I have anybody else?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; I think you have been fair to me.

Senator McCLELLAN. Let me ask you one other thing, and let's still be fair. Don't you think it is just as important to get out of the head of the Army those who are coddling and protecting Communists as it is to get the individual Communist out of the defense plants?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; that is one of the bases for perhaps the trouble here. We wanted to go after the persons who were—

Senator McCLELLAN. Maybe it is the whole trouble. But what I am trying to get at and have been trying to get at is the truth of the charges on each side. And do you agree with me that if your charges are true, that this committee could hardly be engaged in more important work than trying to establish the fact and take remedial action accordingly?

Mr. CARR. Well, I think that I am in pretty general agreement with you; yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. I think you are, too. Let me ask you one other thing and then I am through.

Speaking of smears, is it not also true from your observation and experience that Senators who do their duty in connection with investigations like this also get smeared?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. I think any one who comes to Washington is taking a good chance.

Senator McCLELLAN. You and I are in agreement with respect to the seriousness of the charges and also that you get exposed to smears if you do your duty. Are we?

Mr. CARR. It can happen; yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. It does happen, doesn't it?

Mr. CARR. It does happen.

Senator McCLELLAN. Not only can, but does.

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. Thank you, that is all.

Senator MUNDT. Senator Dirksen?

Senator DIRKSEN. Mr. Chairman, I have 1 or perhaps 2 questions.

Mr. Carr, I have heard that expression "coddling Communists" on a number of occasions in the hearing. Drawing on recollection, do you recall that that expression appears in the answer and charges made by Senator McCarthy for himself and Mr. Cohn and you? Frankly, I couldn't—

Mr. CARR. I don't know about the phrase being used; no sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. I could not find it in the answer and in the countercharges. I wondered whether I had overlooked it or whether you knew whether it was there or not.

Mr. CARR. I don't recall that phrase being used in the paper.

Senator DIRKSEN. One other observation, rather than a question. It occurs to me that the language used was that there has been gross mis-handling of the Communist issue; is that correct?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. That, of course, would be something different, I think, from the expression quote "coddling Communists" end quote.

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MUNDT. Senator Jackson?

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Carr, maybe you wish you had stayed up in New York?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Senator JACKSON. You are taking no amendments on that. Do you feel anybody on this committee has smeared you?

Mr. CARR. On this committee here?

Senator JACKSON. Yes.

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Senator JACKSON. Some of us on this side in these hearings have been given some smear publicity, as a matter of fact, so it isn't all just a one-way affair, is it?

Mr. CARR. I don't know about that, sir. I have never given any publicity, made any statement—

Senator JACKSON. I am not saying you.

Mr. CARR. Right, sir.

Senator JACKSON. I am not referring to you.

Mr. CARR. I might say you have never done anything to me, sir.

Senator JACKSON. That is all.

Senator MUNDT. Senator Potter?

Senator POTTER. I have no questions.

Senator MUNDT. Senator Symington?

Senator SYMINGTON. I pass.

Senator MUNDT. Senator Dworshak? Mr. Cohn or Senator McCarthy?

Senator McCARTHY. Mr. Cohn?

Mr. COHN. I pass.

Senator McCARTHY. I pass.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Welch, you have 10 minutes.

Mr. WELCH. Mr. Carr, when I was last questioning you, I was questioning you about your list—

Senator McCARTHY. There is one question, Mr. Welch, I would like to ask, if I may. Just one. May I interrupt?

Mr. WELCH. Surely.

Senator McCARTHY. Mr. Carr, I may not have cleared this up this morning, I am not sure. On page 6691, I notice you say:

As I think Senator McCarthy has testified—
referring to the FBI—

they have advised us from time to time that they had no derogatory information concerning members of the staff.

Am I correct that you were testifying as to what I told you and that the FBI had given no direct report to any member of the staff, including yourself?

Mr. CARR. No; the reports come through the chairman. Yes, sir. Senator McCARTHY. Any reports that come directly to me marked "Confidential" are for my use only?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; that is my understanding.

Senator McCARTHY. I think we should also make it clear that these reports do not have to do with investigations. These reports have to do with the members of the staff; is that correct?

Mr. CARR. That is my understanding; yes, sir.

Senator McCARTHY. As far as you know, neither I nor any member of the staff has ever gotten any report of any kind directly from the FBI; is that right?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. You are using the word "report," sir. I am thinking of a letter which they say they had, a name check letter, sir.

Senator McCARTHY. When you say there is a report on all employees, you are relying upon what I told you?

Mr. CARR. Yes.

Senator McCARTHY. No further questions.

Senator MUNDT. All right, Mr. Welch, you have 10 minutes.

Mr. WELCH. Mr. Carr, I was asking you at the close of my 10-minute period about your little group of informers, if you have one, and I think perhaps we were misunderstanding each other, because just as my period ended, I think you were saying that you have some people who give you information in respect to the activities of Government employees. Is that right, sir?

Mr. CARR. From time to time; yes, sir.

Mr. WELCH. Sir?

Mr. CARR. From time to time; yes, sir.

Mr. WELCH. And those men you protect as to their names?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. WELCH. I take it Mr. Cohn has his list of informers?

Mr. CARR. I don't know about Mr. Cohn, sir.

Mr. WELCH. You have no information as to whether or not he has?

Mr. CARR. I think he has, but I can't speak for him.

Mr. WELCH. Did you understand that Mr. Schine also had a list, perhaps a smaller one?

Mr. CARR. It is my understanding he has; yes, sir.

Mr. WELCH. He has one?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. WELCH. Of course, we know the Senator has one.

Mr. CARR. Yes.

Mr. WELCH. Now, Mr. Carr, to turn to another subject for a moment, speaking of Communists, the one group of people or the one arm of this Government that has literally fought communism with blood and with steel is the Army in Korea, isn't it?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. WELCH. There is no doubt about all of us being proud of that act on the part of our Army?

Mr. CARR. Not in the least, sir.

Mr. WELCH. Of course, nobody could think that was coddling Communists, could they?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Mr. WELCH. Isn't it just incredible to you, Mr. Carr, just simply incredible to you that anybody in the Army should actually coddle Communists?

Mr. CARR. It would be incredible to me; yes, sir.

Mr. WELCH. Just incredible. At least we can agree on that one.

You don't want to sit in that chair and have anybody in this country think for a moment that you believe the United States Army coddles Communists, do you?

Mr. CARR. I don't think the United States Army coddles Communists.

Mr. WELCH. Thank you, sir. I knew you would agree with me.

Mr. CARR. I would like to complete it, sir.

Mr. WELCH. Would you like to qualify it now?

Mr. CARR. I don't want to qualify it.

Mr. WELCH. Wouldn't you rather just have it simply that way?

Mr. CARR. No; I would rather say it my way, if you don't mind.

Mr. WELCH. I will let you say it your way, provided you say it nicely, sir, to the effect that the United States Army does not coddle Communists. Is that what you would like to tell us in your own words?

Mr. CARR. No, not exactly that. I am in agreement with you, Mr. Welch—

Mr. WELCH. If you are, can't we move along?

Senator McCARTHY. Let him finish.

Mr. WELCH. I think he wants to put a kind of qualification on it that I don't think he really ought to want to put on.

Mr. Carr, do you want to add something to what seemed to me to be so clear and so fresh and so nice?

Mr. CARR. No, sir. I would just like to say that I don't think that at this time the Army is coddling Communists. I think that the Army has gone to a great extent—I should not say the Army—I think Mr. Stevens and Mr. Adams went to great limits to prevent the exposure of persons who had cleared Communists. I don't say that that is necessarily coddling Communists.

Mr. WELCH. What you are talking about there is the loyalty board deal, isn't it?

Mr. CARR. That is correct.

Mr. WELCH. You know perfectly well—by the way, you have told us you went to law school.

Mr. CARR. Yes.

Mr. WELCH. You know perfectly well there is a very grave legal issue involved right at that point, don't you?

Mr. CARR. I don't—I am not sure that I follow you on that.

Mr. WELCH. Well, you have heard Mr. Cohn and me discuss the proposition as to whether or not your committee may legally call members of the loyalty board and put them on the stand and say, "How come you decided this way in this case?" You have heard that discussion, haven't you?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; I have.

Mr. WELCH. Don't you know, as an investigator and a lawyer, that that presents grave legal problems?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; there are two arguments there.

Mr. WELCH. Yes, sir. Thank you for that. Honest men and patriotic men can have Mr. Cohn's view, that you ought to be able to sum-

mons them and question the dickens out of them. That is right, isn't it?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. WELCH. And honest and patriotic men can have, let's say, the Welch view, that it is pretty awkward to call up the judge and say "How come you decided the case the way you did?"

Mr. CARR. You can have that view, sir; yes, sir.

Mr. WELCH. Yes. That is a proper and a patriotic view, isn't it?

Mr. CARR. I can't say patriotic or proper. I know nothing unpatriotic about your view or persons who hold that view. It is not the view that I would hold. I think that any Government employee is responsible for what he does just as I am responsible sitting here.

Mr. WELCH. Understand me, Mr. Carr. I am not saying I am right, you understand. I am just saying it is perfectly possible to have that legal view.

Mr. CARR. All right.

Mr. WELCH. You must see yourself that it is a little awkward for these people who sit on the Loyalty Board if they are going to decide questions fairly, it is a little awkward for them to have to bear in mind all the time that after they have decided a case maybe they will be hauled up, put under oath and questioned as to how they reached their decision.

Mr. CARR. It may be a little awkward, but I can't see that if they are doing their job and if they do it right, why they should worry about it at all.

Mr. WELCH. In any event, I want you to make it clear that the only point at which your committee and the Army came into collision, real collision, was on the point of whether the members of the Loyalty Board were going to be produced and examined.

Mr. CARR. There was one other thing that came—

Mr. WELCH. Wasn't that their—

Mr. CARR. The other thing was the Peress case.

Mr. WELCH. That is another matter. The real collision came about the loyalty boards, didn't it?

Mr. CARR. That was when—yes, the collision came there, and it came on the Peress case.

Mr. WELCH. And there was a scrap about the Zwicker matter?

Mr. CARR. There was a combination of things; yes, sir.

Mr. WELCH. But the real thing where Adams stood pat and said "You are not going to do it," was at the point where you wanted the loyalty board members and he said no?

Mr. CARR. That is what he said; yes.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Now, Mr. Carr, do you want to take a minute to get your mind reoriented? It is perfectly all right. We were discussing the attempts that you say Mr. Adams and Mr. Stevens made to get you to call off these Fort Monmouth hearings, and you suggested, I think, that the first intimation came from Mr. Adams as early as about October 9. Is that correct?

Mr. CARR. To my knowledge.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Yes, to your knowledge, and that is what I am asking you about.

Mr. CARR. Yes.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Now, on October 21 was another occasion that I think you have told us about. That was the night you went to the prize fight. Do you remember?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Incidentally, did you pay for your ticket, Mr. Carr?

Mr. CARR. No. I was a guest of Mr. Cohn.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Did he ever ask you to pay for it?

Mr. CARR. No, sir; and I never offered to pay for it.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Twenty dollars is a rather expensive fight, isn't it?

Mr. CARR. It was a championship fight.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. It is rather hard to get tickets in the first place, I assume.

Mr. CARR. Probably.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Now, on that occasion there was a party of four, was there not, at some time?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Who was the fourth member, Mr. Carr?

Mr. CARR. A friend of mine.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. If, for some reason, you don't want to say his name, it is perfectly all right. I will let you exercise that option.

Mr. CARR. I don't think that it adds to these hearings.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. It may or may not. Was he with you part of the evening?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. He was with us during the fight and I think afterwards we went to a restaurant and had something to eat, and I think maybe a drink.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. And he was with you then?

Mr. CARR. For a portion of the time. As I recall, he left early, a few minutes.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Did these efforts by Mr. Adams to get you to call off the hearings take place in his presence?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. That would have been a rather impolitic thing for Mr. Adams to do, would it not have?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. He was a stranger to Mr. Adams, was he not?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Now, Mr. Adams—incidentally, Mr. Adams is a reasonably intelligent person, don't you think, Mr. Carr?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; very much so.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. He was a friend of yours, wasn't he?

Mr. CARR. I thought he was; yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Now, I think the next thing you testified to that I can remember, and I may slip over some of them, but I think you testified that again on December 9 you had a talk with Mr. Adams and he again suggested to you that it might not be a bad idea to call this whole thing off; is that right?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. On this occasion, however, he started to use some rather frightening language, according to you?

Mr. CARR. I didn't quite hear you. I am sorry.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Well, he started to use, in accordance with your testimony, sir, some rather frightening language, like blackmail and hostage and "what is there in it for us," and things like that?

Mr. CARR. He used the last two.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. The last two. And I think your testimony is that the substance of his conversation consisted of what you deem as a blackmail, is that right?

Mr. CARR. Yes; I thought it was—

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Or an extortion, or something equally as serious, is that right?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator MUNDT. I am sorry, Mr. St. Clair, your time is up. In fact, you had 11 minutes. I was tapped on the shoulder and didn't know about it.

Mr. PREWITT, any questions?

Mr. PREWITT. Pass.

Senator MUNDT. The Chair has just 1 or 2 questions, and I want to ask them in line with what Mr. Welch is bringing out, because I am afraid that possibly Mr. Welch brought out an implication which I am sure he would be the last man in the world to want to bring out, and that is that simply because we all agree that we have the best Army in the world, we all agree that we have a magnificent officer corps, we all agree that they went over and did a terrific job of fighting against communism in Korea. Those things we are in agreement about, but the implication might be that those things being true, that there could be no Communists in the Army. I want to ask you now, as an old FBI agent, I want to ask you in your present capacity as staff director, whether, in your opinion, a young Communist boy drafted in the Army ceases to be a Communist operative simply because he gets into the Army under the draft.

Mr. CARR. No, sir; he doesn't.

Senator MUNDT. He is not only then in the uniform of the United States, but we find a man in the uniform of the United States who is there primarily for the purpose of disrupting the Army, of breaking down our security, of delivering secrets to the enemy, of sabotaging our defense, would that be right?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; and I think largely as a result of the Peress case, the Defense Department has taken steps to be in a position to better handle the induction and the subsequent Army career, the Defense Department career of such persons.

Senator MUNDT. And I want to join you in congratulating the Defense Department in doing what it did last April. Mr. Welch, we are confronted with a very serious problem. You and I, I am sure, will agree that a Communist should not have a draft-exempt status. He cannot be a conscientious objector. So the Army has to bring him in. What you do when you get him there raises some real problems. For a time they treated Communist draftees like everybody else, gave them commissions, promoted them as they did in the case of Peress. That thing having been highlighted before the public, that thing having been demonstrated as it was, made everybody feel that that isn't the way to treat a Communist. So they have tried a new method. I hope it is satisfactory. It is not an easy problem.

We should not be quick to condemn the Army or anybody else for dealing with the problem. But the idea must not get abroad in the United States that simply because a Communist has a uniform on, that we now have a good American instead of an actual or potential spy.

Mr. CARR. That is correct.

Senator MUNDT. I am sure Mr. Welch agrees to that. I wanted to make that clear because our listeners might get a false impression.

Senator McClellan, you have 10 minutes.

We will have order, please, in the committee room.

Senator McCLELLAN. Mr. Carr, I thought I had concluded a moment ago, but I find I should ask you 1 or 2 other questions now. If you have it there, you may follow me. I think I will read it correctly. I want to read your charge No. 46, or read from that charge.

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. Follow me as I read the last sentence in that charge:

But as soon as the probe turned to the infinitely more important question of who was responsible for protecting Communist infiltration, and protecting Communists who had infiltrated, every conceivable obstacle was placed in the path of the committee's search for the truth.

I have used the term or word "coddling" with respect to that charge.

Now, I may have been challenged for the use of that term. Will you tell me, in view of that charge, and your having testified that that charge is true, if the use or the application of the term "coddling" is too strong a term to apply to it?

Mr. CARR. Well, Senator, I don't wish to get into a dispute on definitions of words here, but I think perhaps "coddling" might imply that the persons alleged to do the coddling were in favor of the Communists that were being coddled. I think, if I could continue, sir; I think this statement here more clearly expresses the position that it might not be that they like the Communists any better than the rest of us, and I am sure that you, yourself, from your experience, as I recall, in connection with the privates that we were bringing in here, I am sure you had no love for them; I am sure—

Senator McCLELLAN. I have pretty well demonstrated that to your satisfaction, haven't I?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; you have. But I think that this language here implies that there might have been not a desire to protect the Communists, but a desire to protect other people, maybe themselves, and maybe a system.

Senator McCLELLAN. This language says, "And protecting Communists." It is direct. It doesn't say other people; "and protecting Communists who had infiltrated."

Mr. CARR. That is correct.

Senator McCLELLAN. That is a direct charge that they were protecting Communists who had infiltrated.

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. I don't withdraw any of this language. I just am giving you the thought that I think, in the protecting of the Communists, it might have been for some other reason.

Senator McCLELLAN. But actually, isn't "coddling" a much softer word, a weaker work, than "protecting"? If I have used the wrong term, I want to know it.

Mr. CARR. No; I don't quarrel with you, Senator, about your terms, and don't quarrel with me about this, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. If you do, wherever I have used the term or the word "coddling," I will substitute the word "protecting," if you think it would make any difference.

Mr. CARR. I don't quarrel with you over the use of the word.

Senator McCLELLAN. Thank you very much.

That is all.

Senator MUNDT. Senator Dirksen, you have 10 minutes.

Senator DIRKSEN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to address this to Mr. Welch.

Mr. Welch, this is really only a footnote to the rather pleasant discussion we have had about the extent to which the legislative power goes in investigations of the executive branch. What I propose to cite is not exactly a matter in point, because I recognize the distinction that is involved, but back in the MacArthur hearings, which were held in this very room, incidentally, by the Armed Services Committee of the Senate, there was an inquiry into the dismissal of General MacArthur in April of 1951, and the Armed Services Committee held closed hearings in this room in the following month. Transcripts were made available to the press as soon as they were cleared with respect to security information.

General Bradley, who was then Chief of Staff, and certainly bore a confidential relationship to the President of the United States, came to us voluntarily to testify; and as I recall, he testified that the decision for the dismissal of MacArthur had been made at a White House conference which was attended by President Truman, General Marshall, Averill Harriman, Secretary of State Acheson, and there may have been others.

Having made that statement, Senator Wiley then sought to ascertain whether or not somebody was in attendance at this conference who expressed an opposite view, and General Bradley at that point said that because of the clear separation of powers between the legislative and the executive, he refused to testify any further.

The committee went into that question at considerable length, and as I recall, there were seven Members of the Senate who felt that General Bradley ought to be compelled to testify with respect to everything that had been said at the conference. However, the issue was not pressed and got lost in the welter of things, as I recall.

So, frankly, I think we are back to that question again. In some way or another it is going to have to be more clearly resolved than it has been at any other time.

Of course, that raises the question of whether or not the committee can actually subpoena members of the top loyalty screening board in the Army and not only compel them to appear, which I think is a right under the *Marbury v. Madison* decision by John Marshall long ago, but the more important question is whether they can be compelled to testify as to the reasons why they reversed the lower loyalty boards in the Army structure. That question, of course, has not yet been resolved. We sort of bounced around the edges in the course of this very long hearing.

I wanted to allude to it only for purposes of the record, because it is something which in time must be explored.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WELCH. Mr. Chairman, could I have just a moment to comment on that?

Senator MUNDT. I think you should have it.

Mr. WELCH. This will be a friendly approach, Senator Dirksen, as you would expect from one in my position to you.

As a lawyer, the way this thing points up in my mind is as follows, and it is quite simple. As a lawyer, you and I know that when a case is tried in a courtroom and it is decided, nobody ever has the power to call on the jury and say, "How come you did what you did?" and nobody ever has the power to call on the judge and say, "How come you did what you did?"

These loyalty review boards are quite a lot like a judge and jury, as any lawyer will admit. They are not precisely like them, but they are quite a lot like them. You are in that area where you either do or you don't call them up and say, "How come you did what you did?"

On that point, sir, as I need not tell you, lawyers differ, and on that point the Army and this committee differed. As I have said before, it will not be resolved in this courtroom—in this room—but somewhere one of these days it must be resolved for the good of this country.

Senator DIRKSEN. I would raise only two questions with respect to that, Mr. Welch. The first one is this: Whether they perform a quasi-judicial or an administrative function, as such; and perhaps the more important query: If you assume, for instance, that somebody on one of those boards had some rather oblique ideas, let us say, about communism—and I make no allegation, of course—and the committee were stymied in its efforts to get that information, the question is then, How could a committee of Congress evoke all of the truth in a matter of such importance to the security of the country?

I know, of course, that you and I shall not resolve it here, but I did want the record at least to show that in one way or another, only within the last few years this same constitutional question has been bouncing around in the Congress.

Mr. WELCH. What I like about it is that in a country like this, honorable and patriotic men can differ about it, and I think you will agree they may.

Senator DIRKSEN. That is correct, sir.

Senator MUNDT. Senator Jackson, do you have any questions?

Senator JACKSON. I will pass, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MUNDT. Senator Potter?

Senator POTTER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to comment on the statement which you made during your period of questioning about the Communists being drafted into the Army and the Department of Defense meeting that situation. For the information of the committee, I might mention I am working on legislation which, I hope, may cure that problem.

In my opinion, a member of the Communist Party is not fit to wear the uniform of a United States soldier. We don't allow criminals to wear the uniform. We should not allow a Communist, who is dedicated to the overthrow of our Government by force and violence, to wear the uniform.

I think our Selective Service Act should be amended to provide a special designation for a person who uses the fifth amendment to refuse to state whether he is a member of the Communist Party. That designation should be plainly stamped upon all of his records so that people will know that this man was refused military service; he was unfit to wear the uniform because that man was not loyal to his country.

Senator MUNDT. I am glad to have that information, Senator Potter.

Senator Symington?

Senator SYMINGTON. I pass.

Senator MUNDT. Senator Dworshak.

Senator DWORSHAK. No questions.

Senator MUNDT. Senator McCarthy or Mr. Cohn.

Mr. COHN. No questions.

Senator McCARTHY. I have a few questions.

Mr. Carr, there has been raised here the question of what can be done with a Communist who has been drafted and is in the military. Is it correct that we called four cases, each one of them handled differently? One was a doctor who was kept in as a private.

The next, a fifth-amendment Communist dentist given an honorable discharge.

Another one, still a doctor in the military.

And a fourth, who had been a member of the Communist Party for a short period of time, gave the FBI all the information he could about the Communist conspiracy. He got less than an honorable discharge, not exactly a dishonorable discharge. It was the second-grade discharge.

They were called for the purpose of demonstrating very clearly to Mr. Stevens and those in charge that there was no policy up until the time at least that we called these people. All four were handled in a completely different fashion.

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator McCARTHY. The only one who got less than an honorable discharge—I won't use his name here—was the young man who had been a member for a while, frankly admitted he was a member, gave the FBI—gave Army Intelligence apparently all the information he had about the people who were with him in the Communist movement.

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. As I recall, he testified that he had been cooperative with the Army and he was most cooperative with the committee.

Senator McCARTHY. Mr. Carr, there was raised a question about what a wonderful job our men did in Korea. I agree they did a tremendous job over there, the fighting men. I think it is especially appropriate that I ask you some questions about that today in view of the fact that we have here behind this table Sgt. Gilbert Cumbow, of the Army Chemical Center of Maryland, who was in Korea for about 14 months, selected as the outstanding soldier of the Second Army. I think it may be quite appropriate that we did this Korean matter in view of the fact that we have one of the young men over there who was fortunate enough to come back alive, who might well have died because of the result of a few things I would like to question you about now.

For example, I find in the Congressional Record of January 17 an insert by Senator Styles Bridges. We find here that General Lowe was sent by President Truman to Korea. Apparently President Truman wanted to have some eyes and ears over there so he would get a firsthand report. Why he sent him I don't know, but apparently he was not too satisfied with the reports he was getting, and Lowe was apparently a very good selection by President Truman.

We find the story that Lowe's report never did get through to President Truman. If it had, we don't know how many more young men would be living today who are dead now.

We find the story on page A-22 of the Congressional Record of January 17. May I quote. It is a story by Bill Cunningham, as a result of an interview with a general whose lips were sealed for sometime after he came back, but finally became unsealed. He said:

General MacArthur was right in Korea, and if he had been left alone, he long since would have won in Korea.

Dropping down, he says:

What we face now is a disgraceful stalemate, the writing off of tens of thousands of needless American casualties, the loss of face through the entire oriental world, and a pointless, undefined position for ourselves. MacArthur was hamstrung and finally brought down by the interference of the State Department.

Then, he goes on to describe this. Here is a man picked by President Truman. We don't know whether he is a Democrat or Republican. I assume he was just a great American soldier. All the records indicate he was. He says that we could have long since won the war. Because MacArthur was hamstrung and finally brought down, we have had to write off tens of thousands of casualties.

Now, in connection with Mr. Welch's question about whether or not the American people have the right to know the facts, don't you agree with me wholeheartedly, Mr. Carr, that where you have a situation such as this, where a top general says that, in effect, thousands of men died because a general was not allowed to win the war, that the American people are entitled to know the facts, all of the facts, and they should not be kept from the people?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir, I would.

Senator McCARTHY. No. 2: Mr. Carr, there seems to be being built up, I gather, some idea that there seems to be something sacred about what a member of the loyalty board does. If a man steals \$10,000, there is no question about our right to expose him, is that right?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Senator McCARTHY. Wouldn't you think that it is 10 times more serious to find a man ordering a Communist returned to secret radar laboratories knowing he was a Communist?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator McCARTHY. I would like to call your attention, Mr. Carr, to a statement by Maj. Gen. C. H. Gerhardt, who incidentally has not been before this committee, but this statement was made publicly, so there apparently is no violation of any confidence by repeating it. He said this:

The 24 civilian employees of the Second Army at Fort Meade, Md., were on a subversive list, but were protected by someone within the Department of the Army.

He is quoted as having stated on May 15, 1954, that—

in the cases of some of these civilians, we would carry the removal proceedings successfully through every stage upward, only to have these cases in every instance reversed by the President's Loyalty Security Review Board.

Is that roughly the same situation we found in regard to Fort Monmouth?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; it was.

Senator McCARTHY. Do you think, Mr. Carr, that there is anything sacred, any reason, why the American people should not know who is clearing these Communists, who is sending them as I have so often said back to a position where they are in effect poised with a razor blade over the jugular vein of this Nation?

Mr. CARR. No, sir, I don't.

Senator McCARTHY. President Eisenhower, in his state of the Union message made a statement, and I am again reverting back to Mr. Welch's discussion of the Korean war—I got the impression he felt that because our soldiers did a great job there that perhaps we should not protect them from traitors who might be able to infiltrate the Army, and maybe I am doing Mr. Welch an injustice, but that is the impression I got from his statement. Let me read what the President of the United States said, if I may, and see if this does not indicate either subversion or criminal incompetence, which resulted in the death of American young men, a situation which should have been exposed long before this time.

Here is the President of the United States, he says this:

In June 1950, following the aggressive attack on the Republic of Korea, the United States Seventh Fleet was instructed both to prevent attack upon Formosa, and also to insure that Formosa should not be used as a base of operations against the Chinese Communist mainland.

And I call your attention especially to this:

This has meant, in effect, that the United States Navy was required to serve as a defensive arm of Communist China.

Here is the President of the United States. May I repeat that?

He says:

This has meant in effect that the United States Navy was required to serve as a defensive arm of Communist China.

Then, dropping down further, he says:

This permitted those Communists with greater impunity to kill our soldiers and those of our United Nations allies in Korea.

I may say that I heartily agree with President Eisenhower when he says that the order which was in existence until he took over the Presidency in effect made our Seventh Fleet a defensive arm of the Communist Party, allowed them to kill American young men. If the statement is true, and I am sure it is, it means that young American men are dead today who would be living if it were not for this traitorous order. Do you agree—could I finish the question—do you agree with me, Mr. Carr, that, in a situation such as this, there is no reason on earth why the American people should not hear the individuals who were responsible for such a traitorous order, find out whether they were Communists or whether they were merely stupid beyond words?

Mr. CARR. I agree with you.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Welch, or Mr. St. Clair, you have ten minutes.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Well, Mr. Carr, we were talking, I think, about the prize fight.

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. A fight on a little smaller scale than we have just been talking about.

I think I am wrong, I think we passed from that into around December sometime when your memorandum indicates that Mr. Adams was using some strong language. I suppose, Mr. Carr, that you would not look upon those alleged activities of Mr. Adams as being very much in the order of cooperation with you and your staff and the committee, would you?

Mr. CARR. In the order of cooperation, sir?

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Yes.

Mr. CARR. How do you mean that?

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Well, if I were to blackmail you or attempt to blackmail you, I wouldn't be cooperating with you in the same breath, would I?

Mr. CARR. Perhaps I didn't hear you, sir. Go ahead, sir. Will you repeat it?

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Perhaps it should be read.

(The reporter read from his notes as requested.)

Mr. CARR. I am sorry, I wasn't paying attention—

Mr. ST. CLAIR. That is all right. It is not a difficult question. You would look upon it—

Mr. CARR. I would like to hear it.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Certainly you may.

Senator MUNDT. The reporter will read the question, please.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Why don't I restate it quickly?

Senator MUNDT. Very well.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. If I were to attempt to blackmail you, you wouldn't think that would be highly cooperative of me, would you?

Mr. CARR. No, I wouldn't think so; no.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. If I threatened to hold a friend of yours as a hostage, you wouldn't think that I was highly cooperative with you, would you?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You say these things happened on December 9, don't you, Mr. Carr?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. I am not sure in my mind whether, at least insofar as the "hostage" language is concerned, your testimony is that it was facetious or not. Perhaps you can tell me. Did you consider it facetious?

Mr. CARR. The use of the term "hostage" by Mr. Adams was on many occasions facetious. It might have been at this time.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. It might have been at this time?

Mr. CARR. It might have been.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Would you have written a memorandum about it, sir, if it was facetious?

Mr. CARR. I wrote a memorandum about the other statement.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. It also includes something about "hostage," doesn't it?

Mr. CARR. It includes the fact that we had been, I think, to a hearing. It includes many things. But the reason I wrote it was this other statement.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Sure. You don't mean to suggest that you wrote a memorandum about a facetious remark made by Mr. Adams, do you?

Mr. CARR. No; of course not.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. It was serious, wasn't it?

Mr. CARR. The reason I wrote this memorandum was the other remark by Mr. Adams.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. All right, but insofar as the question of "hostage" is concerned, he was serious, wasn't he, as far as you know?

Mr. CARR. Yes. He was serious. He had been serious several times. Other times he had been facetious. It is hard to tell which is which sometimes.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. He certainly wasn't very cooperative with you or the staff on December 9, was he?

Mr. CARR. No; I don't think he was being cooperative; no, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. No. It was so bad you wrote a memorandum to Senator McCarthy about it, didn't you?

Mr. CARR. That is right.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. When did you write it?

Mr. CARR. The same day.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. The same day?

Mr. CARR. I might say that he was perhaps trying to be cooperative, if we wanted to cooperate with him; yes.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Would you read me that answer? I didn't quite understand it.

(Whereupon, the answer was read by the reporter as above recorded.)

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Do you mean to suggest, Mr. Carr, that while he as you said, tried to blackmail you, he was also being cooperative?

Mr. CARR. No. I say you might put the interpretation on it that he was trying to be cooperative with us if we wanted to play ball with him; yes. He was making an offer. He said, "What's there in it for us?"

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You didn't accept the offer, did you?

Mr. CARR. That is right.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. So he was not cooperative, was he?

Mr. CARR. No; but it was a try.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. But it didn't result in cooperation, did it?

Mr. CARR. No, sir; not in that respect.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. It did not in any respect on that day, did it?

Mr. CARR. That is substantially correct.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You know, sir, that about a week later the Senator stated for the public record that Mr. Stevens and those who are now in charge, which would include Mr. Adams, had fully cooperated with the committee. You know that, don't you?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir, I do.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Do you consider that the information you gave to the Senator on December 9 is consistent with his statement in the public record on December 15?

Mr. CARR. I don't know that it is consistent with it; no. I know that—

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You consider it highly inconsistent, don't you?

Mr. CARR. It is inconsistent with it; yes. Inconsistent with my memorandum; yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Sure, and the information you imparted to him?

Mr. CARR. That is correct.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. And the information you had been imparting to him since October 9?

Mr. CARR. That is correct.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Were you present when the chairman, Senator McCarthy, made that statement for the public record?

Mr. CARR. I don't know—

Mr. COHN. I was going to ask, Mr. St. Clair, can you give me the documentation on that?

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Yes. It is now in the record at page 5841.

Mr. CARR. I don't know whether I was present. I might very well have been. I might say—and I think maybe I could save a little time by saying it now—that Senator McCarthy, when I gave him this memorandum, after he had seen this memorandum and I had spoken to him, he thought that I was overly disturbed by this situation. He thought that I was perhaps too disturbed about this; that Adams might not have meant what I thought he meant.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Mr. Adams was sent by you, as you testified, to see Senator McCarthy that same day, namely, December 9?

Mr. CARR. I wouldn't say "sent."

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You suggested that he might go see the Senator?

Mr. CARR. Right; that is right.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You know that he did go see the Senator?

Mr. CARR. Yes; I know that.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Sure. Are you suggesting that the Senator didn't quite believe your memorandum?

Mr. CARR. No. I am suggesting only that the Senator was not as disturbed about the situation as I was.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. I see. You have no doubt in any event, though, Mr. Carr, but that Senator McCarthy, when he stated for the public record on December 15 that he had had full cooperation, he meant what he said?

Mr. CARR. I have no doubt. I don't know what he meant.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You don't suggest that he didn't mean it, do you, Mr. Carr?

Mr. CARR. Well, he said it. The record speaks for itself, I guess.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You don't want all these people to understand the Senator speaks for the public record and not mean it, do you?

Mr. CARR. No, I don't. I want you to ask the Senator what he means when he says it, not me.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Perhaps we will, Mr. Carr, but insofar as you are concerned, I just want to get it established that the chairman as of December 15 stated there had been full cooperation.

Mr. CARR. All right. He probably—

Mr. ST. CLAIR. And that you consider that inconsistent with your memorandum which you say you wrote on December 9.

Mr. CARR. I consider it inconsistent with my memorandum; yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. I would like to go back for just a moment, to change the pace a little bit. You remember the flight to McGuire Air Base in New Jersey on December 17?

Mr. CARR. Yes.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. There has been an awful lot of talk about a photograph that was taken on that day, or a series of photographs.

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. It now turns out that you are the mysterious fourth man in the picture, aren't you?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Did you see Private Schine as you got off the plane?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; I did.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Did you go up and shake hands with him and say "hello," or something?

Mr. CARR. As I recall, there was more or less a round of handshakings. I don't know whether I went up to see him or he went up to see me. There were some other people there.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You shook hands all around, and you shook hands all around?

Mr. CARR. I am sure I must have shaken hands with him. I know I shook hands with General Ryan.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. And other people shook hands with Private Schine and General Ryan and other persons?

Mr. CARR. That is correct.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Did you see that Private Schine had two coats with him?

Mr. CARR. I don't recall that he had two coats. I don't recall that he didn't have two coats.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. When the picture was taken he had a coat on, didn't he?

Mr. CARR. That is correct.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You didn't see him hand another coat to any colonel, did you?

Mr. CARR. No; I can't say that I saw him hand a coat to a colonel.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Either you did or you didn't. Which is it?

Mr. CARR. As I say, I can't say that I saw him hand a coat to another colonel. The reason I wanted to go on, the reason I can't say is because I recall that on the flight to Boston that night Senator McCarthy and Mr. Cohn and I were joking about the fact that somebody had held Schine's coat so he could have his picture. I can't at this point state whether somebody held Schine's second coat or his first coat or whether somebody helped him on with his coat. I don't know. I know we joked about it. We thought it was General Ryan. At least I thought it was General Ryan who had held his coat. It may have been one of the colonels.

Senator MUNDT. Your time has expired.

Mr. Prewitt?

The Chair will pass.

Senator McClellan?

Senator McCLELLAN. Mr. Carr, I have been using the words "coddling Communists" and apparently there was some objection to it. Let's take up another term now that has been used to describe situations, and that is "holding a razor blade at the jugular vein of this Nation." I believe you agreed with Senator McCarthy in his application of that term to those to whom he referred in his questions a while ago. Did you?

Mr. CARR. He had some pretty long questions.

Senator McCLELLAN. I know he did.

Mr. CARR. But I will agree that the Communists, especially those strategically placed in defense industries and in Government and in other places, do hold in effect a razor blade at the throat of the Nation; yes.

Senator McCLELLAN. All right, we will agree on that.

Now let's go a little further and see if you agree on this. I think we have agreed that Communists, individual Communists working in defense plants or who have infiltrated, hold a razor blade over the jugular vein of this Nation. If your charges are true with respect to Secretary Stevens and Mr. Adams that they have been protecting those who have infiltrated, those Communists, would you also agree with me that they are holding a razor blade over the jugular vein of this Nation?

Mr. CARR. Well, let me put it this way, sir. I would not say—I think the Communists are the ones who would be holding a razor blade at the jugular vein of the Nation.

Senator McCLELLAN. They are protecting the razor.

Mr. CARR. I would say, our charges, our statement being what it is, they are not rushing to pull the razor away.

Senator McCLELLAN. They are not rushing to pull it away. They are protecting the razor then.

Mr. CARR. That is the best I can say.

Senator McCLELLAN. All right, thank you. That is all.

Senator MUNDT. Senator Dirksen?

Senator Jackson?

Senator JACKSON. Just a couple of questions, Mr. Carr. What was the reason that you made the trip on November 17 to see Private Schine at Fort Dix?

Mr. CARR. Well, I didn't make the trip to see Private Schine at Fort Dix. I, in effect, went along for the ride. I was going to Boston. I was going to Boston by commercial airplane and the Secretary offered his plane—in fact, he insisted that the Senator and his party use his plane, and I went along.

Senator JACKSON. Do you know what the reason was for the trip to Fort Dix? You were riding as a passenger?

Mr. CARR. Right. The only answer I can give you to that is—

Senator JACKSON. That was really the trip to McGuire Air Force Base, which is adjacent to Fort Dix?

Mr. CARR. That is right. The best answer I can give you to that is to tell you what happened. I had no knowledge as to the purpose of the trip when I was invited to go along. The only thing I know is that when we were there, Senator McCarthy, in front of two colonels, and, again, later, told Private Schine that he wanted him to work every moment he had off of his training on getting out—getting the reports prepared.

Senator JACKSON. Was there any work discussed at this meeting on November 17?

Mr. CARR. Yes, there was.

Senator JACKSON. What did you discuss? I mean, what project?

Mr. CARR. Well, I personally didn't discuss too much with him. Mr. Cohn did. The Senator talked with him about the reports.

Senator JACKSON. When you say "report," are you referring to the report on the Voice?

Mr. CARR. Sir?

Senator JACKSON. When you say the report, what report are you—

Mr. CARR. Generally speaking, I was speaking about the information centers report and the Voice of America report. I recall that

the Senator spoke to him about other things. I recall that he mentioned the Oppenheimer situation.

Senator JACKSON. To Private Schine?

Mr. CARR. Yes. There was something of a discussion about that. What it was, I, at this point, don't recall, sir.

Senator JACKSON. Do you mean that there was some discussion about an investigation on Mr. Oppenheimer?

Mr. CARR. I couldn't say that. I got the impression that it related to something, perhaps, that Schine had done or knew about. I didn't pay much attention at this point. That is about all I can say about it.

Senator JACKSON. You don't recall any information or anything that you needed to get from Schine on that occasion?

Mr. CARR. I didn't personally. I think maybe Mr. Cohn did. And I don't know whether the Senator needed it or just wanted to discuss something with him.

Senator JACKSON. But you didn't have any information that you wanted or—

Mr. CARR. Not at that particular time. I just went along to go to Boston.

Senator JACKSON. But your recollection was that it was something with reference to the Oppenheimer matter?

Mr. CARR. No; that is not my recollection as to what it was. I don't know all about it. I do recall that there was some discussion of that, that subject.

Senator JACKSON. Were you with Private Schine and Mr. Cohn all the time?

Mr. CARR. Most of the time; yes, sir. There were two colonels with us most of the time. I spent some time discussing many topics with them.

Senator JACKSON. You worked on the hearings in connection with the latter—the hearings at Boston?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. Do you recall that Mr. Cohn has testified—it is on page 646:

the circumstances of our meeting Private Schine were that prior to commencing certain hearings in Boston, we desired to obtain from Private Schine information which he had, sir, pertaining to the investigation which we were about to open in Boston. For that reason, we went down to see him and we talked to him about that and that alone.

Mr. CARR. That is probably right, that is probably correct, sir. As I say, I went along for the ride.

Senator JACKSON. When did the investigation of defense plants start?

Mr. CARR. The investigation of defense plants?

Senator JACKSON. Yes.

Mr. CARR. That had been started, as I recall, some time during the fall of the year.

Senator JACKSON. Do you know about when?

Mr. CARR. Yes. It was during the course of the Fort Monmouth hearings. It developed that this radar work was more or less farmed out to different electrical companies and establishments.

Senator JACKSON. Well, did Schine start in on this new work then in connection with these defense plants when he was already in the Army?

Mr. CARR. No, sir. This was in October, and it wasn't a question, as far as I know, it wasn't so much a question of his starting in on new work as a question of his receiving information from an informant of his who had some knowledge concerning it. That is my understanding of it, sir.

Senator JACKSON. Some information that was important in connection with these hearings?

Mr. CARR. Information that was important in connection with Communist infiltration into defense industries.

Senator JACKSON. That is all.

Senator MUNDT. Any questions to my right?

Senator McCarthy or Mr. Cohn, any questions?

Mr. COHN. Yes, sir.

Senator McCARTHY. Yes; I have a few.

Senator MUNDT. Senator McCarthy?

Senator McCARTHY. Mr. Carr, I have discussed a number of times publicly what I call "treason." I have been criticized for that because they claimed that I use words too strong. I would like to now discuss the statements by five rather outstanding Americans, I think all of them telling the truth. I believe it adds up to what we can call treason, and I would like to discuss with you the question of whether or not the American people are entitled to the information or not.

As I have said to you often, I think you have heartily agreed, this is no game we are in, although you would think so from what we see go on here some days. The blue chips are really down now.

There, of course, are two theories. One is that it is a favor to the American people to give them the information of what their servants are doing. The other is that they are entitled to the information as a matter of right. As you know, I subscribe to the latter theory.

Now, I would like to read to you, if I may, from the statements of three individuals and ask you if you don't agree that regardless of how the information is classified, the American people should know the background of this.

General Van Fleet was on the witness stand, one of our really great generals, next to Douglas MacArthur, and on page 31 he had this to say. Senator Byrd was asking a question. He said:

You are quoted, I think, General, in the newspapers, as I recall, as saying on two occasions that you could have gotten the military victory in Korea. Is that correct?

General VAN FLEET. I think that was a little overstated in the paper. We might define what you mean by military victory. I would not say a complete victory, but in June of 1951, we had the Communist armies on the run, they were hurting badly, out of supplies, completely out of hand, out of control. They were in a panic, and were doing their best to fall back, doing their best to fall as far back as possible, and we stopped by order. We did not pursue to finish the enemy.

Senator BYRD. Did you recommend that the attack be continued?

General VAN FLEET. Oh, yes; I was praying for them to turn me loose.

Dropping down:

Senator BYRD. If you had authority to go ahead and pursue the enemy as far as you could, what would have been the result?

General VAN FLEET. I believe we would have gotten all of his heavy equipment and perhaps two or three hundred thousand prisoners.

Then General Ridgway was testifying, and I don't have his testimony here but I can recap it, I think, pretty much from memory. He was talking about the order to cut down the production of ammunition, an order which was signed in 1950 and never countermanded.

As Ridgway says, and, as I say, I am not quoting him verbatim, but in effect he said, "When the ammunition piles ran low, the corpses in the graves registration section piled high."

I am just quoting you from five individuals. One other now, all dissected episodes but all part of the same picture.

General Bullitt was testifying. He was testifying about the order which President Eisenhower canceled when he took office, the order which the President referred to as using our Navy as a protective arm of the Communist—using our Seventh Fleet as the protective arm of the Communist army—here is what General Bullitt said. He said :

The anti-Communist Chinese Navy is forbidden to act in any way by order of our Government, which has given orders to our fleet to prevent it from stopping the Communist supply ships going up to Korea. Those Communist supply ships sail right by Formosa, equipped with Soviet munitions, put in the Communist ship in Gdynia. They come all the way around and go right by Formosa and sail past there, taking those weapons up to be used to kill American soldiers in Korea, and by order of our Government, the Chinese Navy is flatly forbidden to stop them on their way up there.

Senator Watkins asked the question :

Would the Chinese Navy—

and the anti-Communist Navy of China—

would the Chinese Navy have the power except for that order to intercept them, and capture them?

Ambassador BULLITT. Certainly, without question, sir, without question.

So, Mr. Carr, when we are talking about investigating, we have here a sequence of statements made not 20 years ago, not 10 years ago, but in the very recent past, a statement made by General Lowe to the effect that because General MacArthur was hamstrung and brought down we had to write off tens of thousands of casualties; the statement by President Eisenhower that until he took office our Seventh Fleet was being used as the protective arm of the Communist Party; the statement by General Van Fleet that we could have captured all of the heavy equipment, and two or three hundred thousand of the enemy if politicians in Washington had not stopped him; the testimony of General Ridgway to the effect that the ammunition shortage, when the piles of ammunition ran low the number of corpses piled high; the testimony of Ambassador Bullitt to the effect that by order of our Government the bullets were being shipped by Formosa and being used to kill American boys.

Now, I have referred to that, Mr. Carr, as treason. I am not going to ask you to say how you would define it, but I hear Mr. Welch and individuals here talking about the importance of secrecy, whether or not the American people can know what is going on. You and I know, Mr. Carr, that if individuals were in the Government, responsible for the 5 different incidents which I have just related to you, and if all the information is stamped secret, we have no way on earth of knowing whether they are still there, whether they are still holding important jobs, and the only way, the only way we can determine whether or not the individuals responsible for these, what I call 5 incidents of treason, the only way we can find out whether they are still holding positions of power, is that we have access freely to information except, of course, anything which would give out the names of informants, which would endanger the security of this Nation.

Do you agree with me, Mr. Carr, that we get down to this: It is important beyond words that when we get through with this hearing that somehow, someway, we work out with this administration a formula whereby we can get the names so the American people can see the faces of the individuals responsible for, as Lowe says, the deaths, or tens of thousands of casualties, of Americans?

Mr. CARR. I think that we, and the people, have the right to know, and I think it important that some policy is worked out on that line; yes, sir.

Senator McCARTHY. Mr. Carr, can you think of any reason why the old Truman blackout order of 1948 should be maintained in effect as of 1954?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Senator McCARTHY. Just one further question. If our committee is to perform its function, it is imperative, is it not, that every blackout order, regardless of whether it is Truman's or anyone else's, be canceled instantly?

Mr. CARR. I think that is correct, sir.

Senator McCARTHY. No further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Welch or Mr. St. Clair, you have 10 minutes.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Mr. Carr, I take it the summation of your testimony yesterday as to Private Schine was that you had no interest in his military career, is that correct?

Mr. CARR. That is substantially correct, yes.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. I mean, if the Army felt that he should be a private, that was all right with you?

Mr. CARR. That is correct.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. If he was to be promoted to a sergeant, that would be all right with you?

Mr. CARR. That is correct.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You had no interest one way or the other, right?

Mr. CARR. That is correct, no personal interest.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Do you think Mr. Cohn had any personal interest in Private Schine's Army career?

Mr. CARR. No, I don't think he had any what you would call personal interest in his career. I think he had an interest in his career more so than I would have, since he knew Mr. Schine better than I did, to see that the Army did not misuse Private Schine because he had come from the committee.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Did you have any information, sir, that the Army was misusing Private Schine in any way?

Mr. CARR. No. Let me think for a second here. I don't recall any information that the Army was misusing Private Schine, no, sir, but that wouldn't prevent alertness to such possibility, no, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Do you think there was such an alertness on your part?

Mr. CARR. No, I didn't have any great alertness; no, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Do you think that Mr. Cohn had a great alertness toward the possibility of misuse of Private Schine?

Mr. CARR. I think that he didn't have any great alertness. I think that he had perhaps more than I did an awareness of the possibilities of such action being taken by the Army.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Do you think he was extremely tender on that subject?

Mr. CARR. No, I don't think he was extremely tender on that subject.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You don't think he was quick to find any misuse?

Mr. CARR. No.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Or alleged misuse, pardon me.

Mr. CARR. No, I don't.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Then I take it that if Mr. Adams were to offer you a quote, tidbit, unquote, it would fall on deaf ears, is that correct? You had no interest in this man as an Army private?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir, it would fall on deaf ears.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Would it have fallen on deaf ears on Mr. Cohn's part, do you think?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir, I think it would.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. So these were simply silly acts on the part of John Adams to offer you quote, tidbits, unquote?

Mr. CARR. I think maybe.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Just plain ridiculous, isn't that right?

Mr. CARR. I think they were ridiculous, yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. I take it your testimony yesterday was that John Adams, a reasonably intelligent person, is said to have offered you tidbits in exchange for breaking a general, isn't that right?

Mr. CARR. I don't recall—I don't know that that is my testimony, but I recall the train ride, I think, if that is what you are referring to.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. I am referring to several things, but that is one.

Mr. CARR. Yes.

No, I don't think I said yesterday that he offered tidbits in return for the breaking of a general; no. I don't think that would be the exact way of saying it.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Didn't you say in substance that on one occasion Mr. Adams said, "If you will give me a good word on General Lawton, I will give you a good word on Private Schine's Thanksgiving weekend"?

Mr. CARR. Yes, I said that; yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Do you really think that happened, Mr. Carr?

Mr. CARR. Really think what happened, sir?

Mr. ST. CLAIR. That he offered a weekend pass to a private in order to get this committee's approval for breaking a general?

Mr. CARR. Well, you say that he offered a weekend pass. You give a different connotation to it than I would, and than I did. He said—

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Let me read it to you so we won't have any misunderstanding. Page 6515:

Mr. Adams said to Mr. Cohn, "If you can give me some good word on the Lawton situation, maybe I can give you some good word on whether or not Schine will be available this weekend."

Mr. CARR. Yes. That is November 24, isn't it?

Mr. ST. CLAIR. That is right.

Mr. CARR. Yes. Go ahead.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Is that the suggestion of a rational person, that a weekend pass for a private is counterbalance for approval of the breaking of a general?

Mr. CARR. No, sir. I think you—

Mr. ST. CLAIR. That is your testimony. I read it, sir.

Mr. CARR. All right. Do you want me to explain it to you now?

Mr. ST. CLAIR. No. I just want to know if that is what you intended to give as your testimony.

Senator McCARTHY. Mr. St. Clair, could the witness answer?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. I will stand on any testimony I have given here. If you can show me something that is wrong, if I have made a mistake—

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Am I wrong in suggesting to you that your testimony is that John Adams offered a weekend pass for Senator McCarthy's approval of breaking a general?

Mr. CARR. No. My testimony here, if I am reading from the same page you are, sir, 6515—

Mr. ST. CLAIR. That is correct. I haven't misread it, have I?

Mr. CARR. The second full paragraph. It says here:

Mr. Adams said to Mr. Cohn that "If you can give me some good word on the Lawton situation, maybe I can give you some good word on whether or not Schine will be available this weekend."

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Did I misread it?

Mr. CARR. I am not sure that you read it, but you are talking about, did Adams trade off a weekend for a private as against a demotion for a general. Adams is saying here, as I interpreted it when he said it, he is saying here that if Cohn would—actually, he is referring to Senator McCarthy. That is who he is interested in. If Senator McCarthy would give some good word, that means would Senator McCarthy go along and not make any public statement concerning the removal or demotion of a general, he then might be able to be a little more agreeable as to whether or not Mr. Schine would be available that weekend to work on committee business.

The Secretary of the Army had previously said—

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Are you still answering a question or making a speech?

Mr. CARR. I am still answering a question. I am not addicted to making speeches, but I would like to get the question in here. The Secretary of the Army had said that Schine would be available these weekends. Mr. Adams is trying to usurp the power, I assume, of the Secretary. He is changing things around.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. It still adds up that there is on one side of the balance the question of a weekend pass for a private and on the other side of the balance the ratification or at least silence on the part of Senator McCarthy as to the breaking of a general. Is that your testimony?

Mr. CARR. If you want to add it that way, it is all right with me.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Don't you think that is the fair way to add it?

Mr. CARR. I don't think it is necessarily a fair way to add it.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. All right. You don't have to.

Mr. CARR. I don't wish to continue disagreeing with you.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You are entitled to disagree with me at any time you wish, sir.

Mr. CARR. All right, sir. Then I will continue.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. What was there about Private Schine that would lead a rational person to think, sir, that a little tidbit could move around such powerful forces as generals?

Mr. CARR. I think that you are talking in circles here, Mr. St. Clair.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Maybe you are talking in circles. It is your testimony I am referring to.

Mr. CARR. Maybe I am, sir, but what I am trying to say here is that General—the General Lawton situation was something aside from Schine. Mr. Adams was trying to tie the General Lawton situation in with the Schine thing.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. That is what you say.

Mr. CARR. That is what I say; yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. That is right. I am suggesting to you it is a rather ludicrous suggestion, isn't it?

Mr. CARR. It probably is. It didn't work.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. It is even more ludicrous to offer a tidbit to a private in exchange for calling off the work of this subcommittee, isn't it, Mr. Carr?

Mr. CARR. It didn't work. I guess maybe it is ludicrous.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. That is right.

Mr. CARR. I didn't make the suggestion.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. No; but you are testifying to it, aren't you?

Mr. CARR. I am testifying to what happened, what I heard and what I know, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Here is, you are testifying, a reasonably intelligent man making two absolutely ludicrous suggestions.

Mr. CARR. I think that John Adams is a reasonably intelligent man. I think on occasions he has made ludicrous suggestions; yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Isn't it true, sir, that there is something about Private Schine that didn't make these suggestions, as you put them, so ludicrous?

Mr. CARR. What would that be, sir?

Mr. ST. CLAIR. A little bait in front of Private Schine—I am using your words and I don't mean to suggest that I agree with them—in fact had enough power to cause these things to happen, did it not?

Mr. CARR. It didn't happen. Maybe Mr. Adams thought that it would. I don't know.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. What would there be about Private Schine that would lead this reasonably intelligent man to think that a little tidbit dangled in front of him would cause the work of the subcommittee to cease, and cause a general to be broken?

Mr. CARR. I can't say what was in Mr. Adams' mind. I think Mr. Adams was trying. He tried many times in many ways. He was trying.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. These were rather feeble efforts, though, weren't they, Mr. Carr?

Mr. CARR. They were feeble. He didn't succeed.

Senator MUNDT. The time has expired. You may finish your answer.

Mr. CARR. They didn't succeed.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Prewitt?

The Chair will pass.

Any questions to my right?

Any questions to my left?

Mr. COHN or Senator McCarthy?

Mr. COHN. No questions.

Senator McCARTHY. Just one question: Regardless of what Mr. Adams or Mr. Stevens or anyone else did, the course of the hearings wasn't affected one iota by anything they did until they succeeded in calling them off by this hearing here, is that correct?

Mr. CARR. That is correct.

Senator McCARTHY. No further questions.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. St. Clair or Mr. Welch, you have another 10 minutes.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. And by the same token, Private Schine received no special treatment from the Army, did he?

Mr. CARR. I think that General Ryan has testified that he hadn't; yes, that is correct.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. So that if Mr. Adams is correct, that this committee, through its chief counsel and others sought to get preferential treatment, this committee didn't get it?

Mr. CARR. So, then, Mr. — would you have that read, please?

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Would you read it, please?

(The reporter read from his notes as requested.)

Mr. ST. CLAIR. That is true, there was no preferential treatment you know of?

Mr. CARR. For Schine?

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Yes.

Mr. CARR. No; there was no preferential treatment that I know of.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Now, let's go to December 17. You recall that occasion, do you not?

Mr. CARR. December 17? Yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. There were hearings that morning in New York, were there not, Mr. Carr?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You attended them?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Did you have a discussion with Senator McCarthy either before, during, or immediately after those hearings about Private Schine?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Did his name come up at all, either before, during, or immediately after the hearing?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Now, you testified that you and Mr. Cohn met with the Senator and Mr. Adams at Gasner's Restaurant after the hearings at noon.

Mr. CARR. That is correct.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You testified, as I remember, that Mr. Adams and the Senator were already there?

Mr. CARR. That is correct.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Can you tell me about what time of the day it was?

Mr. CARR. It would be rough, but the hearings were in the morning, they start at 10:30. Probably somewhere between 12 and 1, maybe 1:30. Lunchtime.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Now, when you sat down, you said, I think, that there was some general conversation, and then the Senator said, in effect, that Mr. Adams had brought up the subject of General Lawton. Do you recall that?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. I don't mean to misstate it. Have I fairly stated your testimony?

Mr. CARR. Yes, I think that is—

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Was this general conversation, sir, of long duration or just how would you type it?

Mr. CARR. I don't recall specifically. I know that there was general conversation before this came up.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Yes. Well, did this come up rather quickly in the conversation?

Mr. CARR. I don't think it came up too quickly. It may have. I recall—I know—

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Well, as you—

Mr. CARR (continuing). We ordered lunch. There was talk about what we were going to eat. There was general conversation.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Well, the first serious subject, then, discussed, was that of General Lawton, is that correct?

Mr. CARR. I think that is correct.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. And would you say that the Senator made his observation almost after he had ordered his lunch?

Mr. CARR. No. I can't tell you exactly.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Well, as a matter of fact, there were some other people present, weren't there?

Mr. CARR. Yes, there were other people present for a period of time.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. And did this conversation take place at any time while they were there?

Mr. CARR. Which conversation? The general conversation?

Mr. ST. CLAIR. I thought, sir, that was the only conversation. I will take it all back. I will take it all back. It is my fault. I have too many generals. Now, when these people were there, is that the period of time in which, as we say, the general conversation took place?

Mr. CARR. Yes, that is my recollection.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Was it after they left that the subject of General Lawton came up?

Mr. CARR. I think it was. I think it was.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You think that was the case?

Mr. CARR. I think it was. Now, it may have started before. I don't know.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Your testimony was that that suggestion from the Senator touched off a monologue from Mr. Cohn?

Mr. CARR. Yes. Now, I don't know whether immediately Mr. Cohn got the floor, but a monologue followed; yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Well, I think I am quoting you directly when I say you testified yesterday it touched off.

Mr. CARR. All right. I will—

Mr. ST. CLAIR. And that indicates, does it not, to you and to me, that that was an immediate reaction on the part of Mr. Cohn?

Mr. CARR. Yes. Yes, I will go along with that, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. And that was after these other persons had left, is that correct?

Mr. CARR. It is my recollection it was after they had left.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You are not too sure of it?

Mr. CARR. I wouldn't state that positively; no, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You wouldn't?

Mr. CARR. No.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You are not too sure of it?

Mr. CARR. I just wouldn't state positively. I am pretty sure of it.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. All right. Now, how long were you in the restaurant?

Mr. CARR. I don't know. The usual time it takes to eat lunch, not too much—

Mr. ST. CLAIR. It is true Mr. Adams missed a couple of trains, is it not?

Mr. CARR. He says he did. I am not sure.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You are not in a position to deny it, are you?

Mr. CARR. I wouldn't deny it. Of course not.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. How long do you think you were there?

Mr. CARR. Oh, I would say—I don't really know. Probably an hour, 45 minutes, maybe longer, maybe less.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Would it have been as much as 2 hours?

Mr. CARR. It might have been. I don't think so, but it could have been. I am not sure.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Well, an hour, or 45 minutes, is what you believe it was?

Mr. CARR. I am really not sure on that.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Did this monologue continue throughout the duration of the lunch?

Mr. CARR. Well, it is my recollection that it continued. Perhaps somebody got a word in once in awhile. But pretty much, yes, pretty much.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. And did it continue from the ride uptown until Mr. Adams got out of the car?

Mr. CARR. Well, no. There I am not sure that it was only Mr. Cohn who was talking. I think the Senator may have said something. I think I may have said something.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. This was the first time you had observed Mr. Cohn take the floor on the question of General Lawton, isn't it?

Mr. CARR. I am not sure this is the first time I observed him take the floor. I know I have heard him take the floor on the subject of possible reprisals against persons who had helped the committee. We have had—he had had instances of that before in other investigations conducted.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. This whole matter had been gone over before at the end of November, had it not?

Mr. CARR. What whole matter is that, sir?

Mr. ST. CLAIR. The question of General Lawton.

Mr. CARR. The question of General Lawton came up, to my first knowledge, concerning any action or possible action, came up in November around Thanksgiving.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Yes. And didn't you learn that he had been required to submit a written report to the Secretary?

Mr. CARR. I didn't learn that, no, not at that time.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You didn't learn that?

Mr. CARR. No.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You didn't learn that that report was dated November 25?

Mr. CARR. No, I don't think I learned that.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. And you didn't learn that the Secretary accepted that report?

Mr. CARR. No, sir; I don't think I learned that.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. All right. You testified there was a monologue, and I guess a rather animated one, for a period through lunch, and perhaps part of the ride.

Mr. CARR. Well, I—no, I think I testified that there were undoubtedly some interruptions.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. All on the same subject?

Mr. CARR. Yes, on the same subject.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. All on the same subject?

Mr. CARR. As best I recall; yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. And that the only question about Schine was an attempted interruption by Mr. Adams?

Mr. CARR. That is my recollection; yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Well, do you want to state positively, sir, that that is what happened?

Mr. CARR. That the only talk about Schine was this attempt by Mr. Adams to bring it into the conversation?

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Yes.

Mr. CARR. I think that I could say that that is the only mention of Schine that was made that day. When you say positively, I am not sure that I would want to say that. Somebody might have mentioned him, might have said something. But I am pretty sure that is the only time.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You are pretty sure of it?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You have no reservations about that?

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. What time was it when you let the Senator out at the Waldorf Astoria?

Mr. CARR. I don't know. It was following the lunch. It takes probably 20 minutes to drive uptown, maybe 25. I don't know—

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Well, about what time was it?

Mr. CARR. I don't know. The middle of the afternoon sometime.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. And you got out, and I guess the Senator got out, and Mr. Cohn got out?

Mr. CARR. No, as I recall, the Senator got out, I continued uptown with Mr. Cohn.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Where did you go?

Mr. CARR. He dropped me farther uptown.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Where did you go?

Mr. CARR. Mr. Cohn was making a speech, as I recall—is that right?—another speech that afternoon at some high school up in the Bronx. I drove up with him, I think. I think following the speech I went somewhere and I met him later. I know I met him again that night.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You went with Mr. Cohn to this high school up in the Bronx, is that right?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. That speech was delivered, and then you went someplace with him for supper?

Mr. CARR. No. I think I left him. If I recall, I think I went Christmas shopping.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Christmas shopping?

Mr. CARR. I think so.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Did you know that the Senator was going on a trip that afternoon?

Mr. CARR. Yes, I did.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. And he took a plane out and went for several days?

Mr. CARR. Yes.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Do you know—

Mr. CARR. I am not sure how long, but he went to Chicago, I think.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Do you know what time he was supposed to leave?

Mr. CARR. No; I really don't.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Do you know what time he checked out of the hotel?

Mr. CARR. No, I don't.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You testified yesterday that the Senator called you on the telephone to talk with you about Schine, do you recall that?

Mr. CARR. I think I testified yesterday that I called the Senator on the phone and I now recall that I called the Senator from up in the Bronx on the telephone about other matters, one matter being for my information how long he was going to be out of town, and things like that.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. What made you call him there? Why didn't you ask him while you were riding uptown, Mr. Carr?

Mr. CARR. I just can't answer that. I don't know.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You just don't know?

Mr. CARR. I don't know.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. It just suddenly struck you, Mr. Carr, that you had better find out about Mr. Schine, is that right?

Mr. CARR. I don't know. I just can't tell you.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. You just can't tell me.

Senator MUNDT. Do you mean Mr. Schine or Senator McCarthy?

Mr. ST. CLAIR. I mean Mr. Schine..

Mr. CARR. You had better ask that again. I thought you meant what made me call Senator McCarthy at that time.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. That is right, and suggested—

Mr. CARR. Would you repeat the question?

Mr. ST. CLAIR. Would you read the question to him?

(Whereupon, the question was read by the reporter as above recorded.)

Mr. CARR. No, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. What was it that made you call the Senator shortly after you left him off at the hotel? You had been with him all noon-time, hadn't you?

Mr. CARR. Right at this point, I really can't say.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. I am sorry.

Mr. CARR. The best I could say was that I probably forgot about something that I should have talked to him about.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. And that was Private Schine?

Mr. CARR. No, it wasn't, sir.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. That is what you talked with him about on the telephone when you called him from the Bronx?

Mr. CARR. That is one of the things which we talked about and, as I testified yesterday, I believe it was the Senator who mentioned Schine's name to me.

Mr. ST. CLAIR. What were the other subjects you talked about?

Senator MUNDT. You may answer the question. The time has expired.

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir. One subject that I recall was the length of time that Senator McCarthy would be out of town and I believe there was something about the reports. That is about all. I am sure there was something else.

Senator MUNDT. We will stand in recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, the committee recessed at 12:33 p. m., to reconvene at 2 p. m., the same day.)

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